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Abstract
By virtue of vehicular connectivity and automation, the vehicle becomes increasingly intelligent and self-driving capable. However, no matter what automation level the vehicle can
achieve, humans will still be in the loop despite their roles. First, considering the manual driving
car as a disturbance to the connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs), a novel string stability is
proposed for mixed traffic platoons consisting of both autonomous and manual driving cars to
guarantee acceptable motion fluctuation and platoon safety. Furthermore, humans are naturally
considered as the rider in the passenger vehicle. A human-centered cooperative adaptive cruise
control (CACC) is designed to improve physical and psychological comfort with the guarantee of
string stability. Compared with the benchmark CACC, the human-centered CACC essentially
enhances driving comfort.
In emergencies and adversarial scenarios, the human operator can act as a supervisor of
the autonomous driving systems. Correspondingly, a human-robot interaction framework to reduce the vulnerability of a CAV platoon under cyber attacks is proposed. To mitigate the effects of
cyber-attacks, an observer-based resilient controller is first designed. The corresponding platoon
safety conditions are also derived. Next, to facilitate human supervision, a decision-making aid
system is developed, which consists of an anomaly reporting system (ARS), a trust-based information management system (TIMS), and a graphical user interface (GUI). Representative humansin-the-loop experiment demonstrates that the proposed framework can effectively guide human
operators when working with CAV platoons under cyber attacks.
ii

Moreover, as an expert, an experienced driver can even teach autonomous systems to drive
safely. To fulfill this imitation learning task, safety awareness is injected into the adversarial inverse
reinforcement learning (AIRL) algorithm, forming a novel safe inverse reinforcement learning
(SAIRL) algorithm. First, the control barrier function (CBF) analysis is used to guide the training
process of a safety critic. Second, the safety critic is integrated with the AIRL discriminator to
impose the safety consideration. To further enforce the importance of safety, a safety regulator
is also introduced to discourage the recovered reward function from assigning high rewards to
the risky state-action pairs. In the simulated highway-driving scenario, the proposed S-AIRL
outperformed the original AIRL algorithm with a much lower collision rate.
Finally, to accommodate the maximum adversaries of the neighbor manual driving car,
its interaction with the subject autonomous vehicle is modeled as a two-player zero-sum Markov
game (TZMG). The TZMG Q learning algorithm is then adopted to train a safe policy corresponding to the Nash Equilibrium. In the human subject test, compared to the conventional
policy learning algorithm, the TZMG-based algorithm can produce a much safer driving policy
with a lower collision rate to the adversaries of real manual driving cars.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
It has been proved that the development of autonomous driving algorithms can greatly
benefit traffic efficiency and driving safety [82]. Lots of studies also focus on how to improve
the automation capability of the vehicles [73, 75]. However, no matter what automation level
the vehicle has reached, the human will still be in-the-loop as either driver or passenger. As a result, autonomous driving algorithms should be aware of the existence of humans. For example,
when analyzing the autonomous driving controller’s performance in mixed traffic, disturbances
and uncertainties introduced by manual-driving vehicles can not be ignored. While maintaining
the desired interdistance with respect to the preceding vehicle, the controller should also improve
the driver’s comfort. Other than compromising the automation performance to accommodate
the existence of humans, the autonomous controller can benefit from human intelligence. For
example, the human operator is able to supervise the operations of autonomous vehicles in emergencies. Furthermore, human operators can even teach the vehicle to drive safely and efficiently
by giving demonstrations. To avoid ambiguity, it is worth mentioning that the “safety” and “safe”
in this dissertation refer to no inter-vehicle collision.
In Chapter 2 and our published paper [58], we analyze how manual-driving vehicles can
affect the string stability of the platoon, i.e., mixed traffic platoon string stability. Currently, adap1

tive cruise control (ACC) systems can be equipped in almost every newly-launched vehicle and
are proved to outperform common human drivers [95,104]. More recently, thanks to the vehicleto-vehicle (V2V) communication technology, the cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC)
system is proposed [62]. Compared to ACC, CACC is expected to result in a much shorter
headway and hence a better performance in throughput, fuel consumption, and emission [22].
However, the adoption of exclusively automated cruise control vehicles in real traffic is still unrealistic in the near future. As a result, the research on mixed traffic platoon, in which autonomous
vehicles and manual-driving vehicles share the same traffic lane, is of great importance.
In the literature, there are many different definitions for the stability of a vehicle platoon.
Early works regard the platoon as an interconnected system and analyze its Lyapunov stability.
In [88], it is proposed that Lyapunov stability can be satisfied when the motion states of the platoon are always bounded under some initial condition perturbations. In [34], the least stable
eigenvalue of the platoon system matrix is used as a measure of stability margin. However, the
mere boundedness of motion states under initial condition perturbations cannot guarantee a
well-behaved platoon because the large state fluctuation brought by the change of leading vehicle’s velocity profile can still cause problems from the traffic and safety aspects, such as congestion [84] and collision [36]. Therefore, the platoon behavior under a varying velocity profile of
the leading vehicle needs to be investigated. The definition of string stability has been widely
adopted, which requires that the motion fluctuation caused by external inputs from the leading
vehicle should not propagate upstream [64]. Nevertheless, there is so far no unified conclusion
about how to measure and quantify the platoon fluctuation. In [85], the spacing error between
the actual and desired inter-vehicle distance is chosen as the measurement of platoon fluctuation.
String stability is satisfied if the 2-norm of the spacing error does not propagate upstream. Based
on the input-output theory for linear systems [91], this is equivalent to having 𝐻∞ norm of the
transfer function of the spacing error of two adjacent vehicles to be less than or equal to one.
In [65], a relaxed criterion for the mixed traffic platoon scenario is proposed, which only
2

requires the transfer function of the spacing error from the first following vehicle to the last following vehicle to be no larger than 1. In [73], it is found that motion states (i.e., velocity and
acceleration), compared to the spacing error, should be a better choice for heterogeneous platoons since their corresponding transfer functions do not depend on other vehicles’ dynamics.
More generally, in [11], the platoon fluctuation is quantified by the 𝑝-norm of the fluctuation
measurements, where 𝑝 can be any integer from 1 to ∞. From the input-output theory of linear
systems, the 1-norm of the inverse Laplace transform of the above error transfer functions should
always be less than or equal to 1 to guarantee string stability when the fluctuation is quantified
by the ∞-norm. A similar criterion is proposed in [76], which requires the 𝑝 norm of the output
signal should be bounded by the class K functions of the 𝑝 norm of the input of the leading vehicle and the initial states deviation from the equilibrium. Compared to the conventional feedback
and feedforward controller design to guarantee 𝐻∞ string stability, larger time headway and controller gain are adopted therein. Although the above 𝐻∞ and L 𝑝 string stability definitions can
be applied for heterogeneous CACC platoons, the resulting transfer function of consecutive vehicles fails to serve as a criterion for stability analysis in mixed traffic due to the presence of manual
vehicles. Due to human limits such as long reaction time and low sensitivity to velocity changes,
a manual-driving vehicle can easily break the above conventional string stability conditions [11].
Therefore, a more general string stability definition for mixed traffic platoons is necessary. As a
result, a novel definition for mixed traffic string stability is proposed in Chapter 2.2, which can
guarantee both an acceptable platoon behavior and the platoon safety. To the best of the author’s
knowledge, very few works have considered a formal quantitative definition of string stability in
mixed traffic platoons [65]. In Chapter 2.3, the mixed traffic string stability with the benchmark
linear controller is verified analytically and demonstrated numerically.
The CACC system belongs to Level 1 Automation with a human-in-the-loop according to the definition given by the national highway traffic safety administration (NHTSA) [2].
Therefore, the interaction between a human driver and the CACC system is inevitable and criti3

cal to the joint operation system. In general, we can categorize human factors in CACC controller
design into two aspects: physical and psychological comfort. Physical comfort is directly related
to the receptors of the human, such as motion sickness. Psychological comfort is related to human’s cognition and emotion [100]. Although there is a lot of research in cruise control design
taking into account driver’s physical comfort [60, 61, 97], the automated controller considering
psychological comfort has not been well addressed. In [67], the large spacing error deviation is
regarded as unnatural to the driver, which may cause psychological discomfort. The cruise control is designed to minimize the spacing error transfer function magnitude from the preceding
vehicle’s velocity to that of the current vehicle. In [43], it is proposed that driving at an unacceptably close distance to the preceding vehicle is impolite. As a result, a minimum limit for the
desired headway should be adopted even though safety can be guaranteed. In Chapter 3 and the
second part of our published paper [58], a human-centered controller taking into account both
physical and psychological comfort is developed. Specifically, the human’s psychological comfort is considered being improved if the human driver is less disrupted by the rapid interaction
with the preceding vehicle. The concept of unconscious regime in the action-point (AP) vehiclefollowing model [102] is adopted to minimize the human driver’s perception of motion changes
of the preceding vehicle. In addition, a minimum distance headway is set to obey the social rules.
A model predictive control (MPC)-like blending ratio controller is developed to realize reasonable trade-offs among driver physical comfort, psychological comfort, traffic efficiency, and fuel
economy while guaranteeing mixed traffic string stability.
Although the V2V and vehicle-to-cloud (V2C) communication technologies are essential
to facilitate information sharing and hence overall performance optimization in multi-autonomous
and connected vehicle (CAV) teams [53]. However, in autonomous driving, cyber attack is one
of the biggest threats in future intelligent transportation systems (ITS), especially for multi-CAV
coordination. As a result, an effective mechanism, i.e., a human-robot interaction (HRI) framework, to mitigate adversarial effects of cyber attacks on ITS is of great significance and is proposed
4

in Chapter 4 and our published paper [57]. This HRI framework synergies sub-systems in different levels, i.e., a low-level vehicle control system, an anomaly detection system, a high-level
information management system, and the terminal GUI are integrated.
The motion state information is commonly broadcasted to facilitate the control of lowlevel vehicle dynamics in ITS. However, the compromised or maliciously tempered signals can
heavily deteriorate the performance of vehicles and even threaten their safety. Information consensus/correction under adversaries is a popular topic in multi-agent systems [59] and relay networks [70]. The robustness of the network graph can be improved by the strong connectivity
between the nodes [94] and resilient control [52]. Nonetheless, the demand for strong connectivity is less practical in ITS. For example, the most common connectivity topology of the CACC is
predecessor-follower communication, i.e., one node only has connection with its preceding node.
There are some works seeking to deal with the compromised driving performance caused by cyber attacks in ITS. Biron et al. [10] studied the CACC for vehicle platoon under denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks. The data transmission delay was estimated by a sliding mode observer, and hence
the existence of cyber attacks can be detected. Sargolzaei et al. [81] utilized the estimated error
dynamics, i.e., the motion state difference between the online calibrated vehicle model and the
nominal vehicle model, to detect cyber attacks. The desired interdistance to its preceding vehicle was then regulated by a fuzzy logic controller considering the magnitude of errors and the
current vehicle speed. In our paper [55], the dynamics of the CAV platoon under cyber attacks
were formulated as an unknown input injection problem. An unknown input observer (UIO)based resilient controller was designed to compensate for the attack effects. However, the safety
of platoon has yet to be fully explored in the above literature. In Chapter 4, the state boundedness under the UIO-based resilient controller was further proved. Moreover, different from the
existing works that either analyze the platoon safety numerically from simulation results [18] or
imply the safety of platoon via stability property of the dynamic system [21], rigorous proof for
the safety conditions of the platoon under V2V cyber attacks is derived in Chapter 4.2.
5

In addition to the motion state information mentioned above, more abstract information (e.g., vehicle status information) shared within the ITS system is essential for the high-level
vehicle teaming [82]. Due to the existence of cyber attacks, these high-level management systems
in ITS can also be corrupted by false information. In the literature, it is also possible to recover
the abstract information if redundancies exist. A V2C-based computation mechanism that can
collect, process, and send out information within ITS is most common in the transportation
literature [82]. In general, trustworthiness of the information sources can be utilized as an effective tool to process redundancies and rule out the unreliable information. Hu et. al [41] adopted
Dirichlet distribution to form the evaluation of the leading vehicle performance in the platoon
via aggregating the reports from the following vehicles. An iterative filtering algorithm was proposed to punish the trustworthiness of the vehicles whose reports deviated from the weighted averages of overall reports. Li et. al [63] proposed a road anomaly detection algorithm based on the
clusters of connected vehicles. The trustworthiness of the cluster was determined by the information freshness of its aggregated reports. Only road anomalies identified by the clusters with high
trustworthiness will be reported to the road users. However, the effectiveness of the above information management systems to V2C attacks has yet to be fully analyzed and verified. Therefore,
in Chapter 4.4, a trust-based information management system (TIMS) is developed to identify
the abnormal CAVs (those under V2V attacks) via a Bayesian-based information pre-processor
and an enhanced median filter with trustworthiness regulation. The effectiveness of the TIMS
under mild V2C cyber attacks is then rigorously proved. Furthermore, it is well-acknowledged
that the autonomous information management system can fail under unexpected severe cyber
attacks, e.g., when most of the nodes in ITS are hacked simultaneously [20]. To deal with such
severe cyber attack scenarios, a trustworthiness correction algorithm is also included.
Although the above mechanisms can be designed to resist false or invalid information,
most of them are model-based approaches that only work with certain cyber attack patterns. If the
scenario does not match the predefined patterns, the performance of the automated mechanism
6

might be degraded. Moreover, the attacker can direct the automated system to instability even
faster by taking advantage of its configuration information. Current research demonstrates that
human intelligence is still irreplaceable in dealing with environmental uncertainties [19, 32]. It is
also recommended that the human operator should be involved in the autonomous agent team at
least via a supervisory role. To further improve the efficiency of the human operator and reduce
the human workload, especially when working with multiple robots concurrently, a decisionmaking aid system is usually designed [14]. Chen et al. designed an automated RoboLeader system as an intermediate layer to help the human operator to replan paths of multiple CAVs in
dangerous area reconnoiter missions [15]. Efficiency improvement was reported based on field
experiments. Rosenfeld et al. designed a decision-making aid to assist the human operator in
supervising multiple robots in the warehouse merchandise transportation scenario [79]. When
the robots needed human operator’s attention, e.g., when they got stuck, the human operator
received requests from robots via a user interface. It has been shown that the requests sent by
robots can greatly improve human supervision efficiency and reduce human workload.
The human-supervised CAV platoon is an example of human multi-robot teaming. However, very few studies investigate the safety of CAV platooning under cyber attacks from a humanrobot interaction (HRI) perspective. The cyber attacks can not only deteriorate the CAV platoon
performance, but also lead to human misjudgment via tampering with the status information of
the platoon [30]. The proposed HRI framework in Chapter 4 fills in the above gap. Comparing
to a multi-screen surveillance benchmark approach, the proposed HRI framework can increase
the platoon survivability and reduce human workload.
In addition to being a supervisor in case of adversaries, thanks to the fast development of
the data-driven methods [47], the human has the opportunity to be the teacher of autonomous
driving systems. While reinforcement learning (RL) is becoming a promising method to design the optimal policies/controllers for autonomous driving [46] and robotics [47], the requirement of a hand-tuned reward function brings about a new challenge. Correspondingly, as an7

other mainstream policy learning category, imitation learning (IL) can circumvent the need for
a specified reward function via only requesting human demonstrations. There are mainly two
branches of IL, i.e., behavioral cloning and inverse reinforcement learning (IRL). Behavioral
cloning adopts a simple supervised learning structure and can perform well in simple tasks [78].
However, this method suffers from a covariate shifting problem, which greatly reduces its performance in the presence of environmental complexities and uncertainties [80].
Instead of directly learning an input-output map that matches the human demonstrations, the IRL tries to learn an optimal policy with an unknown cost function [1]. The formulation of maximum entropy IRL (MaxEnt IRL) is widely adopted in recent IRL studies [110],
where the probability of the specific expert demonstration is exponentially proportional to its
rewards. As a result, sub-optimal human demonstrations can be accommodated but with lower
probabilities. The MaxEnt IRL problem is first solved by dynamic programming via formulating
the cost function as a linear combination of different features [110]. The task of manually specifying a cost function has then been simplified to handpicking the features. To further improve
the generality of the IRL algorithm, Finn et al. [26] used a neural network to represent the cost
function. Moreover, an importance sampling-based method was adopted to solve the optimal
policy and optimal cost function iteratively. It has been shown that this importance samplingbased IRL is equivalent to training a generative adversarial network (GAN) with a specific form
of discriminator [25]. Furthermore, instead of taking account of the whole trajectory, the adversarial inverse reinforcement learning (AIRL) algorithm takes the individual state-action pair in
its construction of the discriminator to reduce training variance [29]. AIRL has been successfully
applied in many areas, such as modeling the decision-making of human drivers [96] and playing
video games [93]. It is also worth mentioning that, at the expense of no explicit cost function
returned, the generative adversarial imitation learning (GAIL) can handle a simpler process by
directly modeling the discriminator as a neural network [39].
Although the policy learning algorithms, i.e., RL and IL, provide an intriguingly effi8

cient and flexible approach to tackling some real-world problems, the safety concerns impede its
wide applications. Several papers in the literature studied how to improve the safety of the policy
learning algorithms. To begin with, model-based techniques are typically adopted in safe policy
learning algorithms with the inherent advantages in reachability and safety analysis. Gillula et
al. [31] applied the Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) reachability analysis to improve the safety of the
policy learning process. The HJI calculated a proactive unsafe set of the states where disturbances
can drive the system to hazardous situations within limited time units no matter what control input is applied [8]. If the states of systems are near the boundary of the proactive unsafe set, the
safe control law (solved in HJI analysis) will be applied to drive the state away from it. Similar
to the HJI analysis, the control barrier function (CBF) analysis can also be adopted in policy
learning algorithms to improve safety but with less computation efforts [17]. The CBF analysis
calculates the admissible control input set for a given state, such that the state will continue staying in the safe region if the control inputs are chosen from the admissible control input set [3].
Correspondingly, Cheng et al. [16] formulated a quadratic programming (QP) problem, where
a minimum correction value is added to the original control input from the learned policy to ensure the corrected control input is within the admissible control input set. As can be expected,
the performance of the above model-based methods heavily depends on the model accuracy. To
improve the model accuracy, data-driven methods are recently integrated with the model-based
approaches, such as adopting the Gaussian process to approximate disturbances [27] [16] and using the neural network to approximate model uncertainties [89]. On the other hand, without the
need for pre-knowledges of system dynamics, model-free safety improvement approaches have
been developed. Srinivasan et al. [86] trained the safety critic based on interactions with the environment, which can estimate the probability of failure in the future for the given state and action
pair under a specific policy. The action will not be taken in the learning process if its corresponding state-action pair induces a high probability of failure (judged by the safety critic). Instead of
directly overriding the unsafe actions, a recovery policy can also be learned to guide the agent back
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to the origin [24] or the nearby safe zone [90] to render a smoother transition.
Compared to the RL algorithms, where safety can be reiterated by adding a penalty on
the unsafe states, IL algorithms are even more vulnerable to unsafe situations as the importance
of safety can only be inferred from the distribution of expert demonstrations. Correspondingly,
in addition to the above safety approaches for general policy learning algorithms, a few papers
focused on IL/IRL algorithms. As the expert demonstrations are used to guide the IL process,
to reduce uncertainties, more expert demonstrations will be requested if the learned policy is
deviated from the expert policy by a margin in terms of expected value [106] or the Value-atRisk [12]. Being aware of the worst-case scenarios, on top of the GAIL, Lacotte et al. [50] imposed
a constraint that the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) of the learned policy, in terms of reward,
should be at least as good as the expert demonstrations. However, reducing the uncertainty in
a learned policy based on expert demonstrations and improving performance do not necessarily
guarantee safety.
In chapter 5 and the published paper [56], directly targeting to improve safety, we proposed a safety-aware adversarial inverse reinforcement learning algorithm (S-AIRL) via extending
the original AIRL algorithm. Compared to the extant approaches, we directly focus on safe imitation learning and provide a hybrid solution, i.e., model-based CBF analysis combined with the
model-free safety critic. This hybrid approach can improve the sampling efficiency of safety-critic
while minimizing the performance compromise caused by the inaccurate models in CBF analysis. First, the CBF is used to guide the model-free learning of the safety critic. The trained safety
critic is then integrated into the building block of the discriminator of AIRL. Finally, to further
improve the safety awareness, an additional penalty is applied on the loss function of the AIRL
training to discourage the recovered reward function from assigning high rewards on the risky
behaviors.
Interactions with the surrounding manual-driving vehicles are required in order to train
a driving policy with online RL/IRL algorithms. However, the human interaction data is very
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expensive or even infeasible to collect considering the safety issue in the trial-and-error learning
strategy [5]. In the literature, a simulated driving environment is commonly adopted as the playground of RL/IRL algorithms, where the interactive neighbor vehicles are modeled by typical
human driver models [23,54]. As a result, the training process is able to gain sufficient interaction
data with minimal cost. Although it is a typical and very efficient method to train the learningbased algorithm, the predefined models significantly rule out the uncertainties and randomness
introduced by the manual-driving vehicles. As adversaries of the manual-driving vehicles are one
of the biggest threats to the autonomous driving system on the road [42], it cannot be expected
that the driving policy “trained in a virtual playground” can still safely fulfill driving tasks in the
real world. Being aware of this research gap, a solution that can train a safe driving policy considering the the maximum adversaries from the neighbor vehicle is discussed in Chapter 6.
In order to accommodate the maximum uncertainties of the neighbor vehicles, the interaction between the subject autonomous vehicle and neighbor vehicle is modeled as a two-player
zero-sum game, where the subject autonomous vehicle tries to avoid the collision, and the neighbor vehicle targets the occurrence of a crash. In other words, the objectives of the subject autonomous driving vehicle (player-1) and a neighbor vehicle (player-2) are opposite to each other
(zero-sum). Correspondingly, the TZMG Q-learning algorithm in [109] is adopted to train a safe
driving policy with the consideration of the most destructive behavior of the neighbor vehicle.
Human subject tests are conducted to show the effectiveness of the above approach. In the testing scenario, the human participants play as aggressive/careless neighbor vehicles to interact with
the trained driving policies. Compared to the vanilla RL algorithm trained in the conventional
simulated environment, the TZMG-based method can produce a much safer driving policy to
the adversaries introduced by real human drivers.
In conclusion, the novelties of this dissertation compared to the state-of-the-arts are summarized as follows.
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1. A novel definition for mixed traffic string stability is proposed, which can guarantee both
an acceptable platoon behavior and the platoon safety. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, very few works have considered a formal quantitative definition of string stability in
mixed traffic platoons [65]. The mixed traffic string stability with the benchmark linear
controller is verified analytically and demonstrated numerically (Chapter 2).
2. A human-centered controller taking into account both physical and psychological comfort
is developed. A model predictive control (MPC)-like blending ratio controller is developed
to realize reasonable trade-offs among driver physical comfort, psychological comfort, traffic efficiency and fuel economy while guaranteeing mixed traffic string stability (Chapter 3).
3. A synergized human-in-the-loop (HITL) solution to the platooning under both V2V and
V2C cyber attacks is proposed. It includes an observer-based resilient controller (OBRC)
that can boost the resistance to V2V cyber attack and a decision-making aid system that an
resist the V2C cyber attack. The performances of both systems have been proved theoretically and verified by the HITL experiment (Chapter 4).
4. The CBF analysis is used to guide the safety critic training. Comparing to other typical
approaches summarized above [86] [90], it avoids the necessity of training an additional
policy to guide the sampling process. Because of the involvement of the system dynamics knowledge, the CBF-guided sampling process can render a more sufficient exploration
(Chapter 5).
5. Instead of using the trained safety critic as a supervisory controller to override the unsafe
actions [86], the safety critic is integrated into the building block of the original AIRL
discriminator. While the safety awareness is improved, the capability of imitating the expert behavior is not compromised. Leveraging AIRL’s property in recovering the reward
function, a safety-critic regulator based on the evaluations of recovered reward function
12

is added to the loss function of the discriminator training process to improve the safety
further (Chapter 5).
6. The safe driving policy training task is formulated as a TMZG problem. Compared to
the vanilla RL approach, the simultaneously-trained second player in TZMG can force
the safe driving policy to accommodate the maximum adversaries of the neighbor vehicle.
The human-in-the-loop experiment is implemented to demonstrate the superiority of the
TZMG formulation in the training of safe driving policy. (Chapter 6)
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Chapter 2
String Stability of the Mixed Traffic
2.1

Problem Definition

2.1.1

Mixed Traffic Scenario

Definition 1. Mixed Traffic Platoon. The mixed traﬃc platoon is a string of automated (ACC
and/or CACC) and manual driving cars driving along a same lane with short inter-distances. The
leading car’s time-varying velocity proﬁle is taken as the external input of the mixed traﬃc platoon, which is also the major source of velocity perturbation of the platoon. Each following car only
executes the car-following task based on its preceding cars’ motion states or inter-distance. The leading car can be either a manual driving or an automated car operated under the guidance of traﬃc
infrastructures. The sequence of following cars can be arbitrary.
Based on the parameters shown in Fig. 2.1, several types of transfer functions will be
introduced as follows. Since the car length is fixed and can be subtracted from distance calculation, a car is considered as a point mass without length (𝑙𝑖 = 0) for simplicity. Firstly, denote
𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) ∈ {𝑎𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡)} as the motion states where 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) and 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) are the acceleration and velocity
of the 𝑖 th car, respectively. Let the index of the leading car be 1. Define the motion states transfer
14

function from the 𝑗 th car to the 𝑖 th car as follows:
𝐺 𝑖,Λ𝑗 (𝑠) ≜

Λ𝑖 (𝑠)
, 𝑖 ≥ 𝑗 ≥ 1.
Λ 𝑗 (𝑠)

(2.1)

where Λ𝑖 (𝑠) (Λ 𝑗 (𝑠)) is the Laplace transform of 𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) (𝜆 𝑗 (𝑡)). In addition, we use Φ(𝑖) ∈
{𝐻, 𝐴, 𝐶} to denote the type of the 𝑖 th car, where 𝐻, 𝐴 and 𝐶 represent the sets of the manual driving, ACC, and CACC cars, respectively.

i th car

( i − 1) th car

xi

di

li − 1

xi− 1

Figure 2.1: Illustration of the mixed traffic platoon.
If the predecessor-following (PF) information flow topology [62] is adopted, i.e. only the
information of the immediate preceding car is taken into account, we define 𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) as the motion
states transfer function from any type of preceding car to the immediate following car with type
Φ(𝑖). That is,
Λ
𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) ≜ 𝐺 𝑖,𝑖−1
(𝑠), 𝑖 > 1.

(2.2)

Denote the inter-distance between the 𝑖 th and 𝑖 − 1th car as 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡), i.e. 𝑑𝑖 = 𝑥𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑥𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑖 > 1.
Define the inter-distance transfer function from the 𝑗 th car to the 𝑖 th car as

𝐺 𝑖,𝐷𝑗 (𝑠) ≜

𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠)
,
𝐷 𝑗 (𝑠)

𝑖 ≥ 𝑗 > 1,

where 𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠)(𝐷 𝑗 (𝑠)) is Laplace transform of 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡)(𝑑 𝑗 (𝑡)). Specially, for two adjacent cars, we
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have:

𝑋𝑖 (𝑠) − 𝑋𝑖−1 (𝑠)
𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠)
=
𝐷 𝑖−1 (𝑠) 𝑋𝑖−1 (𝑠) − 𝑋𝑖−2 (𝑠)
1
1
𝑠 𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠) − 𝑠 𝑉𝑖 (𝑠)
= 1
1
𝑠 𝑉𝑖−2 (𝑠) − 𝑠 𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠)

𝐷
𝐺 𝑖,𝑖−1
(𝑠) =

=

2.1.2

Λ (𝑠)
1 − 𝐺 𝑖,𝑖−1
Λ
1 − 𝐺 𝑖−1,𝑖−2
(𝑠)

Λ
𝐺 𝑖−1,𝑖−2
(𝑠),

(2.3)
𝑖 > 2.

Automated Platoon String Stability
Various criteria of string stability for either homogeneous or heterogeneous automated

platoons have been proposed in the literature. These criteria require the following car’s fluctuation should not be larger than that of the preceding car. However, the quantification and measurement of the fluctuation are different. For example, [65] and [73] use the 2 norm to quantify
the fluctuation, while [76] and [11] consider the infinity norm. For the measurements of string
stability, velocity and spacing error are the most common choices. In addition, both the 2 norm
and infinity norm criteria have their sufficient conditions represented by transfer function.
For the 2 norm criterion, as ∥L −1 (𝐺 (𝑠)𝑈 (𝑠))∥ 2 ≤ ∥𝐺 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥L −1 (𝑈 (𝑠))∥ 2 based on
input-output theorem [91] with input 𝑈 (𝑠) and output 𝐺 (𝑠)𝑈 (𝑠), assuming that the platoon
reaches the equilibrium 𝜆 𝑒 when 𝜆𝑖 (0) = 𝜆 1 (0) = 𝜆 𝑒 , ∀𝑖 > 1, the general expression for string
stability is:
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ 2
Λ
≤ ∥𝐺 𝑖,𝑖−1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 > 1, 𝑡 > 0.
∥𝜆𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖−1 (0)∥ 2

(2.4)

For the infinity norm criterion, because ∥L −1 (𝐺 (𝑠)𝑈 (𝑠))∥ ∞ ≤ ∥L −1 (𝐺 (𝑠))∥ 1 ∥L −1 (𝑈 (𝑠))∥ ∞
[91], the general expression for string stability is
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ ∞
Λ
≤ ∥𝑔𝑖,𝑖−1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ 1, ∀𝑖 > 1, 𝑡 > 0,
∥𝜆𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞

(2.5)

Λ (𝑡) = L −1 (𝐺 Λ (𝑠)) and 𝜆 is the measurement of fluctuation in terms of motion
where 𝑔𝑖,𝑖−1
𝑖
𝑖,𝑖−1

states. The expressions are similar when the fluctuation is measured by the spacing error.
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Remark 1. The criteria in inequalities (2.4) and (2.5) for automated platoons concentrate on the
relation between the following car and its immediate preceding car. However, numerous research,
such as [11], has shown that the human drivers behave an accordion effect that will propagate the
motion states oscillation. Hence, (2.4) and (2.5) cannot be satisﬁed mathematically. As a result, the
string stability criteria for automated platoons are not applicable to the mixed traﬃc platoons if
•

manual driving cars are involved.

To address this issue, in the next section, a novel definition for mixed traffic string stability
will be proposed.

2.2

String Stability for Mixed Traffic Platoon
Traffic congestion is a severe problem in transportation and the propagation of velocity

fluctuation upstream is a leading factor [71]. It is hence reasonable to propose a definition of
string stability corresponding to the suppression of this effect. As a result, the mixed traffic string
stability should guarantee an acceptable fluctuation upstream caused by the time-variant velocity
profile of the leading car. In addition, the rear-end collision should be avoided to guarantee safety.
Based on the above requirements, we have the following definition.
Definition 2. Mixed Traffic String Stability. For the mixed traﬃc platoon deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1, assuming that the platoon reaches the equilibrium when 𝜆𝑖 (0) = 𝜆 1 (0) = 𝜆 𝑒 , ∀𝑖 > 1, the
platoon is string stable if:
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ 2 ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2 , 𝑖 > 1.

(2.6)

∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆1 (𝑡) − 𝜆1 (0)∥ ∞ , 𝑖 > 1.

(2.7)

𝑥𝑖 (𝑡) < 𝑥𝑖−1 (𝑡),
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∀𝑡 > 0, 𝑖 > 1.

(2.8)

where ℎ𝑎 ∈ 𝐻 is a standard type of manual driving car, which is used as a reference for the platoon’s
behavior and 𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡) = L −1 (𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)) .
Remark 2. Different car-following models can be adopted as standard manual driving car. For
example, we can use the Pipe model in which the acceleration of the following car depends on the
velocity difference with the preceding car, human’s reaction delay, sensitivity factor and the mass of
the car [13]. According to the average value calibrated by [13], it follows that ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ ∞ = 1.03 > 1
and ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 = 1.328 > 1.

•

Remark 3. The inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) give the relation between the motion states ﬂuctuation
of every following car (𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)) and that of the leading car (𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)). From the inputoutput theorem [91], if the second car is a manual driving car, we also have ∥𝜆 2 (𝑡) − 𝜆 2 (0)∥ 2 ≤
∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2 and ∥𝜆 2 (𝑡) − 𝜆 2 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ ∞ . The above
two inequalities share the same right hand side with (2.6) and (2.7). It is required that the motion
ﬂuctuation in every following car is bounded by the ﬂuctuation when the standard manual driving
car directly follows the leading car. When the 2 norm is adopted in (2.6), the ﬂuctuation in the
platoon is quantiﬁed from the energy aspect. When the ∞ norm is adopted in (2.7), the ﬂuctuation
•

is quantiﬁed by the maximum overshoot.

Remark 4. The mere boundedness of motion states is not enough to guarantee safety of the whole
platoon. Therefore, the inequality (2.8) is necessary to restrict the position of any following car not to
•

exceed that of its preceding car.

Remark 5. This paper only focuses on the scenario that is initiated from the equilibrium which can
be regarded as the platoon maintaining problem that has attracted many research interests [84].
The initiation from equilibrium is reasonable since the main task of a platoon in highway is cruising
•

under constant velocity [37].
The following theorem is proposed to check the mixed traffic string stability.
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Theorem 1. Consider the mixed traﬃc platoon deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1. Let the leading car’s velocity
proﬁle be 𝑣 1 . Assume that the automated cars adopt the constant time headway (CTH) policy [11]
and all the cars adopt the predecessor-following (PF) information topology [62]. The system is mixed
traﬃc string stable according to Deﬁnition 2 if:

Λ
∥𝐺 𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ , ∀ 𝑖 > 1,

(2.9)

Λ
∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 , ∀ 𝑖 > 1,

∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ min

(2.10)
ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0)

′

∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1

,

ℎΦ(2) 𝑣 1 (0)
′

∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡)∥ 1

!
, ∀𝑖 > 2,

(2.11)

′

where ℎΦ(𝑖) is the constant time headway for the cars with type Φ(𝑖), 𝐺 Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) ≜ (1 − 𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)) 𝑠1
′

′

and 𝑔Φ(𝑖) ≜ L −1 (𝐺 Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)).
Proof From [91], based on (2.1) and (2.9), we have:
Λ
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ 2 ≤∥𝐺 𝑖,1

≤∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2 .
As a result, the inequality (2.6) is satisfied. Similarly, based on the input-output characteristics
and (2.10), we have:
Λ
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ ∞

≤∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ ∞ .
As a result, the inequality (2.7) is satisfied. The proof of condition (2.8) is as follows. From (2.2)
and (2.3), we have:
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𝐷
𝐺 𝑖,2
(𝑠) =

=

Λ (𝑠)
1 − 𝐺 𝑖,𝑖−1

Λ
𝐺 𝑖−1,1
(𝑠),
Λ
1 − 𝐺 2,1 (𝑠)
1 − 𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)
Λ
𝐺 𝑖−1,1
(𝑠),
∗
1 − 𝐺 Φ(2) (𝑠)

(2.12)
𝑖 > 2.


1
𝑠

In addition, we can also get 𝐷 2 (𝑠) = (𝑉1 (𝑠) − 𝑉2 (𝑠)) = 𝑉1 (𝑠) 1 −


𝐷 2 (𝑠)
∗
hence 𝑉1 (𝑠) = 1 − 𝐺 Φ(2) (𝑠) 𝑠1 . Therefore, we can obtain the follows:

𝐺 ∗Φ(2) (𝑠)



1
𝑠

and

𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠) 𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠) 𝐷 2 (𝑠)
=
𝑉1 (𝑠)
𝐷 2 (𝑠) 𝑉1 (𝑠)
∗

 1
1 − 𝐺 Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)
∗
Λ
1 − 𝐺 Φ(2) (𝑠) 𝐺 𝑖−1,1
(𝑠)
=
∗
1 − 𝐺 Φ(2) (𝑠)
𝑠

 1
′
∗
Λ
Λ
= 1 − 𝐺 Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) 𝐺 𝑖−1,1
(𝑠) = 𝐺 Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)𝐺 𝑖−1,1
(𝑠), 𝑖 > 2.
𝑠

𝐺 𝐷 𝑖 ,𝑉1 (𝑠)

=

Based on the Young’s Inequality [48] and (2.10), we have the following about the 1-norm
of inverse Laplace transform:
′

Λ
∥𝑔 𝐷 𝑖 ,𝑉1 (𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔𝑖−1,1
(𝑡)∥ 1
′

≤ ∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ,

𝑖 > 2.

Since 𝐷 𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐺 𝐷 𝑖 ,𝑉1 (𝑠)𝑉1 (𝑠), 𝑖 > 2, based on the linear input-output system property [91], we
have,
∥𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑑𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔 𝐷 𝑖 ,𝑉1 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞
′

≤ ∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ , 𝑖 > 2.
Substituting (2.11) into (2.13), we have ∥𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑑𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0), 𝑖 > 2. Since we assume
that the platoon reaches its equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 in Definition 2, at the beginning, every car
should be at the same velocity and the inter-distance should equal to its desired headway, i.e.
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𝑣 𝑖 (0) = 𝑣 1 (0) = 𝑣 𝑒 , 𝑑𝑖 (0) = 𝑣 𝑖 (0)ℎΦ(𝑖) , ∀𝑖 ≥ 2. As a result, (2.13) becomes

∥𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑑𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0) = 𝑑𝑖 (0), ∀𝑖 > 2.

(2.13)
′

As can be seen from (2.13), 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) > 0, ∀𝑖 > 2. Similarly, for 𝑖 = 2, 𝐷 2 (𝑠) = 𝐺 Φ(2) (𝑠)𝑉1 (𝑠) and,
′

∥𝑑2 (𝑡) − 𝑑2 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞

(2.14)

Substituting the inequality (2.11) into (2.14), it follows that ∥𝑑2 (𝑡) − 𝑑2 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ℎΦ(2) 𝑣 1 (0) =
𝑑2 (0). Therefore, we have 𝑑2 (𝑡) > 0. Finally, combined with (2.13), the safety condition (2.8) is
guaranteed (𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) > 0, ∀𝑖 ≥ 2).

□

Remark 6. From Theorem 1, we can conclude that the suitable design of the automated systems,
the arrangement of the mixed traﬃc sequence, i.e. the inequalities (2.9), (2.10) and the restriction on
the leading car’s velocity overshoot (2.11) will together guarantee the mixed traﬃc string stability. •
The inequalities (2.9) and (2.10) require to get the exact value or upper bound of the
norms for every car in the platoon, which might become a burden if the platoon is too long. We
next discuss how to simplify this process.
Proposition 1. For Theorem 1, assume ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 ∥ 𝐻∞ ≥ 1 and ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ≥ 1, if the automated cars
are designed such that:
∥𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ 1,

∀Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶.

(2.15)

∗
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ 1,
∥𝑔Φ(𝑖)

∀Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶.

(2.16)
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the inequalities (2.9), (2.10) and (2.11) can be changed into the following inequalities ∀ 𝑖 > 1:
Λ
∥𝐺 𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ , ∀Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐻,

(2.17)

Λ
∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 , ∀Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐻,

∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ min

ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0)

(2.18)
!

′

∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1

(2.19)

Proof Let the indexes of manual-driving cars in the platoon be 𝑘 1 , 𝑘 2 , 𝑘 3 , . . . , 𝑘 𝑛 where
𝑘 1 < 𝑘 2 < . . . < 𝑘 𝑛 . With the sub-multiplicative property of transfer function, we can get the
following inequalities to show the satisfaction of (2.9).
For the automated cars in front the first manual driving car 𝑘 1 , under the assumption
(2.15), we have:

Λ
∥𝐺 𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞

≤

𝑖
Ö

∥𝐺 ∗Φ( 𝑗) (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ 1 ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ , ∀𝑖 < 𝑘 1

(2.20)

𝑗=2

For a manual driving car, directly from (2.17), we have:
Λ
∥𝐺 𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ , ∀𝑖 ∈ {𝑘 1 , 𝑘 2 , ..., 𝑘 𝑛 }

(2.21)

For the automated cars between manual driving cars or after the last manual driving car,
from (2.15) and (2.17), we have

Λ
∥𝐺 𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞

≤

𝑖
Ö

∥𝐺 ∗Φ( 𝑗) (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝐺 Λ𝑘 𝑚 ,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞

𝑗=𝑘 𝑚 +1

≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ,

∀𝑘 𝑚 < 𝑖 < 𝑘 𝑚+1 , 1 ≤ 𝑚 < 𝑛, or 𝑘 𝑚 < 𝑖, 𝑚 = 𝑛

Hence, based on (2.20)-(2.22), the inequality (2.9) is satisfied. For (2.10), with Young’s Inequality,
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we have the following proof:

Λ
∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 1 ≤
Λ
∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 1

≤

Λ
∥𝑔𝑖,1
(𝑠)∥ 1 ≤

𝑖
Ö

∗
∗
∥𝑔Φ(
𝑗) (𝑠)∥ 1 ≤ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 1 , ∀𝑖 < 𝑘 1 ,

𝑗=2
∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 1 , ∀𝑖 ∈ {𝑘 1 , 𝑘 2 , ..., 𝑘 𝑛 }
𝑖
Ö
∗
Λ
∥𝑔Φ(
𝑗) (𝑠)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 𝑘 𝑚 ,1 (𝑠)∥ 1 ≤
𝑗=𝑘 𝑚 +1

∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 1 ,

∀𝑘 𝑚 < 𝑖 < 𝑘 𝑚+1 , 1 ≤ 𝑚 < 𝑛, or 𝑖 > 𝑘 𝑚 , 𝑚 = 𝑛.
For the condition (2.11), since ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ≥ 1, we have

ℎΦ(2) 𝑣 1 (0)
′
∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ𝑎 (𝑡) ∥ 1

≤

ℎΦ(2) 𝑣 1 (0)
.
′
∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡) ∥ 1

As

a result, ∀𝑖 > 1

min

ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0)
′

∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1

!


= min

≤ min

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑣 1 (0)
ℎ
𝑣 (0)
, ′ Φ(2) 1
′
∥𝑔Φ( 𝑗) (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ𝑎 (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ𝑎 (𝑡) ∥ 1

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑣 1 (0)
ℎΦ(2) 𝑣 1 (0)
,
′
′
∗
∥𝑔Φ( 𝑗) (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ℎ𝑎 (𝑡) ∥ 1 ∥𝑔Φ(2) (𝑡) ∥ 1


(2.22)


, ∀𝑗 > 2

Thus, condition (2.11) can be replaced with condition (2.19).

2.3

Linear Platoon with Benchmark CACC design

2.3.1

Mixed Traffic Platoon Setup

□

For the CACC controllers, the benchmark structural diagram is shown in Fig. 2.2, which
is a typical design used in PF communication scenario. For the ACC controller, the structure is
similar except the absence of the feedforward path 𝐹𝑖 (𝑠).

23

ai−1

Fi (s)

Feedforward Path
+ ui
xi−1 +
xi
C
(s)
N
(s)
i
i
+
-

Hi (s)
Feedback Path
Figure 2.2: Linear feedback feedforward controller.
For the car dynamics, the transfer function is adopted as 𝑁𝑖 (𝑠) =

𝑋𝑖 (𝑠)
𝑈𝑖 (𝑠)

=

1
(1+𝜏𝑖 𝑠)𝑠2

where

𝜏𝑖 is the lumped lag of the 𝑖 th car’s longitudinal dynamics. A proportional derivative (PD) controller is adopted as a cascade controller

𝐶𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐾 𝑝,𝑖 + 𝐾 𝑑,𝑖 𝑠.

(2.23)

𝐾 𝑝,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖 and 𝐾 𝑑,𝑖 = 𝜔𝑖2 are chosen based on [73] where 𝜔𝑖 is the bandwidth of the system with
𝜔𝑖 <

1
𝜏𝑖 . Since the CTH spacing policy is adopted, 𝐻𝑖 (𝑠)

= ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑠+1 where ℎΦ (𝑖) is the constant

time headway of the 𝑖 th car with type Φ(𝑖). For the feedforward controller/filter, we adopt the
design from [73]:
𝐹𝑖 (𝑠) =

1
1 + 𝜏𝑖 𝑠
.
=
2
𝐻𝑖 (𝑠)𝑁𝑖 (𝑠)𝑠
1 + ℎΦ (𝑖)𝑠

(2.24)

Hence, the neighbor motion states transfer function of the CACC and ACC car can be
derived as follows, respectively,
(𝐶𝑖 (𝑠) + 𝑠2 𝐹𝑖 (𝑠))𝑁𝑖 (𝑠)
, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐶.
1 + 𝐻𝑖 (𝑠)𝐶𝑖 (𝑠)𝑁𝑖 (𝑠)
𝐶𝑖 (𝑠)𝑁𝑖 (𝑠)
𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) =
, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴.
1 + 𝐻𝑖 (𝑠)𝐶𝑖 (𝑠)𝑁𝑖 (𝑠)
𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) =

For the manual driving car, the well-known Pipe model [13] is adopted: 𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) =
24

(2.25)

𝛽 𝑖 𝑒 − 𝛿𝑖 𝑠
,
𝑠+𝛽𝑖 𝑒 − 𝛿𝑖 𝑠

Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐻, where 𝛽𝑖 is the sensitivity factor and 𝛿𝑖 is the delay of the human driver. Using the
Padé approximation 𝑒 −𝛿𝑖 𝑠 ≈

𝛿𝑖
2 𝑠
𝛿𝑖
1+ 2 𝑠

1−

𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) =

2.3.2

[7], we can get the standard driver model as follows:

𝛿𝑖

𝑠2

−𝛿𝑖 𝛽𝑖 𝑠 + 2𝛽𝑖
, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐻.
+ (2 − 𝛿𝑖 𝛽𝑖 )𝑠 + 2𝛽𝑖

(2.26)

Platoon Model
We now obtain the state space model for a linear platoon. Let the states of the 𝑖 th indi-

vidual car be x𝑖 = [𝑥𝑖 , 𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖 , 𝑢 𝑓 𝑓 ,𝑖 ] 𝑇 representing the position, velocity, acceleration and feedforward control signal, respectively.
For the leading car, we have 𝑎¤ 1 = − 𝜏11 𝑎 1 +

𝑢𝑟
𝜏1

where 𝑢𝑟 is the leading car’s reference accel-

eration profile [97] and its state space form is:

x¤ 1 = 𝐴1,1 x1 + 𝐵1 𝑢𝑟 ,

(2.27)

©0 1 0 0ª
©0ª

®
 ®

®
 ®
0 0 1 0®
0®

®
𝐴1,1 = 
, 𝐵1 =  ®® .
®
0 0 − 1 0®
1®
𝜏1 ®

 𝜏1 ®

®
 ®
0
0
0
0
«
¬
«0¬
For the 𝑖 th manual driving car (𝑖 ≥ 2), we can convert the transfer function (2.26) into
the following state-space form:

x¤ 𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑖−1 x𝑖−1 + 𝐴𝑖,𝑖 x𝑖 , Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐻,

𝐴𝑖,𝑖−1

0 0ª
©0 1
©0 0 0 0ª
®

®

®

®

0 0
0 0 0 0®
1 0®
® , 𝐴𝑖,𝑖 = 
®
= 
®
 2𝛽𝑖 2−𝛿𝑖 𝛽𝑖 ® .
®
 0 2𝛽𝑖 −𝛽𝑖 0 ®
0 − −
𝛿𝑖
𝛿𝑖 0 ®
®
 𝛿𝑖

®
®


0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
¬
¬
«
«
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(2.28)

(2.29)

Before giving the state-space representation of the automated following cars (𝑖 ≥ 2) with
the control structure in Section 2.3.1, we define the following:
0 ª
©0 1 0

®

®

®
0
0
1
0
∗
®;
𝐴𝑖,𝑖
≜ 
®
1
0 0 −
0 ®®
𝜏𝑖


®
0
0
0
−1/ℎ
Φ(𝑖) ¬
«

𝑇𝑖 ≜ [0, 0, 1/𝜏𝑖 , 0] 𝑇 ;

𝐾𝑟,𝑖 ≜ [−𝐾 𝑝,𝑖 , −𝐾 𝑑,𝑖 − 𝐾 𝑝,𝑖 ℎΦ(𝑖) , −𝐾 𝑑,𝑖 ℎΦ(𝑖) , 1];
𝑅𝑖 ≜ [0, 0, 0, 1/ℎΦ(𝑖) ] 𝑇 .

𝐾 𝑓 ,𝑖 ≜ [𝐾 𝑝,𝑖 , 𝐾 𝑑,𝑖 , 0, 0];
For the ACC car 𝑖 ≥ 2, we have

x¤ 𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑖−1 x𝑖−1 + 𝐴𝑖,𝑖 x𝑖 , 𝑖 ≥ 2, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴,

(2.30)

∗ + 𝑇 𝐾 and 𝐴
where 𝐴𝑖,𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑖
𝑖 𝑟,𝑖
𝑖,𝑖−1 = 𝑇𝑖 𝐾 𝑓 ,𝑖 . For the CACC car, if 𝑖 = 2, Φ(2) ∈ 𝐶,

x¤ 2 = 𝐴2,1 x1 + 𝐴2,2 x2 + 𝐵2 𝑢𝑟 ,

(2.31)

∗ +
where 𝐴2,1 = 𝑇2 𝐾 𝑓 ,2 + 𝑅2 [0, 0, 1, 0] + 𝜏2 𝑅2 𝐴1,1 (3, :), where 𝐴1,1 is from (2.27). 𝐴2,2 = 𝐴2,2
2
𝑇2 𝐾𝑟,2 , 𝐵2 = [0, 0, 0, 𝜏1 ℎ𝜏Φ(2)
]. If 𝑖 > 2, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐶,

x¤ 𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖,1 x1 + 𝐴𝑖,2 x2 + ... + 𝐴𝑖,𝑖 x𝑖
∗
𝐴𝑖,𝑖 = 𝐴𝑖,𝑖
+ 𝑇𝑖 𝐾𝑟,𝑖 ,

𝐴𝑖,𝑖−1 = 𝑇𝑖 𝐾 𝑓 ,𝑖 + 𝑅𝑖 [0, 0, 1, 0] + 𝜏𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝐴𝑖−1,𝑖−1 (3, :),
𝐴𝑖,𝑖−2 = 𝜏𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝐴𝑖−1,𝑖−2 (3, :),
..
.
𝐴𝑖,1 = 𝜏𝑖 𝑅𝑖 𝐴𝑖−1,1 (3, :).
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(2.32)

As a result, the state space model for a mixed traffic platoon with an arbitrary car sequence
is as follows:
© x¤ 1 ª © 𝐴1,1 0 0 · · · 0 ª © x1 ª © 𝐵1 ª
® ®  ®
 ® 
® ®  ®
 ® 
 x¤ 2 ®  𝐴2,1 𝐴2,2 0 · · · 0 ®  x2 ®  𝐵2 ®
 ® 
® ®  ®
 ® 
® ®  ®
 x¤ ® =  𝐴 𝐴 𝐴 · · · 0 ®  x ® +  0 ® 𝑢𝑟
 3 ®  3,1 3,2 3,3
® 3®  ®
 ® 
® ®  ®
.
.
.
.
.
 . ®  . . . . . . ®  .. ®  .. ®
. . ® . ®  . ®
.®  . . .
 ® 
® ®  ®
® ®  ®
 ® 
x¤ 𝑛
𝐴𝑛,1 𝐴𝑛,2 𝐴𝑛,3 · · · 𝐴𝑛,𝑛 x𝑛
0
« ¬ «
¬« ¬ « ¬

(2.33)

Depending on the car type, the submatrices 𝐴𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝐵𝑖 have different formulations as
shown above. For example, 𝐴𝑖, 𝑗 , 𝑗 ≤ 𝑖 − 2 is a zero matrix if 𝑖 is an ACC or manual car and 𝐵2
is a zero matrix if the 2nd car is not a CACC car. The discrete time model used is obtained using
the zero order hold (ZOH) method [77] for (2.33).
Theorem 2. Given a mixed traﬃc platoon according to Deﬁnition 1, mixed traﬃc string stability can be guaranteed by adjusting the time headway of CACC cars or inserting an additional
CACC car between the string unstable car and the leading car under the controller structure shown
in Fig. 2.2.
Proof The proof is based on the verification of all conditions (2.9)-(2.11) given in The∗
Λ
orem 1. If there exists a car 𝜄 > 1 such that ∥𝐺 Λ
𝜄,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ > ∥𝐺 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ > 1 or ∥𝑔 𝜄,1 (𝑡)∥ 1 >

∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡) ∥ 1 > 1, it obviously cannot satisfy the mixed traffic string stability. We will prove that
under the proposed control structure shown in Fig. 2.2, the mixed traffic string stability can be
satisfied again by either (a) enlarging time headway of the front CACC car, or (b) inserting an
additional CACC car.
(a) Enlarging Time Headway of CACC Cars
By adopting the feedforward filter (2.24), the transfer function of a CACC car (2.25) can
be rewritten as 𝐺 ∗Φ(𝑖) (𝑠) =

1
𝐻𝑖 (𝑠)

=

1
ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑠+1 , Φ(𝑖)
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∈ 𝐶, 𝑖 > 1.

Firstly, we show the new motion state transfer function from the leading car to the string
unstable car 𝜄 satisfies condition (2.9) via enlarging the time headway of the front CACC car.
We start by increasing the time headway of an arbitrary chosen CACC car (car 𝑗, 1 < 𝑗 ≤
𝜄, 𝑗 can be equal to 𝜄 if Φ(𝜄) ∈ 𝐶) from ℎΦ( 𝑗) to ℎ1 . Correspondingly, the motion state trans(1),Λ
fer function from the leading car to car 𝜄 becomes 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠) =

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠+1 Λ
ℎ1 𝑠+1 𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠).

We know from

the sub-multiplicative property [76] that
ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1

≤
𝐻∞

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1

𝐺Λ
𝜄,1 (𝑠)

(2.34)

𝐻∞

𝐻∞

The equality holds when both 𝐻∞ norms on the right hand side are achieved at the same frequency. It is easy to show that argmax

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠+1
ℎ1 𝑠+1

= 0. We also have ∥𝐺 Λ
𝜄,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ > 1 and

𝑠

𝐺Λ
𝜄,1 (𝑠)

𝑠=0

= 1, which suggests that the 𝐻∞ norm is achieved at 𝑠 ≠ 0. Hence, only the in-

equality holds.
We can keep increasing the time-headway of the chosen CACC car from ℎ1 to ℎ2 . . . to ℎ𝑛
to ℎ∗ with ℎ∗ > ℎ𝑛 > ℎ𝑛−1 . . . > ℎ2 > ℎ1 . It is easy to get, ∀𝛾 = 1, . . . , 𝑛, argmax

ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠+1
ℎ 𝛾 𝑠+1

=0

𝑠

and
ℎ 𝛾−2 𝑠 + 1
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1 ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
... 2
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
> 1,
ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠 + 1
ℎ 𝑠 + 1 ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
𝐻∞
ℎ 𝛾−2 𝑠 + 1
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1 ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
.
.
.
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
= 1,
ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠 + 1
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1 ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
𝑠=0

(2.35)

which suggests that the 𝐻∞ norm is achieved at 𝑠 ≠ 0. Following similar proof as above,

28

we can derive the following:

𝐻∞

ℎ1 𝑠 + 1 (1),Λ
𝐺
(𝑠)
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1 𝜄,1

𝐻∞

ℎ2 𝑠 + 1 (2),Λ
𝐺
(𝑠)
= 3
ℎ 𝑠 + 1 𝜄,1

(2),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

=

(3),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

𝐻∞

ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1

𝐻∞

ℎ2 𝑠 + 1
< 3
ℎ 𝑠+1

<

(1),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

(1),Λ
= 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)
𝐻∞

𝐻∞
(2),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

(2),Λ
= 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)
𝐻∞

𝐻∞

,
𝐻∞

,
𝐻∞

..
.
(𝑛),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

(𝑛−1),Λ
< 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)
𝐻∞

(∗),Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)

,
𝐻∞

(𝑛),Λ
< 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)
𝐻∞

.
𝐻∞

As we keep increasing the time headway of the chosen CACC car 𝑗, the 𝐻∞ norm of motion
states transfer function from the leading car to car 𝜄 will decrease until it is less than 1 when condition (2.35) no longer holds, and hence less than ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ . This proves the satisfaction of
condition (2.9).
Secondly, we show that the new motion state transfer function satisfies condition (2.10)
via enlarging the time headway of the front CACC car. Similarly, we start by increasing the time
headway of the chosen CACC car from ℎΦ( 𝑗) to ℎ1 . Correspondingly, the motion state transfer
(1),Λ
function from the leading car to car 𝜄 becomes 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠) =

ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠+1 Λ
ℎ1 𝑠+1 𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠).

From the Young’s

Inequality [48], we have
L

−1



ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1


≤ L
1

−1



ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1



𝑔 Λ𝜄,1 (𝑡)
1

1

(2.36)

The equality holds only when both inversed Laplace tranforms on the right hand side do not
change the sign with respect to 𝑡 [48]. Based on [11], for a transfer function 𝐺 (𝑠) and its inverse
Laplace transform 𝑔(𝑡), if ∥𝑔(𝑡)∥ 1 > 1 and |𝐺 (0)| = 1, 𝑔(𝑡) will change the sign. It is easy to show
(1),Λ
that |𝐺 𝜄,1
(0)| = 1 by substituting 𝑠 = 0 into the transfer functions (2.25)-(2.26). In addition,
(1),Λ
∥𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 > 1 is also obvious as car 𝜄 is string unstable. Therefore, only the inequality holds.

Similarly, we can keep increasing the time-headway of the chosen CACC car from ℎ1 to
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ℎ2 . . . to ℎ𝑛 to ℎ∗ with ℎ∗ > ℎ𝑛 > ℎ𝑛−1 . . . > ℎ2 > ℎ1 . It is then easy to get that for ∀𝛾 = 1, . . . , 𝑛,
the following (in)equalities hold:
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1 ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
ℎ 𝛾−2 𝑠 + 1
.
.
.
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
= 1,
ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠 + 1
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1 ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
𝑠=0
 𝛾−2

ℎ1 𝑠 + 1 ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 Λ
𝑠+1
−1 ℎ
L
... 2
𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)
> 1,
ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠 + 1
ℎ 𝑠 + 1 ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
1
which suggests that L −1



ℎ 𝛾−1 𝑠+1
ℎ 𝛾 𝑠+1

...

ℎ1 𝑠+1 ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠+1 Λ
ℎ2 𝑠+1 ℎ1 𝑠+1 𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)



(2.37)

will change sign. Therefore, following

the same proof, the following inequalities hold:


 1
ℎ1 𝑠 + 1
(1),Λ
−1 ℎ 𝑠 + 1
∗ 𝑔𝜄,1 (𝑡) < L
= L
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1
ℎ2 𝑠 + 1
1


 2
 2
(2),Λ
(3),Λ
−1 ℎ 𝑠 + 1
−1 ℎ 𝑠 + 1
∗ 𝑔𝜄,1 (𝑡) < L
∥𝑔 𝜄,1 (𝑡)∥ 1 = L
ℎ3 𝑠 + 1
ℎ3 𝑠 + 1
1
..
.
(2),Λ
∥𝑔 𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1

−1



(1),Λ
𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)
1
(2),Λ
𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)
1

1

1

(1),Λ
= 𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡) ,
1

(2),Λ
= 𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡) ,
1

(𝑛),Λ
(𝑛−1),Λ
∥𝑔 𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 < ∥𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ,
(∗),Λ
(𝑛),Λ
∥𝑔 𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 < ∥𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 .

As we keep increasing the time headway of the CACC car, the 1-norm of the inverse Laplace
transform of motion states transfer function from the leading car to car 𝜄 will decrease until it
is less than or equal to 1 when condition (2.35) no longer holds, and hence less than ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 .
Therefore, condition (2.10) is satisfied.
For condition (2.11), there exists an exact value of the right hand side of the inequality for
a specific platoon. This means we can always find a flexible range for the leading car’s velocity
profile to satisfy the velocity fluctuation constraint. As a result, condition (2.11) is also satisfied.
(b) Inserting an Additional CACC Car
We now show that the string stability can also be satisfied by inserting a CACC car in
front of the string unstable car 𝜄. Here, the time headway of the inserted CACC car is chosen
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as ℎ∗ which is equal to the larger time headway used in Part (a). Since the platoon size is increased by 1, the motion state transfer function from the leading car to the 𝜄 + 1th car becomes
𝐺Λ
𝜄+1,1 (𝑠) =

1
Λ
ℎ∗ 𝑠+1 𝐺 𝜄,1 (𝑠)

=

(∗),Λ
1
(𝑠),
ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠+1 𝐺 𝜄,1

where ℎΦ( 𝑗) is the time headway of the arbitrarily

(∗),Λ
chosen CACC car in Part (a). The string stability using 𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠) has been proved in Part (a). It

is also easy to show that ∥ ℎΦ( 𝑗)1 𝑠+1 ∥ 𝐻∞ = 1 and ∥L −1 ( ℎΦ( 𝑗)1 𝑠+1 )∥ 1 = 1. From the sub-multiplication
and Young’s inequality, we have,
1

(∗),Λ
∥ 𝐻 ∥𝐺 (∗),Λ (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 𝜄,1
(𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ,
ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1 ∞ 𝜄,1
1
(∗),Λ
(∗),Λ
Λ
)∥ 1 ∥𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔𝜄,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ,
∥𝑔𝜄+1,1
(𝑡)∥ 1 ≤ ∥L −1 (
ℎΦ( 𝑗) 𝑠 + 1

∥𝐺 Λ
𝜄+1,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥

Hence, conditions (2.9) and (2.10) are satisfied. For condition (2.11), the proof is same as Part (a).
This completes the proof.

2.3.3

□

Platoon example
In this section, a 7-car mixed traffic platoon as shown in Fig. 2.3 is simulated. The leading

car is an automated car under an autonomous controller. It can broadcast information to the
following car. The 2nd car, 3rd car and 5th cars are CACC cars, which can communicate with
their immediate preceding CACC car. Since there is no direct communication with its preceding
manual driving car, the 5th car degrades to ACC despite it may still have communication with
the 3rd car. The 4th car and 7th car are manual driving cars. In addition, the 6th car is an ACC car
without communication capability.

7th

6th

5th

4th

3rd

2nd

Figure 2.3: A 7-car mixed traffic platoon.
31

1st

We assume that each CACC, ACC, or manual driving car in the platoon has identical
dynamics with the same parameters. This means that the neighbor motion states transfer function of the 2nd car is the same as the 3rd car, i.e. 𝐺 ∗Φ(2) (𝑠) = 𝐺 ∗Φ(3) (𝑠). For the ACC cars, we have
𝐺 ∗Φ(5) (𝑠) = 𝐺 ∗Φ(6) (𝑠). All the manual driving cars are modeled by the standard Pipe model with
𝛽 = 0.368 and 𝛿 = 1.55 [13], i.e. 𝐺 ∗Φ(4) = 𝐺 ∗Φ(7) = 𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠). All these cars adopt the dynamic
structure shown in Section 2.3.1. The detailed parameters values are shown in Table 2.1. The time
headway of CACC (ℎ𝐶 𝐴𝐶𝐶 > 0.7𝑠 in practice) and ACC (ℎ 𝐴𝐶𝐶 > 1𝑠) are within the reasonable
ranges [11] [75]. The controller gain satisfies the bandwidth requirement 𝜔 < 1/𝜏 [73]. The value
of 𝜏 is also used in [60].
Table 2.1: Simulation parameters
Parameters
𝜏𝐶 𝐴𝐶𝐶
ℎ𝐶 𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝜔𝐶 𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝛽

Values
0.2
0.8
0.7
0.368

Parameters
𝜏𝐴𝐶𝐶
ℎ 𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝜔 𝐴𝐶𝐶
𝛿

Values
0.2
1.3
2.0
1.55

In this section, we will check the mixed traffic string stability of the linear mixed platoon
under the controller structure in Section 2.3. We can obtain the 𝐻∞ norm of the neighbor motion
state transfer function and the 1 norm of its inverse Laplace transform for every car:
∥𝐺 ∗Φ(2) ∥ 𝐻∞ = ∥𝐺 ∗Φ(3) ∥ 𝐻∞ = 1, Φ(2) = Φ(3) ∈ 𝐶.
∥𝐺 ∗Φ(5) ∥ 𝐻∞ = ∥𝐺 ∗Φ(6) ∥ 𝐻∞ = 1, Φ(5) = Φ(6) ∈ 𝐴.
∥𝐺 ∗Φ(4) ∥ 𝐻∞ = ∥𝐺 ∗Φ(7) ∥ 𝐻∞ = 1.03, Φ(4) = Φ(7) ∈ 𝐻.
∗
∗
∥𝑔Φ(2)
∥ 1 = ∥𝑔Φ(3)
∥ 1 = 1, Φ(2) = Φ(3) ∈ 𝐶.
∗
∗
∥𝑔Φ(5)
∥ 1 = ∥𝑔Φ(6)
∥ 1 = 1, Φ(5) = Φ(6) ∈ 𝐴.
∗
∗
∥𝑔Φ(4)
∥ 1 = ∥𝑔Φ(7)
∥ 1 = 1.328, Φ(4) = Φ(7) ∈ 𝐻.
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As seen from the above calculation, the ACC and CACC cars in the platoon satisfy the condition in Proposition 1. Hence, we only need to check the motion state transfer function from the
leading car to 4th and 7th manual driving cars:
∗
∥𝐺 Λ
4,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ = 1 ≤ ∥𝐺 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ = 1.03.
Λ
Λ
∗
∥𝐺 Λ
7,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ≤ ∥𝐺 4,1 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ ∥𝐺 7,4 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ = 1 × 1 ≤ ∥𝐺 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ = 1.03.
Λ
∥𝑔4,1
(𝑠)∥ 1 = 1.152 ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 𝐻∞ = 1.328.
Λ
Λ
Λ
∥𝑔7,1
(𝑠)∥ 1 ≤ ∥𝑔4,1
(𝑠)∥ 1 ∥𝑔7,4
(𝑠)∥ 1 = 1.259 ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ 1 = 1.328.

The above inequalities show that conditions (2.17) and (2.18) are satisfied. For condition (2.19),
we have the following inequality:

∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ min

ℎΦ(𝑖) 𝑣 1 (0)
′

∥𝑔Φ(𝑖) (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1

!
, 𝑖 = {2, 4, 5},

where cars 2, 4 and 5 represent three types of cars considered in this simulation. It is easy to show
that the above inequality holds for same type of cars in the platoon. Here, we adopt the human
perferred time headway proposed in [74], i.e. ℎΦ(4) = ℎΦ(7) = 1.4𝑠. By calculating the corresponding 1 norm of the above inequality, ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ < min{0.753, 0.753, 0.337}𝑣 1 (0).
That is, 0.663𝑣 1 (0) < 𝑣 1 (𝑡) < 1.337𝑣 1 (0) (33.7% variation). This inequality gives us the boundary of the leading car’s speed profile, which is a wide enough range for the highway condition.
Here, the conservative human time headway ℎ𝑎 = 1.4𝑠 is adopted. The human preferred timeheadway can also be much larger, e.g., the well adopted 1.8s [68], and the corresponding allowed
variance becomes 44.7%.
A set of simulation corresponding to the specific leading car’s velocity profile is then generated. As shown in Fig. 2.4, the maximal velocity fluctuation is (20 − 14.37)/20 = 0.28 < 0.337.
Hence, the safety of the platoon can be guaranteed. The safety criterion can also be checked and
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confirmed from Fig. 2.5a(3). The jerk and control input are also shown in this figure. As can
be seen, the general behavior is acceptable with guarantee of mixed traffic string stability. From
Fig. 2.6a, the 2nd and 3rd CACC cars rarely stay within the unconscious regime.
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Figure 2.4: Linear platoon velocity response.
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Figure 2.5: Response comparison.
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Figure 2.6: Unconscious regime distribution
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4

Chapter 3
Human-centered CACC Design
3.1

Blending-ratio CACC Design
In this chapter, an MPC-like blending ratio control algorithm is proposed to trade off

among physical comfort, psychological comfort, fuel economy as well as the traffic throughput
under the guarantee of mixed traffic string stability.
The V2V communication allows the introduction of the feedforward controller, which
decreases the time headway of the CACC car to 0.7 seconds without breaking the 𝐻∞ string
stability in the real test scenario [75]. As a result, the traffic throughput will be improved significantly. On the other hand, the recommended time headway for a manual driver is 1.4-1.8 seconds [68, 74], which is much larger than that of the CACC system. Comparatively, the shorter
time-headway can make the system more sensitive to the change of the preceding car’s velocity
change, which can be reflected by the car jerk. The above factors can make the human driver feel
uncomfortable when riding with the CACC system. Under this circumstance, more brakes may
be applied, which in turn deteriorates fuel economy and falls in exactly the opposite direction
of the CACC’s design goal. Based on these reasons, although the shorter time-headway of the
current CACC controller design can improve traffic throughput, in practice, driver comfort and
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fuel economy can be deteriorated. To facilitate the adoption of CACC systems, it is therefore
necessary to design a human-centered CACC controller that can make a good balance between
traffic throughput and driving experience.
In this paper, we seek to address this issue by finding an optimal time headway ℎ 𝑑,𝑖 of the
feedback controller in the automated cars, which blends costs among the driver comfort, traffic
throughput and fuel-economy. The variable time headway is selected as the optimal solution to
an MPC-like blending ratio controller. In [87], a similar controller is used to find the optimal
blending ratio between the human control input and the automatic system control signal for the
motion control of a mobile robot. This is an MPC-like optimization but not exactly MPC such
as the work in [108]. For the CACC/ACC controller design considered here, an optimal blending
ratio 𝛼𝑖 between the human preferred time-headway ℎ ℎ,𝑖 and CACC/ACC performance oriented
time-headway ℎ𝑎,𝑖 is computed as follows:

ℎΦ(𝑖) = 𝛼𝑖 ℎ ℎ,𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖 )ℎ𝑎,𝑖 ,

Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶.

(3.1)

The human preferred time headway is considered from the comfort aspects, which can also be regarded as the upper bound of the optimal variable time headway. In contrast, the CACC/ACC
performance oriented time-headway mainly considers the traffic throughput, which can be regarded as the lower bound of the optimal time-headway. The basic structure of our humancentered CACC controller is shown in Fig. 3.1.
In our MPC-like controller, the optimal blending ratio will be found for each control
horizon 𝑇 when the cost function is minimized in the predication horizon 𝑇𝑏 . We formulate
the cost function as the weighted sum of traffic throughput, fuel economy (in terms of control
input), and comfort (both physical and psychological) for each CACC car 𝑖 as:

𝐽𝑖 = 𝑐 1

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑑𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 2

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑢𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 3
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𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥ 𝑗 𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 4

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑧𝑖 ∥.

(3.2)
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Figure 3.1: The proposed MPC-like blending ratio controller.
where 𝑐 1 , 𝑐 2 , 𝑐 3 and 𝑐 4 are the corresponding coefficients. The term 𝑑𝑖 is the inter-distance between the 𝑖 th and (𝑖 − 1) th car as defined in Section 2.1. A smaller inter-distance indicates a higher
traffic throughput. The control input (i.e. desired acceleration 𝑢𝑖 ) is introduced to optimize fuel
economy. Firstly, the fuel consumption of a car is dominated by car acceleration if the engine
operates in normal areas [107]. The suppression of the desired acceleration level will help to reduce fuel consumption. A lot of existing optimization algorithms [60, 61] have shown good fuel
economy improvements by punishing the desired acceleration. Secondly, although there are more
accurate models to show the fuel consumption [38], these models are determined by the type of
the car. Since we seek to show the general optimal algorithm, it is not reasonable to pick one
specific model over others. The term 𝑗 𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 is the longitudinal jerk of the 𝑖 th car, 𝑗 𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 = 𝑎¤𝑖 ,
which can be obtained directly from the discretized state space model discussed in Section 2.3.2.
The jerk can reflect physical comfort of the driver and driving smoothness. The fourth part 𝑧𝑖
is explained as follows. Fig. 3.2 shows the driving regimes in terms of inter-distance and intervelcoity for the psychophysical car-following model (i.e. AP model) proposed in [102]. In this
model, different driving regimes are separated based on the human driver’s perceptual thresholds (i.e. SDX, OPDV, SDV and BX). BX represents the minimum following threshold for the
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human driver. SDV is the perceptual threshold for the human driver to detect approaching of
the preceding car. OPDV is the perceptual threshold for driver to realize leaving of the preceding
car. If the above changes are detected by the human driver, i.e. the inter-vehicle states exceed the
thresholds, corresponding acceleration/deceleration will be generated until the car goes into the
unconscious regime. In the unconscious regime, a human driver cannot perceive any relative motion with the preceding car despite generating small acceleration/deceleration unconsciously. If
the CACC cars can stay more within the unconscious regime, the human driver will have fewer
chances to perceive the velocity change of the preceding car. For one thing, human will have
smoother driving experience without feeling anxious about the rapid interaction with the preceding car. For another, the human workload in monitoring the CACC car operation can be
reduced, since human’s nerve is less stimulated during the normal operating mode. Because one
of the objectives of the CACC cars is to enhance driving comfort as well as reducing workload,
our human-centered CACC controller will utilize the above human perception property to improve the riding experience.
A

B

Figure 3.2: The AP car-following model [69].
To encourage the CACC car to stay more within the unconscious reaction regime, the
punishment factor 𝑧𝑖 is added to the cost function 𝐽𝑖 for every time step in the predication horizon
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when the driver is out of the unconscious regime, i.e.


 constant,

𝑧𝑖 =


0,


if outside of unconscious regime
.

(3.3)

if inside unconscious regime

Moreover, constraints have been added to the MPC-like controller to guarantee the mixed
traffic string stability defined in Definition 2. As a result, we have the constrains (3.4)-(3.7) for the
𝑖 th CACC car in the optimization of (3.2). Firstly, we give the motion fluctuation constraints of
the CACC cars. Here, the constraints are with respect to two consecutive cars, which are more
conservative than the mixed traffic string stability definition but can leave more flexibility to the
constraints on the manual driving cars.

∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ 𝑝 ≤ ∥𝜆𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖−1 (0)∥ 𝑝 ,
∀𝑖 > 1, 𝑡 > 0, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶, 𝑝 ∈ {2, ∞}.

(3.4)

The following constraints of the manual driving cars’ motion states are also added to
the MPC-like controller of the 𝑖 th CACC car considering that the manual driving car cannot be
manipulated directly:
∥𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (0)∥ 2 ≤ ∥𝐺 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ ∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2 ,

(3.5)

∥𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔 ∗ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ ∞ ,

(3.6)

∀𝑧 ≥ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑡 > 0, Φ(𝑖), Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧 + 1) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶, {Φ(𝑖 + 1), Φ(𝑖 + 2)...Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧)} ∈ 𝐻.

We also use the time to collision (TTC) to formulate the safety constraint [60]. A mini-
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mum distance 𝑑min is also set to avoid an unacceptably short inter-distance.

𝑑𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) ≥ max{𝑇𝑇𝐶 𝑣 𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖+ 𝑗−1 (𝑡) , 𝑑min },
∀𝑧 ≥ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑡 > 0, Φ(𝑖), Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧 + 1) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶, {Φ(𝑖 + 1), Φ(𝑖 + 2)...Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧)} ∈ 𝐻.
(3.7)
Furthermore, the predicted preceding car’s motion states x̃𝑖 is necessary to generate the
outputs of the 𝑖 th car’s dynamics in the prediction horizon. For a CACC car, if its preceding car
is also a CACC car, the preceding car’s motion states can be directly received from V2V communication. However, if its preceding car is a manual driving car, the motion states are not available.
The automated car can have communication with the most immediate automated preceding car
directly or indirectly through relay communication.
When the immediate preceding car has no communication capability, i.e. a manual driving or ACC car, its motion states can be predicted based on the predicted motion states of the
most immediate preceding CACC car and the driving models of the cars without communication
capacity. In addition, the performance of the predictor depends on the accuracy of the driving
models adopted. Here, for the sake of illustration and simplicity, perfect driving models are used
in the predictor. In our future works, the design of a driving model estimator and predictor will
be investigated.
Nevertheless, the MPC-like controller might be infeasible when constraints (3.4)-(3.7)
cannot be satisfied. Therefore, the constraint soften method [60] has been adopted. For the

42

string stability constraints (3.4)-(3.6), we have the following changes:
∥𝜆𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖 (0)∥ 𝑝
≤ 1 + 𝜖 𝛾𝑠 ,
∥𝜆𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖−1 (0)∥ 𝑝
∀𝑖 > 1, 𝑡 > 0, Φ(𝑖) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶, 𝑝 ∈ {2, ∞},
∥𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (0)∥ 2
≤ 1 + 𝜖 𝛾𝑠 ,
∗
∥𝐺 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑠)∥ ∞ ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ 2
∥𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (𝑡) − 𝜆𝑖+ 𝑗 (0)∥ ∞
∗
∥𝑔 ℎ 𝑎 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜆 1 (𝑡) − 𝜆 1 (0)∥ ∞

≤ 1 + 𝜖 𝛾𝑠 ,

(3.8)
(3.9)
(3.10)

∀𝑧 ≥ 𝑗 ≥ 0, 𝑡 > 0, Φ(𝑖), Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧 + 1) ∈ 𝐴 ∪ 𝐶,
{Φ(𝑖 + 1), Φ(𝑖 + 2)...Φ(𝑖 + 𝑧)} ∈ 𝐻.

where 𝛾𝑠 is the relaxation of the upper bounds 1 given in (3.4)-(3.6), and 𝜖 is called the slack variable. Moreover, the constraint soften method is not applicable in safety constraint (3.7) considering it is not reasonable to soften the minimum inter-distance. Since our algorithm is to
find the optimal time headway blending ratio, the safety distance constraint is hard to break as
long as the low level controller 𝐶𝑖 (𝑠) has prompt response. If the extreme scenario happens, the
safety-oriented deceleration should override autonomous cruise control. Correspondingly, the
augmented cost function (3.2) becomes:

𝐽𝑖 = 𝑐 1

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑑𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 2

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑢𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 3

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥ 𝑗 𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 ∥ 2 + 𝑐 4

𝑇𝑏
∑︁

∥𝑧𝑖 ∥ + 𝜌𝜖 2 .

(3.11)

where 𝜌 is the weighting ratio. The overall human-centered CACC control algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 1.

3.2

Simulation Results
In this section, human-centered CACC designs are applied to the 2nd , 3rd and 5th CACC

cars to find the optimal time headway for their conventional controllers based on the trade-offs
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Algorithm 1 MPC-like Blending Ratio Controller
INPUT:
ℎ ℎ,𝑖 : Human preferred time headway
OUTPUT:
ℎ 𝑑,𝑖 : Optimal time headway for each time step
for each time horizon 𝑇𝑏 do
x̃𝑖−1 ← Get the motion states of the immediate preceding car from the motion predictor
𝑥 0 ← Update the initial states
for 𝛼𝑖 = 0 to 1 do
ℎ 𝑑,𝑖 ← 𝛼𝑖 ℎ ℎ,𝑖 + (1 − 𝛼𝑖 )ℎ𝑎,𝑖
𝑥𝑖 , 𝜆𝑖 ← Update states based on the discretized model in Section 2.3.2
𝑑𝑖 , 𝑢𝑖 , 𝐽𝑒𝑟 𝑘 𝑖 , 𝑧𝑖 ← Calculate the inter-distance, control input, jerk, and consciousness punishment factor
CONSTRAINTS: (3.4),(3.6),(3.6),(3.7)
if no 𝛼𝑖 can satisfy the constraints then
𝜖 ← Calculate the slack variable from soften constraints (3.8),(3.9),(3.10)
𝐽𝑖 ← Calculate the cost function from (3.11)
else
𝐽𝑖 ← Calculate the cost function from (3.2)
end if
end for
𝛼𝑖 ← argmin𝐽𝑖
ℎΦ(𝑖) ← Update the time headway from (3.1)
end for
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among the driver’s physical comfort, psychological comfort, control input and traffic throughput. Note that although there is no feedfoward path for the 5th car, the MPC-like controller can
still find an optimal time headway for the feedback loop. Since the 2nd and 3rd car have the same
feedback and feedforward controller structure, they share the same MPC-like parameters. Since
the 5th car only has the feedback loop with a larger time headway, it will have another set of MPClike parameters. The main parameters are given in Table 3.1. With 𝑇 = 0.5 and 𝑇𝑏 = 2.5, the 7-car
simulation can be finished within 2 mins using a laptop with a Core i7 processor.
Table 3.1: Optimal controller parameters
Para CACC

Values

Para ACC

Values

{𝑇, 𝑇𝑏 }

{0.5,2.5}

{𝑇, 𝑇𝑏 }

{0.5,2.5}

{𝑐 1 , 𝑐 2 , 𝑐 3 , 𝑐 4 }
{𝜌, 𝛾𝑠 }
{ℎ ℎ , ℎ𝑎 }

{75,150,4,70}

{𝑐 1 , 𝑐 2 , 𝑐 3 , 𝑐 4 }

{1.4,0.8}

{ℎ ℎ , ℎ𝑎 }

{50,0.01}

{𝜌, 𝛾𝑠 }

{50,70,4,70}
{50,0.01}
{1.4,1.3}

Next, we generate a simulation under the same scenario as that in Section 2.3.3 however
introducing the MPC-like controllers in the 2nd , 3rd and 5th cars. The results are shown in Figs.
2.5b and 2.6b. As can be seen from the figures, the jerk decreases largely under the MPC-like
controller, which can improve the drivers’ physical comfort. The CACC cars also have more occurrences within the unconscious regime that can contribute to the drivers’ psychological comfort. Under the benchmark and MPC-like control, we calculate the 2 norm of jerk, control input,
and inter-distance for the CACC cars, i.e. the 2nd , 3rd , and 5th cars, respectively. We also count
the time steps that these cars stay within the unconscious regime ( 𝑍¯ 𝑁 ). After normalization
between the benchmark and human-centered controllers, the statistical comparisons are shown
in Fig. 3.3. As a result, both the physical and psychological comfort are largely improved using
the human-centered CACC design. There are also small improvements in the fuel economy (in
terms of control input) while the traffic throughput (in terms of inter-distance) sacrifices a little.
Although the improvement in fuel economy is relatively small, the increase (6%) is still accept45

able as a minor factor in the multi-objective optimization. The increase of inter-distance is also
reasonable since the benchmark controller is performance-oriented.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison between benchmark and the human-centered controllers.
To further verify the performance of the MPC-like blending ratio controller, a 0.1𝑠 actuator delay and a larger lag term 0.3𝑠 have been added into the vehicle longitudinal dynamics
in Section 2.3.1. The simulation is generated with the same leading car speed profile as shown in
Fig. 2.4. The statistical comparison is shown in Fig. 3.4. The proposed blending ratio controller
still largely improves the physical and psychological comfort despite greater sacrifice of the interdistance performance. In addition, soften constraints of the automated cars have been activated
because of the complexity of the vehicle dynamics as shown in Fig.3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Performance comparison under more complicated dynamics.
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Figure 3.5: Application of soften constraints in the more complicated dynamics.
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Chapter 4
Unmanned Platoon under Cyber Attacks
4.1

Problem Definition
The overall framework, platoon modeling, and cyber attack modeling are presented in

this section. We use ˆ, ¯, and ˜ to represent the estimated, predicted, and corrupted signal, respectively. Vectors are in bold fonts and scalars are in regular fonts. A† is the Moore Pseudo-inverse
of matrix A. A(𝑖, :) and A(:, 𝑖) represent the 𝑖 𝑡ℎ row and column of the matrix A, respectively.

4.1.1

Overall Framework
As shown in Fig.4.1, a UGV platoon is considered. Each UGV maintains a desired inter-

distance with respect to its preceding vehicle and receives information from other UGVs via V2V
communications. In normal situations, every UGV operates under the default autonomous
mode. When abnormal situations (e.g., cyber attacks and sensor failures) occur, the onboard
and distributed OBRC (Section 4.2) will be utilized to mitigate the negative effects and maintain the UGV performance. However, the manual mode of the UGVs is still preferred in dealing
with these abnormal situations considering the limitations of the autonomous systems under
uncertainties as explained in the Introduction. As a result, human supervision is adopted in our
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framework. If an abnormality is detected in a UGV, the human operator can intervene the UGV
manually in a supervisory role.

Abnormal UGVs

GUI

Feedback
Feedback

TIMS

Intervention
V2C
ARS

OBRC
i+1th

V2C

V2C
ARS

V2C

ARS

OBRC

OBRC

ith

ARS
V2V

V2V

V2V

UGV platoon

Set of abnormal UGVs

i−1th

OBRC
i−2th

: Cyber attack

Figure 4.1: Flowchart of the human supervised UGV platoon under abnormal situations utilizing
the proposed automated decision-making aid.
To facilitate human supervision, a decision-making aid is developed. First, to detect degraded UGVs in the platoon, an anomaly reporting system (ARS) (Section 4.3) adopted in each
individual UGV will continuously generate anomaly reports based on motion states monitoring and pre-knowledge of the UGV dynamics. The TIMS (Section 4.4) then collects the reports
from every UGV via V2C communication and determines the abnormal UGVs that need human
intervention. To mitigate the negative effect of cyber attacks through V2C communications, the
TIMS evaluates vehicle trustworthiness based on the observation data and rule out evaluations
with low credits. The evaluation information of the platoon driving performance will then be
provided via the designed GUI. Moreover, the human operator can inject the feedback to refresh
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TIMS in dealing with severe V2C cyber attacks. The ARS, TIMS, and GUI together constitute
the decision-making aid for the human operator.
Remark 7. Directly collecting and processing the motion state information (e.g., velocity and acceleration) of the entire platoon requires a high-rate communication capacity. Instead, we propose
an eﬃcient communication framework. The motion state information will ﬁrst be processed locally
onboard each UGV via the ARS. Then, only anomaly detection reports will be sent to cloud via V2C
communication, where low-rate communication suﬃces. The cloud then processes the reports for further evaluation. Such a hybrid local and cloud framework with relatively fewer requirements on
channel capacity is consistent with the core research direction in ITS [82].

4.1.2

•

UGV Platoon Modeling
An 𝑁-vehicle following platoon is formed as shown in Fig. 4.2. The inter-distance 𝑑𝑖

is given by the difference between 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖−1 ’s longitudinal position 𝑥𝑖−1 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s longitudinal
position 𝑥𝑖 . 𝑈𝐺𝑉1 is the leading vehicle. Every following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, receives the acceleration information 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) from its preceding 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖−1 via V2V communications. In addition,
the inter-distance 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) and velocity 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) can be directly obtained from its onboard sensors. The
CACC system is designed to maintain the desired inter-distance with respect to its preceding
UGV. A typical desired inter-distance formulation is 𝑑𝑖∗ = ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 , where ℎ𝑖∗ is the desired constant
time headway [73]. The feedback-feedforward control structure is adopted to achieve the desired
inter-distance. A filter can also be added right after the controller to improve the vehicle-following
stability [53]. The vehicle-following dynamics equations of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 with the above structure can
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be formulated as

𝑋𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐺 𝑖 (𝑠)𝐹𝐼,𝑖 (𝑠)(𝑈𝐵,𝑖 (𝑠) + 𝑈𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠))

(4.1)

𝑈𝐵,𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐹𝐵,𝑖 (𝑠)(𝑋𝑖−1 (𝑠) − 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠) − ℎ𝑖∗𝑉𝑖 (𝑠))

(4.2)

𝑈𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐹𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) 𝐴𝑖−1 (𝑠)

(4.3)

where 𝐺 𝑖 (𝑠), 𝐹𝐼,𝑖 (𝑠), 𝐹𝐵,𝑖 (𝑠), and 𝐹𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) are the transfer functions of vehicle dynamics, filter dynamics, feedback controller dynamics, and feedforward controller dynamics, respectively.
𝑈𝐵,𝑖 (𝑠) and 𝑈𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) are the feedback and feedforward control signals in the frequency domain.
In addition, 𝑋𝑖 (𝑠), 𝑉𝑖 (𝑠), and 𝐴𝑖 (𝑠) correspond to position 𝑥𝑖 (𝑡), velocity 𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡), and acceleration
𝑎𝑖 (𝑡) of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 .
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of multi-UGV platooning.

4.1.3

Cyber Attacks Models
Cyber Attack via V2V Communications: Although receiving the extra acceleration infor-

mation 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) can improve the vehicle-following performance in terms of velocity fluctuation
minimization and stability margin enhancement, the V2V communication is also vulnerable to
cyber attacks [82]. In this paper, we consider V2V cyber attack without constraints on either attack values or patterns except the boundedness imposed by the physical value (acceleration in this
case) itself. The corrupted V2V communication signal received by 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 is denoted as 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡).
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Correspondingly, Eqn. (4.3) can be updated to
𝑈𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) = 𝐹𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) 𝐴˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑠),

(4.4)

where 𝐴˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑠) is the corrupted communication signal in the frequency domain.
Remark 8. The modeling of cyber attacks above is ﬂexible enough as it can represent many typical cyber attack patterns. When 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) ≠ 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡), it can directly be considered as the false data
injection attack (FDIA) [66]. For a communication jamming attack [33], it can be modeled as
𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) = 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡 − 𝜏𝑐𝑎 (𝑡)) where 𝜏𝑐𝑎 (𝑡) is the time-variant communication delay. When 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 ≠
𝑎𝑖−1 , 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 = 0, it can be considered as the DoS attack [103]. In this paper, a general formulation is
adopted aiming to include the cunning and malicious cyber attacks. It should be noticed that, in addition to cyber attacks, other communication issues, such as mild communication delays, might also
result in 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) ≠ 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡). However, since the corresponding solutions have been well-studied [105]
and their threats to platoon safety are relatively smaller compared to cyber attacks, these issues are
•

not treated separately.

Cyber Attack via V2C Communications: The UGV anomaly report can also be hacked
when it is sent to the TIMS via V2C communications. It is straightforward to assume the hacked
report is different from the original one at arbitrary time steps. Similarly, the V2C cyber attacks
can include the FDIA attack, communication jamming, and DoS attack. More details about the
UGV anomaly detection reports can be found in Section 4.3.
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4.2

Observer-based Resilient Controller (OBRC) and Platoon Safety Analysis
As introduced in Section 4.1.1, when V2V cyber attacks happen, the distributed OBRC

on each individual UGV is first used to mitigate its effect. In this section, we will present the
detailed structure of the OBRC in Section 4.2.1. Moreover, the performance of the OBRC and
platoon safety are discussed in Section 4.2.2.

4.2.1

The Design of OBRC
The difference between corrupted signals and original signals, i.e., 𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −

𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡), in V2V communication can be considered as an unknown input in the CACC dynamic
system shown in Eqns. (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4). To mitigate the effects of the unknown input, a resilient control signal 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡), which is derived based on the estimated unknown value 𝜁ˆ𝑖 (𝑡) from a
UIO, is injected back to the control loop. For the design of the UIO-based resilient controller, we
set x𝑖 (𝑡) = [𝑑𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖−1 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡)] 𝑇 as the system states vector and Φ𝑖 (𝑡) = [𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡), 𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)] 𝑇
as the unknown inputs vector. The outputs are y𝑖 = [𝑑𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖−1 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡)] 𝑇 . By assuming
𝐹𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) = 1, 1 the state-space representation of the overall system, i.e., the combination of CACC
dynamics and resilient controller, is,
CACC dynamics:
x¤ 𝑖 (𝑡) = A𝑖 x𝑖 (𝑡) + B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝐸𝑖 Φ𝑖 (𝑡)

(4.5)

y𝑖 (𝑡) = C𝑖 x𝑖 (𝑡)

(4.6)

Resilient controller:
1 If

𝐹𝐹,𝑖 (𝑠) is a higher-order system, Eqn. (4.8) can be directly replaced by the corresponding higher-order ordinary differential equation (ODE).
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z¤ 𝑖 (𝑡) = F𝑖 z𝑖 (𝑡) + T𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) + K𝑖 y𝑖 (𝑡)
𝑟𝑒𝑠
¤ 𝑖 (𝑡) =

1 ˆ
1
𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)
𝜏𝑖
𝜏𝑖

x̂𝑖 (𝑡) = z𝑖 (𝑡) + P𝑖 y𝑖 (𝑡)

(4.7)
(4.8)
(4.9)

ŷ𝑖 (𝑡) = C𝑖 x̂𝑖 (𝑡)

(4.10)

Φ̂𝑖 (𝑡) = (C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † [ y¤̂ 𝑖 (𝑡) −C𝑖 A𝑖 x̂𝑖 (𝑡) −C𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)]

(4.11)

where z𝑖 ∈ R4 is the internal state of the UIO. 𝜏𝑖 is the time constant of a first-order low-pass
filter that can help mitigate the effects of high-frequency inaccurate measurements of the V2V
cyber attack. In addition,
P𝑖 = E𝑖 [(C𝑖 E𝑖 )𝑇 C𝑖 E𝑖 ] −1 (C𝑖 E𝑖 )𝑇 ;
T𝑖 = I − P𝑖 C𝑖 ;

R𝑖 = T𝑖 A𝑖 ;

K𝑖1 ← pole placement(R𝑖 − K𝑖1 C𝑖 );
F𝑖 = R𝑖 − K𝑖1 C𝑖 ;
K𝑖 = K𝑖1 + F𝑖 P𝑖 .
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By adopting the vehicle-following control design in [10], the matrices in Eqns. (4.5)-(4.7) become

 0


 0

A𝑖 = 
 0


 𝑘 𝑝,𝑖
 ℎ∗
 𝑖

 0


 0

B𝑖 = 
 0


 1
 − ℎ∗
 𝑖

1

-1

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

𝑘 𝑑,𝑖
ℎ∗𝑖

−𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 ℎ∗𝑖 −𝑘 𝑑,𝑖
ℎ∗𝑖

−𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 ℎ∗𝑖 −1
ℎ∗𝑖







,












 0 0 
1 0









 1 0 
0 1




 , E𝑖 = 
 , C𝑖 = 

 0 0 
0 0









 1 1 


 ℎ∗ ℎ∗ 
0 0

 𝑖 𝑖 



0 0 

0 0 
,
1 0 


0 1


where 𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 and 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 are the PD controller gains in the feedback control loop. More details about
the above resilient controller design and system dynamics can be found in our paper [55]. Combining Eqns. (4.5)-(4.7) and (4.9)-(4.11), 𝜁ˆ𝑖 (𝑡) can be substituted by a linear combination of x𝑖 (𝑡),
z𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡), and 𝜁𝑖 (𝑡). In addition, the resilient control signal 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡) is obtained from
𝜁ˆ𝑖 (𝑡) by processing through the first-order low-pass filter. By defining x𝑖𝑎 (𝑡) = [x𝑖 , z𝑇𝑖 , 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 ] 𝑇 ,
the augmented system model becomes

x¤ 𝑖𝑎 (𝑡) = A𝑎,𝑖 x𝑖𝑎 (𝑡) + B𝑎,𝑖 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) + E𝑎,𝑖 𝜁𝑖 (𝑡).

(4.12)

The derivations of the above matrices are shown in Appendix-A. The dimensions of the matrices
in Eqn. (4.12) are A𝑎,𝑖 ∈ R9×9 , B𝑎,𝑖 ∈ R9×1 , and E𝑎,𝑖 ∈ R9×1 . We can also rewrite the above system
model (4.12) only with the states of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , i.e., x𝑖𝑠 (𝑡) = [𝑑𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑣𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑎𝑖 (𝑡), z𝑇𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 (𝑡)] 𝑇 and

x¤ 𝑖𝑠 = A𝑠,𝑖 x𝑖𝑠 +B𝑠,𝑖 𝑎𝑖−1 +E𝑠,𝑖 𝜁𝑖 +J𝑠,𝑖 𝑣 𝑖−1 ,
where A𝑠,𝑖 ∈ R8×8 , B𝑠,𝑖 ∈ R8×1 , E𝑠,𝑖 ∈ R8×1 , and J𝑠,𝑖 ∈ R8×1 .
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(4.13)

4.2.2

Analysis on the OBRC Performance and Platoon Safety
The performance of the proposed OBRC is analyzed in this section. We first verify the

string stability of the 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 under no cyber attack.
Lemma 1. If there is no cyber attack on 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , i.e., 𝜁𝑖 = 0, and the parameters of the CACC
controller meet the conditions that ℎ𝑖∗ , 𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 , and 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 > 0, then 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 is string stable under the
OBRC with proper choices of the parameters.
Proof The proof is shown in Appendix-B.

□

It is trivial to show that the whole platoon is string stable if all the following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , 2 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, satisfy the conditions in Lemma 1 under no cyber attack [73].
Theoretically, with the consideration of the cyber attack item 𝜁𝑖 , safety can be guaranteed
if the vehicle is still string stable. However, in the safety-critical cyber attack scenario considered in
this paper, the string stability is too restrictive, which requires that the attacked vehicle’s velocity
fluctuation should be smaller than its preceding vehicle’s velocity fluctuation [73]. As a result,
we check the state boundedness and then safety conditions in the cyber attack scenario instead.
In Lemma 2, we verify the boundedness of the augmented states of the subject 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s dynamics
(4.13) under the bounded motion states of its preceding vehicle 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖−1 .
Lemma 2. Consider the resilient controller proposed in Section 4.2.1. If the following conditions are
satisﬁed:
1. ℎ𝑖∗ , 𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 , and 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 > 0
2. 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡) is bounded,
3. 𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) is bounded,
4. 𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) is bounded,
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the parameters of OBRC can then be determined such that the states of augmented 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s dynamics
(4.13) are bounded.
Proof The proof is shown in Appendix-C.

□

Based on Lemma 2 and the cascade structure of the platoon, with proper choices of
OBRC the parameters, it is also straightforward to show that motion states of the whole platoon can be bounded under cyber attacks if the conditions a) and d) in Lemma 2 are satisfied for
all the following UGVs, and the motion states of the leading vehicle 𝑈𝐺𝑉1 are bounded. Nevertheless, the bounded state 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) proved above is not enough to guarantee platoon safety. For
example, the lower bound of the state 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) can be smaller than zero, i.e., rear-end collision can
still happen between 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖−1 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , without violating the state boundedness. As a result,
the safety should be defined as 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) > 𝜖, where 𝜖 ≥ 0 is the safety margin. In the following
paragraphs, we will discuss the conditions to maintain the safety of the platoon.
Theorem 3. Assume the augmented UGV𝑖 ’s dynamics (4.13) reach the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 under
the condition 𝜁𝑖 (0) = 0. The safety of the UGV𝑖 (𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) > 𝜖 ≥ 0, ∀𝑡 ≥ 0) can be guaranteed if the
following condition is satisﬁed:
ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0) − ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ − 𝜖
,
∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ <
∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1

(4.14)

where 𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) is the inverse Laplacian transform of 𝐺 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑠) = C𝑑,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 (𝑠B𝑠,𝑖 + J𝑠,𝑖 ) with
C𝑑,𝑖 = [1, 0, . . . , 0], C𝑑,𝑖 ∈ R1×8 , and 𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) is the inverse Laplacian transform of 𝐺 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑠) =
C𝑑,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 E𝑠,𝑖 .
𝑠 (𝑡) = [𝑑 (𝑡), 𝑣 (𝑡), 𝑎 (𝑡), z (𝑡), 𝑟𝑒𝑠 (𝑡)] 𝑇
Proof Define the reference states as x𝑟,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖

and the corresponding reference dynamics are

𝑠
𝑠
x¤ 𝑟,𝑖
= A𝑠,𝑖 x𝑟,𝑖
+ B𝑠,𝑖 𝑎𝑖−1 + J𝑠,𝑖 𝑣 𝑖−1 .
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(4.15)

𝑠 . The
As only the reference inter-distance is of interest, the output equation can be 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 = C𝑑,𝑖 x𝑟,𝑖

corresponding input-output transfer function, from 𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠) to 𝐷 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑠), is

𝐺 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑠) =

𝐷 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑠)
= C𝑑,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 (𝑠B𝑠,𝑖 + J𝑠,𝑖 ).
𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠)

(4.16)

𝑠 = x𝑠 − x𝑠 , can be updated as
The error states, x𝑒,𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑖

𝑠
𝑠
x¤ 𝑒,𝑖
= A𝑠,𝑖 x𝑒,𝑖
+ E𝑠,𝑖 𝜁𝑖 .

(4.17)

Similarly, since only the inter-distance error, 𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 = 𝑑𝑖 − 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 , is of interest, the output
𝑠 . The corresponding transfer function is 𝐺 (𝑠) =
equation can be written as 𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 = C𝑑,𝑖 x𝑒,𝑖
𝑒,𝑖
𝐷 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑠)
Z𝑖 (𝑠)

= C𝑑,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 E𝑠,𝑖 . Based on Input-Output theorem [91], when the system defined

in Eqn. (4.17) reaches the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0, we have,

∥𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜁𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ .

(4.18)

When (4.13) reaches equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 under condition 𝜁𝑖 (0) = 0, the error state reaches zero
equilibrium, i.e., 𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (0) = 0. Eqn. (4.18) can then be rewritten as

∥𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ .

(4.19)


To guarantee safety, for all 𝑡 ≥ 0, it requires 𝑑𝑖 (𝑡) = 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) ≥ min 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) −

∥𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) ∥ ∞ > 𝜖 . Therefore, the condition becomes min 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) > ∥𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ + 𝜖 . In addition, based on Eqn. (4.16), we also have

∥𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ .
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(4.20)

When the system reaches the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0, it is easy to get that 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (0) = ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0). Substituting to Eqn. (4.20), we then can have,

min 𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) ≥ ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0) − ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ .

Combining with the sufficient condition of platoon safety, i.e., min(𝑑𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)) > ∥𝑑 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ + 𝜖,
the above inequality becomes
∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ < ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0) − ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ − 𝜖,

or
∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞

ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0) − ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ − 𝜖
<
∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1
□

Based on the safety condition proposed in Theorem 3, 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 is able to withstand more
severe V2V cyber attacks if its time headway ℎ𝑖∗ is larger and the velocity fluctuation ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −
𝑣 𝑖−1 (0) ∥ ∞ of its preceding vehicle is smaller. This finding is intuitive and matches other studies
in the platoon safety domain [18, 21]. The scalars ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 and ∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 depend on the vehicle
longitudinal dynamics and resilient controller design. This theorem applies to general closedloop UGV dynamics. In other words, the safety condition (4.14) can be used for UGV dynamics
with or without other resilient control designs as long as the closed-loop dynamics can be converted into the form of Eqn. (4.13). Moreover, starting with zero V2V cyber attack, the initial
condition that the 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s dynamics reaches equilibrium can be satisfied if its preceding vehicle
drives at a constant speed for a while. It is also worth noticing that a general formulation, i.e.,
𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) ≜ 𝑎˜ 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑎𝑖−1 (𝑡), is adopted in this analysis. In addition to the FDIA, Eqn. (4.14) can
also serve as the safety condition under other types of V2V cyber attacks modeled in Remark 8.
Theoretically, under Theorem 3, the safety of the whole platoon can be guaranteed. How59

ever, the safety condition (4.14) may not be feasible in practice since the maximum velocity fluctuations of all the preceding UGVs are required. Correspondingly, we propose the following
proposition by only considering the leading vehicle’s maximum velocity fluctuation. Given the
cascade structure of the platoon, Proposition 2 provides a sufficient and more feasible condition
for the platoon’s safety.
Proposition 2. Assume the augmented dynamics of each following UGV𝑖 , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, in the
platoon can be described by Eqn. (4.13) and the whole platoon reaches the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 under
the condition 𝜁𝑖 (0) = 0, the safety of the platoon can be guaranteed, if the following inequality is
satisﬁed:

∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ <

ℎ𝑖∗ 𝑣 𝑖 (0) − ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ − 𝜖
, ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁
∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1

(4.21)

where 𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡), and 𝜖 are deﬁned in Theorem 3. The term ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡)−𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ is denoted as
the overestimation of ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡)−𝑣 𝑖−1 (0) ∥ ∞ , which can be solved iteratively by the following equations,

∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ =




 ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) −𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ ,


𝑖=2



 ∥𝑔 𝑝,𝑖−1 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−2 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−2 (0)∥ +∞ + ∥𝑔𝑞,𝑖−1 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖−1 (𝑡)∥ ∞ , 𝑖 ≥ 3

(4.22)

where 𝑔 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡) is the inverse Laplacian transform of 𝐺 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑠) = C𝑣,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 (𝑠B𝑠,𝑖 + J𝑠,𝑖 ) with
C𝑣,𝑖 = [0, 1, 0, . . . , 0], C𝑣,𝑖 ∈ R1×8 , and 𝑔𝑞,𝑖 (𝑡) is the inverse Laplacian transform of 𝐺 𝑞,𝑖 (𝑠) =
C𝑣,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 E𝑠,𝑖 .
Proof The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3, which is shown in Appendix-D.

□

As a result, the safety of the whole platoon can be guaranteed, if the initial setup of the
platoon, the leading vehicle’s speed fluctuation, and cyber attacks on the UGVs can satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 2.
60

4.3

On-board Anomaly Reporting System (ARS)
As can be seen from Theorem 3, for a general autonomous resilient platoon dynamics in

the form of Eqn. (4.13), the safety cannot be guaranteed if ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ is greater than the threshold
calculated in Eqn. (4.14). Human supervision can then be in the loop to improve the platoon
survivability. To facilitate human supervision, as the first step, the ARS is designed such that
the abnormally driving UGVs can be detected and reported. In this section, we present the ARS
design to generate anomaly reports of the vehicle driving conditions based on residual generation
and analysis. The ARS in the ego platoon will be first introduced in Section 4.3.1. The extension
to a more general ITS will then be elaborated in Section 4.3.2.

4.3.1

ARS within the Ego Platoon
Enabled by onboard sensors, within the ego platoon, 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 is expected to generate a re-

port 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1 of its following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 and a report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖 of itself via ARS. These reports will then
be sent to the TIMS via V2C communication for further processing.
In the vehicle-following scenario, each 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 can have observations of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 ’s operational states, e.g., inter-distance and velocity, via rear-facing sensors. By comparing the measured
𝑚 based on sensor readings and the predicted velocity 𝑣¯
velocity 𝑣 𝑖+1
𝑖+1 based on the pre-knowledge

of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 ’s dynamic model, it is expected that 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 can generate the anomaly report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1
of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 . This process is illustrated in Fig. 4.3.

Figure 4.3: 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s ARS for its following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 .
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The vehicle velocity transfer function can be defined as
∗
𝐺 𝑖,𝑖+1
(𝑠) =

𝑉𝑖+1 (𝑠)
.
𝑉𝑖 (𝑠)

Based on the normal vehicle dynamics shown in Eqns. (4.1)-(4.3), the corresponding vehicle velocity transfer function becomes
∗
𝐺 𝑖,𝑖+1
(𝑠) =

(𝐹𝐵,𝑖+1 (𝑠) + 𝑠2 𝐹𝐹,𝑖+1 (𝑠))𝐺 𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝐹𝐼,𝑖+1 (𝑠)
,
1 + 𝐻𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝐹𝐵,𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝐺 𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝐹𝐼,𝑖+1 (𝑠)

∗ 𝑠.
where 𝐻𝑖+1 (𝑠) is defined as 1 + ℎ𝑖+1

∗ (𝑠), the information about its controller
Remark 9. To have an accurate transfer function 𝐺 𝑖,𝑖+1

design and powertrain dynamics of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 should be available to 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 . It is feasible to obtain such
∗ (𝑠) = 𝐺 ∗
model information in a homogeneous platoon, i.e., 𝐺 𝑖−1,𝑖
𝑗−1, 𝑗 (𝑠), ∀𝑖, 𝑗 > 1, 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗. For

a heterogeneous platoon, it might be diﬃcult to obtain such information. In this case, by adopting 𝐹𝐹,𝑖+1 (𝑠) =
∗ (𝑠) =
𝐺 𝑖,𝑖+1

1
𝐺 𝑖+1 𝐹𝐼,𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝐻𝑖+1 (𝑠)𝑠2

1
1+ℎ∗𝑖+1 𝑠 .

as designed in [73], the transfer function can be reduced to

∗ can be obtained by ℎ∗ = 𝑑 ∗ (𝑡)/𝑣 (𝑡), which
The desired time headway ℎ𝑖+1
𝑖+1
𝑖+1
𝑖+1

is measurable by sensors in the steady-state driving condition. Moreover, in a cloud-based ITS scenario, this model information might be directly obtained from a vehicle conﬁguration database [105].
•

The predicted velocity of the𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 can then be obtained by 𝑣¯ 𝑖+1 (𝑡) = L −1 𝑉¯𝑖+1 (𝑠) =


∗ (𝑠)𝑉 𝑚 (𝑠) . The detailed description about how to get the predicted velocity can be
L −1 𝐺 𝑖,𝑖+1
𝑖
𝑚 and predicted velocity 𝑣¯
found in [55]. As both the measured velocity 𝑣 𝑖+1
𝑖+1 are available based
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on the above discussion, we define the anomaly report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1 of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 from 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 as

𝑚
𝑚
𝑚
𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) = ∥𝑣 𝑖+1
(𝑡 −𝜅 ·𝛿 𝐴 ) − 𝑣¯ 𝑖+1 (𝑡 −𝜅 ·𝛿 𝐴 ), . . . ,𝑣𝑖+1
(𝑡 −𝛿 𝐴 ) − 𝑣¯ 𝑖+1 (𝑡 − 𝛿 𝐴 ), 𝑣𝑖+1
(𝑡) − 𝑣¯ 𝑖+1 (𝑡) ∥ 2



 1 , 𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) > 𝑐𝑟 ;

𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) =

 −1 , Otherwise,

𝑚 and 𝑣¯
where 𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖,𝑖+1 is the residual which is the 2-norm between 𝑣 𝑖+1
𝑖+1 in the most recent 𝜅

records. 𝛿 𝐴 is the time interval of two consecutive records. A larger 𝜅 value can achieve a more
reliable UGV anomaly detection. If 𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) is greater than the predefined threshold 𝑐𝑟 , it im𝑚 and 𝑣¯
plies that the residual between 𝑣 𝑖+1
𝑖+1 is too large to be explained by the inaccuracy of the

system dynamics pre-knowledge. In other words, 𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) > 𝑐𝑟 means the following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1
is operated under an abnormal condition based on the pre-knowledge of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 . The corresponding report, 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) = 1, will be sent by the ARS. Otherwise, if it is observed that 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖+1 is
driving normally, the report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖+1 (𝑡) = −1 will be sent. Besides V2V cyber attacks, the UGV
abnormality might also be originated from other factors, such as sensor failures and mechanical
failures. Different types of failures can naturally be accommodated by the ARS as long as the
corresponding failures cause deviated driving conditions. Eventually, the human operator will
be notified of the abnormally-driving vehicles.
∗ (𝑠)
Remark 10. The velocity residual, i.e., 𝑑𝑖 𝑓 𝑓𝑖.𝑖+1 , can be caused by (1) the imperfect model 𝐺 𝑖.𝑖+1

and/or (2) adversaries and failures such as cyber attacks and sensor failures. The corresponding
velocity residual data can ﬁrst be collected from simulations and ﬁeld experiments. Once the data
is collected, supervised statistical learning algorithms (e.g., one-dimensional support vector machine
(SVM) [101]) can then be used to calibrate the threshold 𝑐𝑟 such that velocity residual in the above
two scenarios can be classiﬁed. For the sake of simplicity, the 𝑐𝑟 value in Section 4.5 is assigned based
•

on simulation observations.

Similarly, the self anomaly detection report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝𝑖,𝑖 (𝑡) can be obtained by calculating the
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residual between the measured velocity 𝑣 𝑖𝑚 (𝑡) from sensors and the predicted velocity 𝑣¯ 𝑖 (𝑡) based
on the pre-knowledge of its own dynamics. Correspondingly, the velocity transfer function used
∗ (𝑠).
to predict 𝑣¯ 𝑖 (𝑡) is 𝐺 𝑖−1,𝑖

4.3.2

ARS in ITS
In ITS, information can be shared, processed, and cooperatively responded by the con-

nected nodes, such as connected vehicles, road side units (RSUs), and unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs). The anomaly detection algorithm for the ego platoon discussed in Section 4.3.1 can be
extended to a more general ITS scenario under the following two assumptions.
1. The nodes should be equipped with onboard sensors to detect the velocity information of
UGVs in the ego platoon.
2. The nodes should be connected to the cloud via V2C communication in order to send out
the reports.
Consider the example illustrated in Fig. 4.4. The ego platoon (𝑈𝐺𝑉1 -𝑈𝐺𝑉5 ) is on the
middle lane with surrounding connected nodes. It is possible for the connected blue vehicle (not
necessary a UGV) on the adjacent lane to measure the velocities of 𝑈𝐺𝑉2 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉3 from its
onboard sensors. Using the anomaly detection method mentioned above, the blue vehicle on
the adjacent lane can generate anomaly reports of 𝑈𝐺𝑉3 . The model of 𝑈𝐺𝑉3 can be obtained
according to the heterogeneous platoon scenario discussed in Remark 9. Similarly, as long as its
velocity information is available, i.e., obtained from the onboard sensors, the anomaly reports of
the ego platoon can be generated by other connected nodes. As a result, the driving condition of
the UGVs in the ego platoon can be reported by more nodes, which is very helpful for information
management to be introduced in the next section.
As a more general scenario is introduced, the notation of the report and the UGV index
need to be modified accordingly. Corresponding to a general ITS system, the notation 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖
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Figure 4.4: Multi-lane vehicle platoon in the ITS scenario.
denotes the anomaly detection report about 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 sent by node with the index 𝑗, i.e., node 𝑗 .
The node can be any element in the ITS that is equipped with the ARS mentioned above.
It is worth noticing that the quality of reports from ARS might be compromised due to
the inaccurate UGV model, subject sensor errors, or even the V2C cyber attacks when transmitting to the cloud. As a result, the reports generated by ARS cannot be fully trusted or directly
used to identify the abnormally driving UGVs. Therefore, the TIMS system is proposed in the
next section to deal with compromised or maliciously tampered reports.

4.4

Trust-based Information Management System (TIMS)
Illustrated in Fig. 4.1, reports sent by the distributed ARS will be collected in the cloud to

help the human operator identify abnormally driving UGVs. However, as explained in the previous section, the correctness of collected anomaly reports can be compromised. In this section,
TIMS is developed to identify the abnormally-driving UGVs via processing compromised reports
received from ARS. Specifically, the V2C cyber attack is considered as the most challenging fac-
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tor to deal with as it can theoretically tamper the reports with arbitrary patterns and strategies.
Hence, we will focus on the V2C cyber attack scenario without loss of generality in other factors.
In Section 4.4.1, a Bayesian-based information pre-processor is developed to convert the collection of reports into physically meaningful information. The trustworthiness of this information
is quantified and dynamically updated in TIMS. An enhanced median filter with the trustworthiness regulation is developed to rule out low-quality reports. The effectiveness of the TIMS in
dealing with V2C cyber attacks is rigorously proved. To further improve the robustness of the
TIMS, a human correction of trustworthiness (HCT) algorithm that can utilize human line-ofsight observations to resist more severe V2C cyber attack is discussed in Section 4.4.2.

4.4.1

Evaluation Score and Trustworthiness Update
We first define three sets to categorize the nodes in the ITS. Let 𝑃𝑖 be the set of nodes

that generate the reports of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 in the ego platoon, 𝑄 𝑖 be the set of UGVs whose performance
will be reported by node𝑖 , and Ω be the set of nodes that generate the report of at least one UGV
in the ego platoon. To improve computation efficiency, the discrete-time setup is adopted. In
the following paragraphs, without further showing the dependence on time, all the following
introduced variables are denoted at processing time step 𝑘 for simplicity.
Upon receiving the reports, the TIMS first transforms the reports to a physically meaningful interpretation via a Bayesian-based information pre-processor as detailed below. Based on
the 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 sent out by every node 𝑗 in the ITS, 𝑗 ∈ Ω, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑄 𝑗 , the TIMS forms a new variable
evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 ∼ Beta(𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 , 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 ), where 𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 and 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 are defined as,

𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 ≜

𝑘·𝛿
∑︁𝑇

1>0 (𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 (𝑡)) + 1;

𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 ≜

𝑡=(𝑘−1)·𝛿𝑇

𝑘·𝛿
∑︁𝑇

1<0 (𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 (𝑡)) + 1,

(4.23)

𝑡=(𝑘−1)·𝛿𝑇

where 𝛿𝑇 is the TIMS processing time interval. 1>0 (·) and 1<0 (·) are the indicator functions2 .
21

>0 (𝑥)

= 1 if 𝑥 > 0 and 1>0 (𝑥) = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 1<0 (𝑥) = 1 if 𝑥 < 0 and 1<0 (𝑥) = 0 otherwise.
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As the beta distribution is the conjugate prior of the binomial distribution in Bayesian inference [44], the evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 stands for the probability that 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 is abnormal based on
the binominal reports, i.e., 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = 1 or 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 = −1, from node 𝑗 . The opinion 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 of the 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖
is represented by its expected value, i.e., 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 ≜ E(𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 ), 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]. The confidence of the
opinion, 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑖 , is defined in a similar way as in [98],
∫
𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑖 ≜
0

1

∫
pdfBeta (𝑥) − pdfU (𝑥) d𝑥 =

0

1

𝑥 𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 −1 (1 − 𝑥) 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 −1
∫1
0

𝑈 𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 −1 (1 − 𝑈) 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 −1 d𝑈

−1 d𝑥,

where pdfBeta stands for the probability density function of Beta distribution Beta(𝛼 𝑗,𝑖 , 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖 ), 𝑥
is the dummy variable for 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 ∈ (0, 1), and pdfU stands for the probability density function
of uniform distribution U (0, 1) defined on the range of 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 . 𝑈 is the reference parameter for
the integration. The higher confidence 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑖 indicates the distribution of 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 concentrates
more on the opinion 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 . In other words, there is higher certainty on its opinion 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 .
The TIMS can then generate its overall evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 based on the
weighted evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 from each node 𝑗 in the set 𝑃𝑖 . The weight is quantified by
the trustworthiness of the corresponding node 𝑗 . In other words, if a node 𝑗 is compromised,
its trustworthiness is low and hence its contribution to the overall evaluation of UGV𝑖 is less
weighted. The details are shown step by step as follows.
First, the overall TIMS evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 is formulated below

𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖

Í

Í
𝑗 ∈𝑃𝑖 𝑇 𝑗 𝛼 𝑗,𝑖
𝑗 ∈𝑃𝑖 𝑇 𝑗 𝛽 𝑗,𝑖
, Í
.
∼ Beta Í
𝑗 ∈𝑃𝑖 𝑇 𝑗
𝑗 ∈𝑃𝑖 𝑇 𝑗

(4.24)

Correspondingly, we can also formulate the opinion 𝑝𝑇,𝑖 and the confidence 𝑐 𝑓𝑇,𝑖 in a similar way
as 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 and 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑖 . Next, in Equation (4.24), 𝑇 𝑗 ∈ [0, 1] is the trustworthiness of node 𝑗 in terms
of whether or not it can send correct reports to the TIMS. Basically, trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1]
is updated based on the deviation of the opinions from node 𝑗 with respect to the corresponding
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reference opinions. The detailed formulation to update 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1] is given below:



𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1] = min 𝑇 𝑗𝑙 [𝑘 + 1], 𝑙 ∈ 𝑄 𝑗 ,

(4.25a)

𝑇 𝑗𝑙 [𝑘 + 1] = min(max(𝑇 𝑗𝑙 [𝑘] + Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 , 0), 1),

Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 = 𝑓Φ 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙 , 𝑐 𝑓𝑇,𝑙 , | 𝑝 𝑗,𝑙 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑙 | ,

(4.25b)

𝑠.𝑡. |Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 | ∝ 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙 · 𝑐 𝑓𝑇,𝑙 .
Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 < 0 iff | 𝑝 𝑗,𝑙 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑙 | > 𝑐 𝑝

(4.25c)

Since a node 𝑗 might send out multiple reports about different UGVs, the trustworthiness
of node 𝑗 should depend on the trustworthiness of all its reports. Denote the trustworthiness of
an individual report 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑙 sent by node 𝑗 about UGV𝑙 as 𝑇 𝑗𝑙 . The minimal 𝑇 𝑗𝑙 is taken by the
TIMS as the overall trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗 of the node 𝑗 as shown in Eqn. (4.25a). The change of
the individual report trustworthiness, i.e., Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 in Eqn. (4.25b), is modeled as a function 𝑓Φ of
confidence 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙 , 𝑐 𝑓𝑇,𝑙 , and opinion difference | 𝑝 𝑗,𝑙 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑙 | in Eqn. (4.25c). The term 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 is
denoted as the reference opinion about the performance of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 (to be explained in Alg. 2).
The constraints of 𝑓Φ in (4.25c) impose that the change of trustworthiness should be greater if
the confidence of the opinions are higher, and should be decreased if and only if the opinion
deviation is too much, i.e., | 𝑝 𝑗,𝑙 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑙 | > 𝑐 𝑝 , where 𝑐 𝑝 is a tunable parameter depending on
performance of the ARS.
Alg. 2 summarizes the process to update the evaluation score of each UGV in the platoon
and trustworthiness of the nodes in the ITS. It contains two main components, i.e., a Bayesianbased information pre-processor (Lines 4 to 5) and an enhanced median filter with trustworthiness regulation to rule out low-quality reports (Line 6 to 26). Corresponding to the trustworthi-
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ness regulation, the trustworthy reporter set 𝑃𝑖′ of the 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 ’s driving performance is introduced.
Comparing to the original reporter set 𝑃𝑖 , 𝑃𝑖′ excludes the nodes with unacceptable trustworthiness. Initially, in Line 1, 𝑃𝑖′ is set to be equal to 𝑃𝑖 . At each processing step 𝑘, as shown from Lines
4 to 5, the TIMS calculates the evaluation scores based on Eqns. (4.23) and (4.24). The process of
calculating reference opinion 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 is detailed from Lines 6 to 8. First, we denote the amendment
opinion multiset as Υ𝑖 . The elements in Υ𝑖 are the repeated opinions from the highest-trusted
node. The cardinality of Υ𝑖 is equal to |𝑃𝑖 | − |𝑃𝑖′ |. Next, denote the corrected opinion multiset
as 𝑆𝑖 . The multiset 𝑆𝑖 is updated as the multiset summation of opinions from the nodes in the
trustworthy reporter set 𝑃𝑖′ and the amendment opinion multiset Υ𝑖 . The reference opinion 𝑝 ∗,𝑖
is then derived as the median value of the corrected opinion multiset 𝑆𝑖 . In Line 9, we formulate
the corrected TIMS opinion about 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 as

∗
𝑝𝑇,𝑖




 𝑝𝑇,𝑖 , if | 𝑝𝑇,𝑖 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 | < 𝑐 𝑝 ,
=

 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 , else.


(4.26)

From Lines 12 to 14, the trustworthiness of the nodes in the set Ω will be updated based on
Eqn. (4.25). The trustworthiness of the nodes will then be checked from Lines 15 to 26 to manage
the trustworthy reporter set 𝑃𝑖′. If the trustworthiness of the node is below the threshold TH1 ,
it will be removed from 𝑃𝑖′. In addition, the removed node can re-join the set 𝑃𝑖′ if its trustworthiness is recovered (above the threshold TH2 ). The gap between TH1 and TH2 can form a trap
for short-periodic V2C cyber attacked node whose period is not long enough to recover its trustworthiness above TH2 . The hyperparameters TH1 and TH2 can be tuned based on the cautious
level of the TIMS system.
Remark 11. If the V2C cyber attacked node 𝑗 keeps sending the out-of-bound incorrect opinion, i.e.,
| 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 | > 𝑐 𝑝 , for more than 1/min(| 𝑓Φ |) time steps, Alg. 2 will eventually punish the trustworthiness of the cyber attacked node 𝑗 to 0. As a result, only the evaluations 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 that satisfy
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𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 ≤ 𝑐 𝑝 are left with non-zero trustworthiness. Since 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 is the weighted average of
these evaluations, it is straightforward to show that | 𝑝𝑇,𝑖 − 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 | < 𝑐 𝑝 eventually. Hence, the cor∗ in Eqn. (4.26) will converge to 𝑝 .
rected opinion 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
𝑇,𝑖

•

Algorithm 2 Evaluation scores and trustworthiness update
Input: The anomaly detection reports, 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 , 𝑗 ∈ Ω, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑄 𝑗 , about the UGVs in the ego
platoon; The initial trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗 [0], 𝑗 ∈ Ω, based on the historical performance;
∗ , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁,
Output: The TIMS evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 and corrected TIMS opinion, 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
of the UGVs in the platoon; The trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1], 𝑗 ∈ Ω, of the nodes that send reports
to the TIMS;
1: Initialize the trustworthy reporter set 𝑃𝑖′ = 𝑃𝑖 , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁
2: For 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 Do
3:
For each TIMS processing step 𝑘 Do
4:
Update the individual evaluation: 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 𝑗,𝑖 ← Eqn.(4.23)
5:
Calculate the overall evaluation: 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 ← Eqn.(4.24)
6:
Build the multiset Υ𝑖 = 𝑝 𝑤,𝑖 · ⊮, |Υ𝑖 | = |𝑃𝑖 | − |𝑃𝑖′ |, where 𝑤 ←index of the node with
the highest trustworthiness, 𝑤 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 , ⊮ is a vector of all ones
7:
Build the multiset 𝑆𝑖 ← multiset{𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 | 𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑖′ } +Υ𝑖
8:
Calculate 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 ← median(𝑆𝑖 )
∗ ← Eqn. (4.26)
9:
Calculate 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
10:
End
11: End
12: For 𝑗 ∈ Ω Do
13:
Update the trustworthiness: 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1] ← Eqn.(4.25)
14: End
15: For 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 Do
16:
For 𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑖′ Do
17:
IF 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1] <TH1 ,
18:
𝑃𝑖′ = 𝑃𝑖′/ 𝑗
19:
End
20:
End
21:
For 𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑖 \ 𝑃𝑖′ Do
22:
IF 𝑇 𝑗 [𝑘 + 1] >TH2 ,
Ð
23:
𝑃𝑖′ = 𝑃𝑖′ 𝑗
24:
End
25:
End
26: End

Theorem 4. Consider Alg. 2, as long as fewer than half of the opinions in the set 𝑆𝑖 are from the
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∗ , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, with respect to the range of the
hacked nodes, the corrected TIMS opinion, i.e., 𝑝𝑇,𝑖

opinions from the nodes not compromised by V2C cyber attacks (honest nodes) should always be less
than 𝑐 𝑝 .
Proof First of all, assume that the range of the opinions based on the honest reports is
[ 𝑝 min , 𝑝 max ]. Sort the opinions in the set 𝑆𝑖 from the lowest to the highest, i.e., 𝑝′1,𝑖 ≤ 𝑝′2,𝑖 ≤
. . . ≤ 𝑝′𝜉,𝑖 , where 𝜉 is the total number of elements in 𝑆𝑖 and 𝑝′(·),𝑖 is the sorted opinion. We
prove the theorem by contradiction in the following paragraphs.
If 𝜉 is an odd number, 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 = 𝑝 𝜉 +1 ,𝑖 , the number of hacked opinions should be less than
2

𝜉−1
2 .

If 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 < 𝑝 min , then

greater than or equal to

𝑝′1,𝑖

𝜉+1
2

≤

𝑝′2,𝑖

𝜉−1
2 ,

>

≤ . . . < 𝑝 min . The number of the hacked opinions is

which contradicts to our assumption that fewer than half

of the opinions are hacked. If 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 > 𝑝 max , then 𝑝 max < 𝑝′𝜉 +1 ≤ . . . ≤ 𝑝′𝜉,𝑖 . The number of
hacked opinions is greater than or equal to

𝜉+1
2

>

2 ,𝑖
𝜉−1
2 , which again contradicts to our assumption.

As a result, when 𝜉 is an odd number, 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 ∈ [ 𝑝 min , 𝑝 max ].


1
′
′
If 𝜉 is an even number, 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 = 2 𝑝 𝜉 + 𝑝 𝜉
, the number of the hacked opinions
2

should be less than or equal to

𝜉
2

,𝑖

2

+1,1

− 1. If 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 < 𝑝 min , then 𝑝′1,𝑖 ≤ 𝑝′2,𝑖 ≤ . . . ≤ 𝑝′𝜉 < 𝑝 min . The
2

number of the hacked opinions is greater than or equal to
assumption. If 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 > 𝑝 max , then 𝑝 max < 𝑝′𝜉

2 +1,𝑖

is greater than or equal to

𝜉
2

>

𝜉
2

𝜉
2

>

𝜉
2

,𝑖

− 1, which contradicts to our

≤ . . . ≤ 𝑝′𝜉,𝑖 . The number of hacked opinions

− 1, which again contradicts to our assumption. Therefore,

when 𝜉 is an even number, 𝑝 ∗,𝑖 ∈ [ 𝑝 min , 𝑝 max ].
∗ − 𝑝
Based on Eqn. (4.26), it is trivial to prove 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
∗,𝑖 < 𝑐 𝑝 . As it is already proved that
∗ with respect to this range is less than 𝑐 .
𝑝 ∗,𝑖 is within [ 𝑝 min , 𝑝 max ], the deviation of the 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
𝑝

□

The effectiveness of Alg. 2 is demonstrated in Theorem 4. The trustworthiness mechanism can kick the reports from the untrusted nodes out of the multiset 𝑆𝑖 . Besides that, the
∗ , i.e., the difference between 𝑝 ∗ and
TIMS can still guarantee the high quality of its opinion 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
𝑇,𝑖

the honest opinions is less than 𝑐 𝑝 , even if near half of the reports in 𝑆𝑖 are incorrect/dishonest.
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Algorithm 3 Human correction of trustworthiness (HCT)
Input: The human operator’s opinion, 𝑝 ℎ,𝑙 [𝐾], about the driving performance of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑙 ;
The corresponding human operator’s confidence, 𝑐 𝑓 ℎ,𝑙 [𝐾], of the opinion; Steps, 𝑛 ℎ , it takes for
the human operator to have an opinion about UGV𝑙 ; History reports 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑗,𝑖 [𝐾−𝑛 ℎ , . . . , 𝐾], 𝑗 ∈
Ω, 𝑖 ∈ 𝑄 𝑗 ; History trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗𝑖 [𝐾 − 𝑛 ℎ , . . . , 𝐾].
∗ [𝐾] of 𝑈𝐺𝑉 , ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤
Output: Corrected evaluations 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 [𝐾] and TIMS opinion 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
𝑖
𝑁; Corrected trustworthiness 𝑇 𝑗 [𝐾 + 1] of node 𝑗 , 𝑗 ∈ Ω
1: For each human observation injection step 𝐾 Do
2:
For 𝑚 ∈ 𝑃𝑙 Do
Í𝐾·𝛿𝑇
𝑎
𝑎
3:
Aggregate the observations: 𝛼𝑚,𝑙
≜
1 (𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑚,𝑙 (𝑡)) + 1, 𝛽𝑚,𝑙
≜
𝑡=(𝐾−𝑛 ℎ )·𝛿𝑇 >0
Í𝐾·𝛿𝑇
1 (𝑟𝑒 𝑝 𝑚,𝑙 (𝑡)) + 1;
𝑡=(𝐾−𝑛 ℎ )·𝛿𝑇 <0
𝑎 [𝐾] ← Beta(𝛼 𝑎 , 𝛽 𝑎 )
𝑎
4:
Get 𝑝 𝑚,𝑙 [𝐾], 𝑐 𝑓𝑚,𝑙
𝑚,𝑙 𝑚,𝑙
𝑎 , 𝜂 · | 𝑝 𝑎 [𝐾] − 𝑝 [𝐾]|)
5:
Δ𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝐾] = 𝑛 ℎ · 𝑓Φ (𝑐 𝑓 ℎ,𝑙 , 𝑐 𝑓𝑚,𝑙
ℎ
ℎ,𝑙
𝑚,𝑙
6:
𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝐾 + 1] = min(max(𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝐾] + Δ𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝐾], 0), 1)
7:
End
8:
For 𝐾 − 𝑛 ℎ ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐾 Do
∗ [𝑘], 𝑇 [𝑘 + 1], ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, 𝑗 ∈ Ω ← Alg. 2 by holding
9:
Recalculate 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 [𝑘], 𝑝𝑇,𝑖
𝑗
𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝑘] = 𝑇𝑚𝑙 [𝐾 + 1], ∀𝑚 ∈ 𝑃𝑙
10:
End
11: End
Intuitively, the proposed algorithm can withstand scenarios when more than half of the nodes
send incorrect information with different starting time steps. For example, the new hacked node
appears one by one, and the TIMS removes them from the trustworthy reporter set sequentially.
However, the more severe V2C cyber attacks, e.g., when most of the nodes start to send the dishonest reports simultaneously, can compromise the performance of Alg. 2. Under this scenario,
the human observation is expected to help the TIMS. The details will be covered in the next section. This new TIMS improves the reliability in dealing with V2C cyber attacks comparing to
the strategy adopted in our previous paper [55].

4.4.2

Human Correction of Trustworthiness (HCT) Algorithm
Here we introduce a human correction of trustworthiness (HCT) algorithm that can

correct the trustworthiness of the nodes based on the human operator’s line-of-sight opinion 𝑝 ℎ,𝑖
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and the corresponding confidence 𝑐 𝑓 ℎ,𝑖 . Let 𝐾 denote the time step when the human operator
injects through information through the HCT algorithm.
Alg. 3 summarizes the trustworthiness correction process. First of all, it might take a
longer processing time step, 𝑛 ℎ , for the human operator to monitor the performance of 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑙
before the opinion is generated. As a result, the TIMS will first rebuild the Beta distribution based
on reports from the nodes in the set 𝑃𝑙 . As shown in Line 4, the augmented opinion 𝑝 𝑎𝑗,𝑙 [𝐾] and
𝑎 [𝐾] can then be obtained based on the aggregated observations from
augmented confidence 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙

time step 𝐾 − 𝑛 ℎ to step 𝐾 as shown in Line 3. Correspondingly, the trustwortiness of the nodes
in set 𝑃𝑙 is regulated in Lines 5-6. The change of the trustworthiness depends on the function
𝑎 ) and the scaled dissension, i.e., 𝜂 ·
𝑓Φ , defined in Section 4.4.1, of the confidences (𝑐 𝑓 ℎ,𝑙 , 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙
ℎ

| 𝑝 𝑎𝑗,𝑙 − 𝑝 ℎ,𝑙 |. The scale factor 𝜂 ℎ is introduced here to accept a larger human-machine dissension
than the machine-machine dissension without any trustworthiness punishment. Originally, 𝑓Φ is
proposed to regulate the change of the trustworthiness at one processing time step. The time step
𝑛 ℎ is multiplied to aggregate the change of the trustworthiness within that time span. In Lines
8-10, the trustworthiness of the nodes in set Ω are recovered. By holding the trustworthiness of
∗ of
the UGVs in the set 𝑃𝑙 , we re-update the evaluation score 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑇,𝑖 and corrected opinions 𝑝𝑇,𝑖

the UGVs in the platoon, and trustwortiness 𝑇 𝑗 of the nodes in ITS from 𝐾 −𝑛 ℎ step to 𝐾 step
in Alg. 2.

4.5

Simulation and Human-in-the-loop (HIL) Experiment
Results

4.5.1

Task Scenario
The study was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Clemson University.

The participants were asked to supervise a 9-UGV platoon under cyber attack scenarios. The
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values of the core parameters of the OBRC, ARS, and TIMS are summarized in Table. 4.1.
Table 4.1: Simulation parameters

Parameters

Values

Parameters

Values

{𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 , 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 }

{0.7, 0.49}

{𝜏𝑖 , ℎ𝑖∗ }

{0.4, 1}

{𝑐𝑟 , 𝜅}

{10, 60}

{𝑐 𝑝 , 𝛿𝑇 }

{0.1, 0.4}

{TH1 , TH2 }

{0.1, 0.3}

𝜂ℎ

0.3

In addition, the function 𝑓Φ in Eqn. (4.25c) is chosen in the form of a hyperbolic function: Δ𝑇 𝑗𝑙 = −0.3 · 𝑐 𝑓 𝑗,𝑙 · 𝑐 𝑓𝑇,𝑙 · tanh(26 · 𝜂 𝑗,𝑙 − 2.95) − 0.1. The speed profile of the leading
UGV is shown in Fig. 4.5a. The V2V cyber attacks on the platoon is shown in Fig. 4.5b. As can be
seen, 𝑈𝐺𝑉4 (40s-118s), 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 (180s-290s), and 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 (120s-210s, 290s-365s) are under V2V cyber
attacks.
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Figure 4.5: Platoon scenario setup

The simulation results of the OBRC performance in resistance to the V2V cyber attack
can be found in our paper [55]. Based on the parameters in Table 4.1, ∥𝑔𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 = 1, ∥𝑔𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 =
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1.4794, and ∥𝑔 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 = 1, ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 9. As the maximum velocity fluctuation of the leading
vehicle is ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡)−𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ = 8 m/s, the initial velocity is taken as 30 m/s, and the safety margin 𝜖 is
set as 5 m, the maximum acceptable V2V cyber attack magnitude is then calculated as ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ =
11.4911, ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 9, according to Proposition 2 (by assuming an overly optimistic case that there
is no concurrent V2V cyber attack on the preceding vehicles). Similarly, the conventional CACC
dynamics Eqns. (4.1), (4.2), and (4.4) without OBRC can be converted to the form similar to
Eqn. (4.13). Based on Proposition 2, the corresponding maximum acceptable magnitude of V2V
cyber attack without OBRC is only ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ = 6.2193, ∀2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 9. As can be seen, the OBRC
can improve the resilience of the vehicle-following controller under V2V cyber attacks. However,
the V2V cyber attack values shown in Fig. 4.5b are even greater than 11.4911, not to mention that
there are concurrent V2V cyber attacks around 200s. As a result, the limitation of the OBRC is
shown and it cannot guarantee platoon safety. Human supervision is expected to help the UGV
platoon via our proposed automated decision-aid.

4.5.2

Simulation Demonstration of the TIMS Effectiveness
In this section, three simulations are generated to demonstrate the effectiveness of TIMS

under V2C cyber attacks. We assume that for every 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 in the platoon, besides itself and its
preceding UGV, its driving condition can also be monitored and reported by one more node in
the ITS, which should be feasible in the ITS system setup as illustrated in Section 4.3.2.
A mild V2C cyber attack scenario is generated in the first simulation. 𝑈𝐺𝑉3 sent out false
alarm reports of itself from 20s to 70s, i.e., 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 3,3 (𝑡) = 1, 𝑡 ∈ [20, 70]. 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 sent out the missed
detection report of itself from 120s to 210s, i.e., 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 7,7 (𝑡) = −1, 𝑡 ∈ [120, 210]. In addition,
𝑈𝐺𝑉4 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉5 sent out false alarm reports of its following UGV from 120s to 210s and from
290s to 320s respectively, i.e., 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 4,5 (𝑡) = 1, 𝑡 ∈ [120, 210], 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 5,6 (𝑡) = 1, 𝑡 ∈ [290, 320].
Other reports are not hacked. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 4.6a and 4.6b. It is trivial
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to show that this setup satisfies the conditions of Theorem 2. As can be seen, the UGVs with
abnormal driving conditions, i.e., 𝑈𝐺𝑉4 , 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 , and 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 , were all successfully identified as
shown in Fig. 4.6b. The double headed arrows on top show the spans of V2C cyber attacks in
(a), (c), and (e) and those of V2V cyber attacks in (b), (d), and (f). For all the reports annotated in
the figure, they denote false reports. Moreover, as can be seen from Fig. 4.6a, the trustworthiness
of the dishonest nodes dropped when a V2C cyber attack happened, and recovered when the
V2C cyber attack disappeared. It is also worth mentioning that this consistent suppression of
the V2C cyber attack will not be achieved by the straightforward voting mechanism [55], where
trustworthiness-weighted reports are considered as the evaluation score, and the trustworthiness
of dishonest nodes is changed dynamically.
A serve V2C cyber attack scenario is generated in the second simulation. In addition
to the V2C cyber attack set up in the first simulation, UGV6 sent out missed detection report
about 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 from 120s to 220s, i.e., 𝑟𝑒 𝑝 6,7 (𝑡) = −1, 𝑡 ∈ [120, 220]. As a result, from 120s to
220s, there are two nodes, 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 sent out the incorrect information about 𝑈𝐺𝑉7
simultaneously. Only an extra node in the ITS, 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝜖 , sent out the correct report during this
period. As can be seen from Fig. 4.6d, the abnormal driving behavior of 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 was miss-detected
by the TIMS from 120s to 220s. Furthermore, the dishonest nodes, i.e., 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 escaped
from punishment. In contrast, the trustworthiness of the honest 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝜖 dropped incorrectly
(Fig. 4.6c). In such scenarios, the human operator is expected to inject their evaluation of 𝑈𝐺𝑉7
to refresh the TIMS.
In the third simulation, the human observation, 𝑝 ℎ,7 = 0.75, 𝑐 𝑓 ℎ,7 = 0.75, of 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 is
injected into the TIMS at 130s via the HCT algorithm. As can be seen from Fig. 4.6f, 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 with
abnormal driving behavior can be detected with the help of the human operator. In addition, the
trustworthiness of the honest 𝑁𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝜖 recovered and the trustworthiness of the dishonest nodes
(i.e., 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 and 𝑈𝐺𝑉7 ) dropped. The above scenario is generated as an example to show the
effectiveness of the TIMS with the help of human observations. The TIMS can also be refreshed
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by human observations in other severe V2C cyber attack scenarios.

4.5.3

Human Subject Experiment Design
In this experiment setup, front camera views of the UGVs are provided to the human op-

erator to monitor the platoon as shown in Fig 4.7a. Participants need to monitor the driving performance of the 9-UGV platoon and intervene the abnormal one manually via a joystick, shown
in Fig. 4.7b, and an assigned GUI, i.e., either benchmark GUI (GUI-B) or new GUI (GUI-N)
as shown in Fig. 4.7c and 4.7e, respectively. The GUI-B is designed under a typical multi-screen
surveillance approach without the decision-making aid [40]. The GUI-B has basic functions for
a human operator to choose which UGV to intervene and change its control mode, i.e., manual
or autonomous mode. Besides the basic functions provided by GUI-B, the GUI-N can also display the UGV evaluation scores in the “Platoon Info. Panel” (corresponding to Section 4.4.1) and
inject human evaluation in the “Vehicle Eval Panel” (corresponding to Section 4.4.2). It is worth
mentioning that the information provided in the “Platoon Info. Panel” might be incorrect due
to V2C cyber attacks. If the participants find the information conflicts with their observations,
they can help to correct the TIMS by injecting their opinions via the “Vehicle Eval. Panel”. As
a result, the “Platoon Info. Panel” can continue providing accurate information to the participant to facilitate the supervision task. Once the abnormal UGV is identified, the participant can
manually intervene in the longitudinal control of the abnormal UGV via the joystick.
Twenty students from Clemson University (7 female and 13 male) participated in this
experiment. The age ranges from 22 to 34 years old. The photo of one participate conducting
the experiment is shown in Fig, 4.7c. Before the formal experiments, every participant had two
training sessions on how to supervise a UGV platoon via the GUI-B and the GUI-N, respectively, to overcome the learning effect. After the training sessions, the participate conducted two
experiment sessions with the GUI-B and the GUI-N, respectively. The sequence of these two
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experiments was randomized for different participates. In addition, the timing and locations of
the cyber attacks were different between these two experiments. After the experiment, the participants were asked to fill in questionnaires to rate their perceived workload. In the first set of
human subject test, no V2C cyber attack was injected despite the fact that the participants were
told that it may happen. To mitigate the memory effects in two consecutive experiments, the
indices of the abnormal UGVs were shifted by ±1. The set of indices was assigned randomly to
these experiments. In addition, the patterns of these two sets of V2V cyber attacks were the same.
Fig. 4.5b shows one set of V2V cyber attack, i.e., 𝑈𝐺𝑉4 , 𝑈𝐺𝑉5 , and 𝑈𝐺𝑉6 were hacked by the
V2V cyber attack.
We tested the following four hypotheses:
H1. Compared to the GUI-B, our proposed GUI-N can decrease the vulnerability of the platoon under human supervision.
H2. Compared to the GUI-B, our proposed GUI-N requires less human workload.
H3. Compared to the GUI-B, our proposed GUI-N can help the human operator achieve better results in detecting abnormal UGVs.
H4. Compared to the GUI-B, our proposed GUI-N can achieve better platoon efficiency.
The corresponding independent variables (IVs) are the two different GUIs, i.e., GUI-B
and GUI-N. The dependent variables (DVs) are defined as follows:
1. Vulnerability: The vulnerability of the platoon is quantified as the time duration when
the inter-distance between any two UGVs is unacceptably small, e.g., < 𝜖 = 5 m, which
corresponds to hypothesis H1.
2. Subjective Workload: The subjective human workload is quantified by the NASA task load
index (TLX), which corresponds to hypothesis H2.
78

3. Missed Detection Time: The missed detection time is quantified by the time duration when
at least one abnormal UGV is missed by the human operator, which corresponds to hypothesis H3.
4. Platoon Eﬃciency: The platoon efficiency is quantified by the 2 norm of the inter-distance
between the leading UGV and the last UGV, i.e., ∥𝑥 1 (𝑡) − 𝑥 9 (𝑡)∥ 2 . This DV corresponds
to hypothesis H4.

4.5.4

Sample Experiment Results Analysis
The sample experiment results of participant No. 14 are shown in Fig. 4.8. As can be

seen from Fig. 4.8a and 4.8b, this participant did a much better job with the GUI-N in regulating the inter-distances within the platoon. The improvement of the human performance can be
credited to the human decision-making aid system equipped in the GUI-N. With the help of the
decision-aid, the participant could have better understanding of what happened in the platoon
via the “Platoon Info. Panel”. In contrast, the human operator could be struggling in identifying
the abnormal UGVs through the 9 camera multi-screen views in Fig. 4.7a. The manual mode
switching plots shown in Fig. 4.8c and 4.8d support this argument. As can be seen, corresponding to the V2V cyber attack pattern in Fig. 4.5b, the human operator had much better manual
intervention assignments to abnormal UGVs with the GUI-N. Nonetheless, with GUI-B, the
human operator failed to help the abnormal UGVs promptly. Similar results can be shown for
other participants.

4.5.5

Statistical Analysis
The box and whisker of the DV plots with respect to two different GUIs are shown

in Fig. 4.9. Because the vulnerability difference between GUI-N and GUI-B did not pass the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are conducted to justify the
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difference between the two groups statistically. As can be seen in Fig. 4.9a, the vulnerability of
the platoon with GUI-N is lower than that with GUI-B with statistical significance (𝑝 < 0.001).
As a result, hypothesis H1 should be accepted. Similar conclusions can also be obtained for H2
(𝑝 < 0.001) and H3 (𝑝 < 0.001). For H4, we cannot find significant difference between the
efficiency in GUI-N and GUI-B from Fig. 4.9d (𝑝 = 0.167).
On average, the vulnerability of the platoon is decreased by 78.4%, the human workload
is decreased by 39.0%, the missed detection is decreased by 44.8%, and the platoon inefficiency is
not significantly changed in statistics (based on t-test) from GUI-B to GUI-N.

4.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, we consider a scenario where a human operator supervises a UGV pla-

toon under both V2V and V2C cyber attacks. The V2V cyber attack can threaten platoon safety
via hacking the information used by the UGV motion controller. To deal with the V2V cyber
attack, OBRC is proposed to mitigate the adversarial effects. The safety conditions of the platoon under V2V cyber attacks are also rigorously proved and analyzed in this paper. To further
decrease the vulnerability of the UGV platoon, the automated decision-aid is developed to empower human supervision. The driving conditions of the platoon will first be reported by the
nodes in ITS via ARS. Due to the existence of V2C cyber attacks, TIMS is introduced to handle
reports that might be tempered. Under mild V2C cyber attack, TIMS is proved to recover the
ground truth vehicle driving status information automatically from the compromised reports.
Furthermore, the HCT algorithm is designed to incorporate human line-of-sight observations
in resisting the severe V2C cyber attack situation. Based on the simulation and human subject
experiment results, the vulnerability of the platoon, the missed detection on abnormal UGVs,
and the human workload have been shown to decrease with our decision-making aid system.
It is also worth noticing that, via adopting the corresponding resilient controllers and
80

nominal driving models in ARS, this proposed HRI framework can be applied to other ITS applications, such as cooperative lane changing. Moreover, severe cyber attacks scenario is the main
focus in this paper, where the cyber attacks have direct threats to the safety of the platoon. The
human operator was hence introduced to improve the platoon survivability. In our future work,
under mild cyber attacks or communication imperfection, we will also study how the human
operator can further improve the driving efficiency and constrain the propagation of velocity
fluctuations, e.g., the guarantee of platoon string stability.
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Figure 4.6: TIMS performance.
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Chapter 5
Safety-aware Adversarial Inverse
Reinforcement Learning
5.1

Preliminaries

5.1.1

Adversarial Inverse Reinforcement Learning
We first denote the trajectory of the dynamical state-action pairs as 𝜏 = (s1 , a1 , s2 , a2 , . . . ,

s𝐾 , a𝐾 ). Denote the trajectory distribution of human demonstrations as 𝑝(𝜏). In the MaxEntIRL reviewed in Section 1, it is assumed that probability of the trajectory can be approximated
using expert data as a Boltzmann distribution,

𝑝 𝜃 (𝜏) =

where 𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏) =

Í𝐾

𝑘=0 𝑐 𝜃 (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 )

1
exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)),
𝑍

(5.1)

is the cost of the trajectory 𝜏. 𝜃 represents the cost function

parameters. Define the loss of the cost function learning, in maximizing the likelihood of the
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expert trajectories, as:

𝐿 cost (𝜃) = E𝜏∼𝑝 [− log 𝑝 𝜃 (𝜏)] = E𝜏∼𝑝 [𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)] + log 𝑍.

(5.2)

The key objective of the above IRL problem is to get the estimation of 𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏). Theoretically, the
partition function 𝑍 is the sum of exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)) over all the possible trajectories, which is the
main challenge for the MaxEnt-IRL algorithms. In policy-guided IRL [26], under the category
of MaxEnt-IRL, the importance sampling method is used to estimate the partition function 𝑍.
Here, the loss function 𝐿 cost in Eq. (5.2) can be converted as follows



𝐿 cost (𝜃) = E𝜏∼𝑝 [𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)] + log E𝜏∼𝑞

exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏))
𝑞(𝜏)


(5.3)

,

where 𝑞 is the importance sampling distribution, whose optimal value is 𝑞(𝜏) ∝ exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)).
The sampling policy is updated via minimizing the KL-divergence between 𝑞(𝜏) and 𝑍1 exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)),
which is equivalent to minimizing the loss,

𝐿 samp (𝑞) = E𝜏∼𝑞 [𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)] + E𝜏∼𝑞 [log 𝑞(𝜏)].

(5.4)

To reduce the importance sampling variance, a mixture distribution 𝜇 = 21 𝑝 + 21 𝑞 is adopted as
˜
the new importance sampling distribution. Let 𝑝(𝜏)
be the rough estimation of expert demonstration distribution, e.g., the current 𝑝 𝜃 (𝜏) can be used. The loss of the cost function (5.3) then
becomes,

𝐿 cost (𝜃) = E𝜏∼𝑝 [𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)] + log E𝜏∼𝜇



exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏))
1 ˜
1
2 𝑝(𝜏) + 2 𝑞(𝜏)


.

(5.5)

It has been proved that the above policy-guided IRL can be represented by the following
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GAN network [25]:
𝑝 𝜃 (𝜏)
𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏) =
=
𝑝 𝜃 (𝜏) + 𝑞(𝜏)

1
𝑍

1
𝑍

exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏))
,
exp(−𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏)) + 𝑞(𝜏)

(5.6)

𝐿 𝐷 (𝜃) = E𝜏∼𝑝 [−log 𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏)] +E𝜏∼𝑞 [−log(1−𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏))],

(5.7)

𝐿 𝐺 (𝑞) = E𝜏∼𝑞 [− log 𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏)] + E𝜏∼𝑞 [log(1 − 𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏))],

(5.8)

𝐷 (𝜃)
=
with the relation that d𝐿d𝜃

d𝐿 cost (𝜃)
d𝜃

and 𝐿 𝐺 (𝑞) = 𝐿 samp (𝑞) + log𝑍. 𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏) is the discrimina-

tor of the GAN network. The cost function and its corresponding optimal policy can be learned
via minimizing the loss of GAN discriminator 𝐿 𝐷 (𝜃) and the loss of GAN generator 𝐿 𝐺 (𝑞),
respectively. By considering the partition function 𝑍 as a constant, the discriminator in Eq. (5.6)
can be rewritten as:
𝐷 𝜃 (𝜏) =

exp( 𝑓𝜃 (𝜏))
,
exp( 𝑓𝜃 (𝜏)) + 𝑞(𝜏)

(5.9)

where 𝑓𝜃 (𝜏) = −𝑐 𝜃 (𝜏) − log(𝑍).
Instead of taking account of the whole trajectory 𝜏, the AIRL algorithm [28] takes the
individual state-action pair in its construction of the discriminator, i.e.,

𝐷 𝜃 (s, a) =

exp( 𝑓𝜃 (s, a))
.
exp( 𝑓𝜃 (s, a)) + 𝜋(a|s)

(5.10)

As the individual state-action pair is considered in this formulation, the learned stochastic policy
𝜋(a|s) is used here to replace 𝑞(𝜏). In practice, this formulation can reduce the variance in the
training process. Similarly, 𝐷 𝜃 is trained to minimize the following loss,

𝐿 𝐷 (𝜃) = E𝜋 𝐸 [−log 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a)] +E𝜋 [−log(1−𝐷 𝜃 (s, a))],

(5.11)

where 𝜋 𝐸 is the expert’s policy which can be approximated by expert demonstrations. We can
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then get the following reward function for policy training from (5.8),

𝑟 𝜃 = log 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a) − log(1 − 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a)).

(5.12)

By substituting Eq. (5.10), the above equation becomes:

𝑟 𝜃 = 𝑓𝜃 (s, a) − log(𝜋(a|s)),

(5.13)

where the − log(𝜋(a|s)) is the entropy regulator to improve the exploration in the training process. An arbitrary policy optimization RL algorithm can then be used to train the policy network
𝜋. New state-action pairs will then be sampled based on the trained policy. The above processes
form one iteration of AIRL. To further reduce the reward ambiguity issue, i.e., different reward
functions can explain the optimality of trajectories generated by the same optimal policy, the
shaping terms 𝑙 𝜙 (s′) − 𝑙 𝜙 (s) can be added on top of the original function 𝑓𝜃 , which is very helpful in the transfer learning task [28].
As can be seen, the IL task can be solved by AIRL algorithm in matching the state-action
pair distribution between the learned policy and expert demonstrations. No safety awareness has
been reinforced in this process. In this paper, the safety-aware AIRL (S-AIRL) is proposed to
improve the safety of the algorithm.

5.1.2

Control Barrier Function (CBF)
Consider the following nonlinear dynamical system that is affine in control

x¤ = 𝑓 (x) + 𝑔(x)u, u ∈ 𝑈, x ∈ 𝐷 ⊂ R𝑛 .
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(5.14)

Define a continuously differentiable function ℎ(x), the state x is said to be within a safe zone if

ℎ(x) ≥ 0.

(5.15)

In the CBF research, the safety of dynamical systems (5.14) is implied by the forward invariance
of the superlevel set of ℎ(x), i.e., C = {x ∈ 𝐷 ⊂ R𝑛 : ℎ(x) ≥ 0}. The forward invariant set is
defined as follows.
Definition 3. Forward invariant set [3]: A set C is forward invariant if for every x0 ∈ C, x𝑡 ∈ C
for all 𝑡 ∈ 𝐼𝑒 (x0 ), where 𝐼𝑒 (x0 ) is the maximum interval of existence to ensure that x𝑡 is the unique
solution of the system dynamic (5.14). This interval becomes [0, ∞) if the system is forward complete.
The theorem of the relationship between CBF and forward invariant set is as follows.
Theorem 5. [4] Given a dynamical system (5.14), the ℎ(x) function deﬁned in Eq. (5.15), and its
super-level set C, ℎ(x) is called the CBF if there exists an extended class 𝜅∞ function 1 Γ such that,

𝑠𝑢 𝑝 [𝐿 𝑓 ℎ(x) + 𝐿 𝑔 ℎ(x)u] ≥ −Γ(ℎ(x)),

∀x ∈ 𝐷.

(5.16)

u∈𝑈

where 𝐿 𝑓 ℎ and 𝐿 𝑔 ℎ represent the Lie derivatives of ℎ with respect to 𝑓 and 𝑔, respectively. Correspondingly, we have the set that consists of all control values that render C forward invariant:

KCBF (x) = {u ∈ 𝑈 : 𝐿 𝑓 ℎ(x) + 𝐿 𝑔 ℎ(x)u + Γ(ℎ(x)) ≥ 0}

(5.17)

Since both 𝐿 𝑓 (ℎ(x)) and 𝐿 𝑔 (ℎ(x)) depend on the system dynamics, we can directly get
the admissible control input set KCBF (x) of an arbitrary state x with the known system dynamics. However, it might be infeasible to get accurate system dynamic equations in a data-driven
scenario. To deal with this issue, in Section 5.3, the CBF is integrated with model-free method
1𝜅

∞

function is a strictly increasing function 𝑓 : R → R and 𝑓 (0) = 0.
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for deep learning. The on-site sampling data can mitigate the effects of inaccurate models, and
the CBF analysis can also facilitate the training process of the model-free method. It is worth
noticing that the safe set C and admissible control input set KCBF (x) provide safety awareness
proactively. The unsafe situation will not be rendered immediately if the action is taken outside
of KCBF (x) or even the state is outside of C [17]. In this paper, we focus more on the immediate
safety, i.e., no collision happens. Although the CBF analysis might be too conservative to judge
the immediate safety directly, it provides a model-based reference to guide the training process of
the model-free safety approach, which will be detailed in Section 5.3.

5.1.3

Neural Network Safety Critic
Safety critic network is a useful tool used to quantify the safety/risk level of the state-

𝜋𝑠
action pair. The physical meaning of the safety critic 𝑄 safe
(s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 ) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that

the agent will become immediately unsafe in the future if, starting at state s 𝑘 , it takes action a 𝑘 ,
and follows the policy 𝜋 𝑠 in the rest of the trajectory. Its math formulation is [86] [90],
"
𝜋𝑠
𝑄 safe
(s 𝑘 , a𝑘 ) = E𝜋𝑠

∞
∑︁

#
𝑘 ′ −𝑘

𝛾safe 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ′ )|s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 ,

(5.18)

𝑘 ′ =𝑘

where 𝐼 (·) is the incident indicator function, which indicates if the given state is unsafe or not.
𝜋𝑠
𝛾safe is the discount constant. It is believed that comparing to the 𝑄 safe
(s, a), the incident indica-

tor 𝐼 (s) is more straightforward to label. Using the dynamic programming method (the trajectory
terminates once state s become unsafe), we have
𝜋𝑠
𝜋𝑠
𝑄ˆ safe
(s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 ) = 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) + (1 − 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ))E𝜋𝑠 [𝛾safe 𝑄ˆ safe
(s 𝑘+1 , a 𝑘+1 )],
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𝜋𝑠
where 𝑄ˆ safe
(s, a) is the neural network approximator of the original Q-function. To train the

safety critic network, it needs to minimize the following loss:
h
 2i
𝜋𝑠
𝜋𝑠
𝐿 safe = E𝜋 𝑄ˆ safe
(s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 ) − 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) + (1−𝐼 (s 𝑘 )) 𝛾safe 𝑄ˆ safe
(s 𝑘+1 , a 𝑘+1 )
.

(5.19)

Meanwhile, a separate policy is trained, via RL algorithms, to guide the sampling process.
In this paper, we proposed a CBF-based sampling process without the need for extra policy training. Moreover, it is also expected to have better exploration-exploitation property, which will be
detailed in Section 5.3.

5.2

Problem Definition and Overall Framework
This paper considers an IL problem in systems modeled by the Markov decision process

(MDP), defined by a tuple (S, A, T, 𝑟 𝑒 , 𝛾, 𝜌0 ). S is the state space. A is the discrete action space,
i.e., A = {𝛼0 , . . . , 𝛼𝐽 }, where 𝛼 𝑗 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽, is the unique action element. For each action element in A, the corresponding low-level controllers are given. For example, in the highway cruise
control scenario, the action elements can be faster, slower, and idle. The corresponding
low-level longitudinal control u will be generated as throttle position. At time step 𝑘, the corresponding action a𝑘 , can be any element 𝛼 𝑗 in A, i.e., a 𝑘 ∈ A, depending on the policy 𝜋(a 𝑘 |s 𝑘 ).
T(s 𝑘+1 |s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 ) is the transition distribution. 𝑟 𝑒 is the expert reward function that is unknown in
the IL problem. 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. 𝜌0 is the initial distribution of the states. The
objective of the IL is to learn a policy that can map the state s 𝑘 to the optimal discrete action a 𝑘
given the expert demonstrations.
The AIRL algorithm summarized in Section 5.1.1 can be adopted to solve the above IL
problem. In the AIRL algorithm, the discriminator is trained to recover the hidden expert reward
function 𝑟 𝑒 as 𝑟 𝜃 based on the trajectories sampled from learned policy 𝜋 and expert demonstrations. The recovered reward can then guide the update of learned policy 𝜋. However, the above
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Figure 5.1: The overall framework of S-AIRL.
learning process only focuses on the distribution matching between the state-action pairs sampled from learned policy and expert demonstrations without being fully aware of safety. To deal
with this issue, compared to the AIRL, the proposed S-AIRL has three additional processes. As
can be seen from Fig. 5.1, the CBF analysis is first used to guide the training process of the safety
critic (Section 5.3). The trained safety critic is then able to quantify the probability of being safe
of a given state-action pair. Second, the safety critic is integrated with the AIRL discriminator
to impose the safety consideration (Section 5.4.1). Theoretically, this modification will not compromise the IL capability as the loss function of the discriminator training is still the same as
the AIRL, i.e., Eq. (5.11). To further enforce the importance of safety, a safety-regulator is added
on the loss function of the discriminator training to discourage the recovered reward function
from assigning higher rewards to the risky state-action pairs than the safe state-action pairs (Section 5.4.2). As a case study, the proposed S-AIRL will be tested and compared with the original
AIRL in a highway driving scenario (Section 5.5).
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5.3

CBF-guided Safety Critic Training
In the original safety critic papers [86] [90], a separate policy 𝜋 𝑠 needs to be trained to

guide the sampling process for safety critic training. This approach has two drawbacks. First,
training an additional policy is time-consuming and expensive. Second, the policy 𝜋 𝑠 is trained
to optimize a pre-defined fixed reward function, which might deteriorate the exploration in the
safety critic training, i.e., some feasible state-action pairs are not fully explored. These two drawbacks hinder its integration in the IRL training process, where the policy 𝜋 keeps updating, and
the reward function 𝑟 𝜃 is underdeveloped.
In order to address these two issues, we propose a CBF-guided safety critic training approach as shown in Alg. 4. The sampling part is also illustrated in Fig. 5.2. When it reaches the
step 𝑘, for each action element 𝛼 𝑗 , 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝐽, we denote the system state x𝑡 and low-level control input u𝑡 with mini-step 𝑖 as x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 and u𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 , respectively. To begin with, the initial system state
x0𝑘, 𝑗 for CBF analysis is observed (see Line 4 in Alg. 4).2 The CBF analysis then predicts the sys𝑀 , u 𝑀 )] (Line 5).
tem state and low-level control input pairs [(x0𝑘, 𝑗 , u0𝑘, 𝑗 ), (x1𝑘, 𝑗 , u1𝑘, 𝑗 ), . . . , (x 𝑘,
𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗

The above 𝑀 mini-steps are taken from step 𝑘 to 𝑘 + 1 with an even time interval. The prediction
is based on the knowledge of the system dynamics (5.14) and the pre-defined low-level controller
corresponding to the choice of action element 𝛼 𝑗 . Given the predicted trajectories, the CBF mar𝑖 of each system state and low-level control input pair (x𝑖 , u𝑖 ), 𝑖 = 1, · · · , 𝑀, is first
gin 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗

calculated by the following equation (Line 6),

𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗 ≜ 𝐿 𝑓 ℎ(x 𝑘, 𝑗 ) + 𝐿 𝑔 ℎ(x 𝑘, 𝑗 )u 𝑘, 𝑗 + 𝛾(ℎ(x 𝑘, 𝑗 )).

(5.20)

𝑖 ≥ 0, it implies that the low-level control input, u𝑖 , is within the admissible control input
If 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗
𝑖 < 0, the lower value indicates the higher risk of
set KCBF (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 ) defined in Eq. (5.17). When 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗
2 x𝑖
𝑘, 𝑗

corresponds to the state of dynamical system (5.14), while s 𝑘 represents the MDP state for S-AIRL. Although both are states observed at step 𝑘, they are different from each other in general.
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getting out of the safety set C. The overall CBF margin, 𝜁 𝑘, 𝑗 , of the action 𝛼 𝑗 at state s 𝑘 is taken as
h
i
0 , 𝜁1 , . . . , 𝜁 𝑀
the minimum CBF margins of the predicted trajectory, i.e., 𝜁 𝑘, 𝑗 ≜ min 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑘, 𝑗
𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗
(Line 7). Corresponding to different action elements, we can get a collection of overall CBF
margins, i.e., [𝜁 𝑘,0 , 𝜁 𝑘,1 , . . . , 𝜁 𝑘,𝐽 ] (Line 9).
We then want to obtain the action a 𝑘 to execute at step 𝑘. A multinominal distribution
[ 𝑝 𝑘,0 , 𝑝 𝑘,1 , . . . , 𝑝 𝑘,𝐽 ] of which action element to take as a 𝑘 in one trial is formulated as follows.
For the action elements with a positive overall CBF margin, i.e., As ≜ {𝛼 𝑗 |𝜁 𝑘, 𝑗 ≥ 0}, they have
the same probability of being sampled. Since these action elements all satisfy the safety requireAlgorithm 4 CBF-guided training for safety critic training
Input: knowledge of system dynamics and pre-defined low-level controllers
Output: trained safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
(s, a)
safe
1: Initialize the state s0
2: For time step 𝑘 in [0, . . . , Sampling length] Do:
3:
For 𝑗 in [0, . . . , 𝐽] Do:
4:
x0𝑘, 𝑗 ← observe the initial system state for the CBF analysis
𝑀 , u 𝑀 )] ← Predict the system state and low5:
[(x0𝑘, 𝑗 , u0𝑘, 𝑗 ), (x1𝑘, 𝑗 , u1𝑘, 𝑗 ), . . . , (x 𝑘,
𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗
level control input pairs for 𝑀 mini-steps based on knowledge of system dynamics and predefined low-level controllers
0 , 𝜁 1 , . . . , 𝜁 𝑀 ] ← Calculate the CBF margin based on Eq. (5.20).
6:
[𝜁 𝑘,
𝑘, 𝑗
𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗
0 , 𝜁 1 , . . . , 𝜁 𝑀 ])
7:
𝜁 𝑘, 𝑗 ← Get the overall CBF margin as min([𝜁 𝑘,
𝑘, 𝑗
𝑗 𝑘, 𝑗
8:
End
9:
[𝜁 𝑘,0 , 𝜁 𝑘,1 , . . . , 𝜁 𝑘,𝐽 ] ← Collect the overall CBF margin for all the action elements 𝛼 𝑗 ∈
A
10:
[ 𝑝 𝑘,0 , 𝑝 𝑘,1 , . . . , 𝑝 𝑘,𝐽 ]
← Calculate the corresponding probability based on
Eqs. (5.21)(5.22)
11:
a 𝑘 ← Sample the action based on multi-nominal distribution [ 𝑝 𝑘 0 , 𝑝 𝑘,1 , . . . , 𝑝 𝑘,𝐽 ]
Ð
12:
DCBF {(s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ))} ← Include the data
13:
If 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) == 1 or is terminal() Do:
14:
s 𝑘+1 ← reset the environment
15:
Else:
16:
s 𝑘+1 ← Execute a 𝑘
17:
End
18: End
19: Train the safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) via minimizing the loss function defined in
safe
Eq. (5.19). The data tuples (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , s 𝑘+1 , a 𝑘+1 , 𝐼 (s 𝑘 )) are from DCBF
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Figure 5.2: The CBF-guided sampling for safety critic training.
ment, they should be treated equally in the aspect of safety critic. Otherwise, we will have a very
conservative trained safety critic. For the action elements with a negative overall CBF margin, i.e.,
Aus ≜ {𝛼𝑙 |𝜁 𝑘,𝑙 < 0}, the probability of being sampled should be smaller than the elements from
As . Here, we adopted an 𝜖-greedy-like method, i.e., there is 𝜖 probability that a 𝑘 is sampled from
Aus . The probability of a specific element 𝛼 𝑗 within Aus being sampled is inversely proportional
to the absolute value of its overall CBF margin as shown in the 1st row of Eq. (5.21). There is also a
1 − 𝜖 probability that the a𝑘 is sampled from As . The probability of a specific element 𝛼 𝑗 within
As being sampled is uniform as shown in the 2nd row of (5.21). Finally, the normalization should
be applied to ensure the sum of probabilities is equal to 1 (Line 10). The above calculation process
can be summarized as follows:

𝑝 ∗𝑘, 𝑗

𝑝 𝑘, 𝑗

=

𝜖/|𝜁 𝑘, 𝑗 |



Í

 𝑙 |𝛼 ∈A 1/|𝜁 𝑘,𝑙 | ,

𝑙

𝛼 𝑗 ∈ Aus

us


1−𝜖


,
𝛼 𝑗 ∈ As

 card(As )
𝑝 ∗𝑘, 𝑗
, 𝛼 𝑗 ∈ A.
= Í𝐽
∗
𝑗=0 𝑝 𝑘, 𝑗
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,

(5.21)

(5.22)

where card(As ) stands for the cardinality of the set As .
As a result, we can get a 𝑘 sampled from the multi-nominal distribution formulated above
(Line 11). 𝐼 (·) is the incident indicator function introduced in Section 5.1.3. The (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ))
tuple is then included in the database DCBF (Line 12). If 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) == 1 or the termination conditions
are met, the sampling environment will be reset (Line 14). Else, the action a 𝑘 is executed to get new
states s 𝑘+1 (Line 16). Once the collection of the dataset DCBF is done, the gradient optimization
method can be used to train the safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) via minimizing the loss function
safe
in Eq. (5.19) (Line 19). The superscript “CBF” is here to denote that the training process is guided
by CBF analysis instead of a specific policy 𝜋 𝑠 .
Comparing to the conventional approaches [86] [90], the CBF-guided safety critic training process in Alg. 4 can avoid the necessity of training an additional policy network. Moreover,
𝜋𝑠
the trained 𝑄 CBF
network is more general than the conventional 𝑄 safe
network as the feasible
safe

state-action pairs are explored more sufficiently in the training process. In summary, through the
training process in Alg. 4, the trained safety critic 𝑄 CBF
can then be used to quantify the probasafe
bility of being safe of state-action pairs in the IRL process (to be detailed in Section 5.4).

5.4

Safety Awareness Injection on S-AIRL
In the original AIRL algorithm, the discriminator 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a) is defined as Eq. (5.10), where

𝑓𝜃 (s, a) or exp( 𝑓𝜃 (s, a)) can be formulated by a multilayer perceptron (MLP). The MLP is trained
to minimize the loss function specified in Eq. (5.11). It is expected that, via gradient optimization,
the MLP can distill the critical information features to discern the state-action pairs from learned
policy and the state-action pairs from the expert demonstrations. This discrimination result will
be fedback (as 𝑟 𝜃 calculated in Eq. (5.12)) to the RL algorithm to update a more similar policy to
the human expert.
Although this process can fulfill a general IL task, the importance of safety might be ig97

nored. For example, in the highway-driving IL task, having safety guaranteed, expert demonstrations can show many aggressive driving features, such as a higher average speed and a shorter time
headway. These aggressive human demonstrations mentioned above might even conflict with the
purpose of safe driving from the view of a rookie driver or an underdeveloped policy network. As
a result, the rookie driver or underdeveloped policy network might focus more on the aggressive
driving style in obtaining more similarities with the human expert without being aware of the
importance of safety.
Correspondingly, this section proposes two steps to improve the safety awareness of the
S-AIRL algorithm. In Section 5.4.1, the safety critic is integrated with the discriminator such that
the safety feature, i.e., 𝑄 CBF
(s, a), will always be considered when the discriminator discerns the
safe
state-action pairs. In Section 5.4.2, to further make sure that the safety feature plays a vital role in
the discrimination of state-action pairs, a safety critic-based regulator is added to the loss function
of the discriminator training.

5.4.1

Safety Critic Integration with Discriminator
To impose the consideration of safety on the discrimination of the state-action pairs

(from the learned policy and the human expert demonstrations), the safety critic is integrated
with the MLP of the discriminator, as shown in Fig. 5.3.
In addition to the original state-action pair (s, a), its evaluation based on the safety critic,
i.e., 𝑄 CBF
(s, a), will be fed into the discriminator. In other words, the safety critic provides the
safe
discriminator with a hint of safety when it tries to discern the state-action pairs from trained
policy and human demonstrations. In turn, based on the recovered reward function 𝑟 𝜃 , the RL
process can focus more on the safety improvement in the process of being more similar to the
expert demonstrations. It is worth mentioning that, theoretically, this safety approach will not
compromise its capability in imitating the human expert, as the loss function of the discriminator
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training is still the same as Eq. (5.11).

Figure 5.3: Integrate safety critic with discriminator MLP.

5.4.2

Safety Critic-based Regulator
To further enforce the importance of safety, the loss function of the discriminator in

Eq. (5.11) is modified. From the analysis in the previous section, the discriminator can send feedback, i.e., 𝑟 𝜃 , to the RL algorithm, indicating if the state-action pairs from the trained policy are
similar to the expert demonstrations. To discourage the discriminator from assigning higher rewards to the risky state-action pairs than the safe state-action pairs, an extra regulator is added to
the loss function of discriminator training.
The process to build the safety critic-based regulator is summarized in Alg. 5. Given the
data (state-action pairs) Dsamp sampled based on the learned policy 𝜋, the safety of each stateaction pair (s, a) is evaluated by the safety critic 𝑄 CBF
. If 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) is smaller than a safety
safe
safe
𝜋 (s, a)
threshold Δs , the state-action pair will be included in the safe buffer Bs . Otherwise, if 𝑄 safe

is greater than the unsafe threshold Δus , the state-action pair is included in the unsafe buffer Bus .
The above processes are shown from Line 1 to Line 7. We then sample subsets of Bs and Bus randomly based on uniform distribution, and concatenate them as a new sampled buffer [B∗s , B∗us ]
(Line 8). Next, the state-action pairs in the sampled buffer are evaluated by the recovered func99

tion 𝑓𝜃 (s, a), where the entropy regulator − log(𝜋(a|s)) in Eq. (5.13) is not included as it is only
relevant to exploration incentives (Line 9). In the aspect of safety awareness, it is expected that
the rewards assigned to highly risky state-action pairs, i.e., (s, a) ∈ B∗us , should be lower than
the rewards of safe state-action pairs, i.e., (s, a) ∈ B∗s . To quantify the misassignment, the state
∗ ] assigned by
action pairs in [B∗s , B∗us ] are first sorted by their corresponding rewards [Rs∗ , Rus

𝑓𝜃 (s, a) from high to low (Line 10). The ratio 𝜂mistake,𝜃 of the safe state-action pair in B∗s sorted
to the lower half is calculated as the quantification of the misassignment (Line 11). Finally, we can
get the extra regulation item 𝜖safe,𝜃 as, 𝜖safe,𝜃 = 𝑤 𝑟 · 𝜂mistake,𝜃 , where 𝑤 𝑟 > 0 is the weight ratio
depends on how harsh we want to regulate the training process of the discriminator. Adding the
extra regulation item 𝜖safe,𝜃 , the loss function of the discriminator training in Eq. (5.11) becomes:

𝐿 𝑆𝐷 (𝜃) = E𝜋 𝐸 [−log 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a)] +E𝜋 [−log(1−𝐷 𝜃 (s, a))] +𝜖safe,𝜃 .

(5.23)

In the gradient optimization of the loss function above, this extra regulation item can discourage
Algorithm 5 Safety critic-based regulator
Input: On-policy sampled data, Dsamp ; trained safety critic, 𝑄 CBF
(s, a); Safe state-action
safe
pair buffer, Bs ; Unsafe state-action pair buffer, Bus ; Discriminator 𝐷 𝜃 (s, a)
Output: The extra regulation item 𝜖 safe,𝜃 on the discriminator loss; The updated safe buffer
Bs ; The updated unsafe buffer Bus ; On-policy sampled data, Dsamp
1: For (s, a) in Dsamp Do:
2:
If 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) < Δs :
safe Ð
3:
Bs {(s, a)}
4:
Else If 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) > Δus :
safe
Ð
5:
Bus {(s, a)}
6:
End
7: End
8: [B∗s , B∗us ] ← Sample the subsets of Bs and Bus , and concatenate them
∗ ] ← Evaluate the sampled buffer [B∗ , B∗ ] based on the recovered function 𝑓 (s, a)
9: [Rs∗ , Rus
𝜃
s
us
∗
∗
10: Sort the [Rs , Rus ] from high to low.
11: 𝜂mistake,𝜃 ← Calculate the ratio of safe state-action pairs sorted to the lower half.
12: 𝜖 safe,𝜃 = 𝑤 𝑟 · 𝜂mistake,𝜃 ← Return the extra regulation item
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the discriminator from assigning higher reward to the highly risky state-action pairs. As a result,
the trained policy can also be expected to behave safer as it receives less incentive to perform risky
actions.

5.4.3

S-AIRL Algorithm
On top of the typical AIRL algorithm, combining the processes proposed in Sections 5.3,

5.4.1, and 5.4.2, we have the S-AIRL summarized in Alg. 6. The safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
is
safe
first trained based on Alg. 4 (Line 1). The policy network is initialized based on the setup of a
general RL algorithm, and the discriminator network is initialized with the integration of the
trained safety citric 𝑄 CBF
as explained in Section 5.4.1 (Lines 2-3). Within each training loop,
safe
new state-action pairs sampled based on the trained policy network are collected in Dsamp (Line
5). Correspondingly, Bs and Bus are updated. The extra regulation item 𝜖safe,𝜃 is then calculated
based on Alg. 5 (Lines 6-7). As a result, the discriminator network can be trained based on the
regulated loss function in Eqn. (5.23) (Line 8). Finally, the policy network can be trained by an
arbitrary policy optimization algorithm based on the reward function recovered by Eqn. (5.12)
(Line 9).
Basically, there are two major modifications to the original AIRL algorithm. First, the
discriminator is integrated with a CBF-guided safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
(Line 3). Second, the
safe
loss function of discriminator training is regulated by an extra item 𝜖 safe,𝜃 (Lines 5-8).

5.5

Case Study: Highway Driving Scenario

5.5.1

Simulation Environment Setup
This case study tests our proposed S-AIRL and the benchmark AIRL in a highway-

driving simulator called Highway-env [54]. The ego car can be controlled by the action a ∈ A =
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Algorithm 6 Safety-aware AIRL (S-AIRL)
Input: The expert trajectory 𝜏𝐸
Output: The trained policy 𝜋
1: Train the safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
based on Alg. 4
safe
2: Initialize the policy network 𝜋
3: Initialize the discriminator network 𝐷 𝜃 based on Section 5.4.1
4: For iteration in [1, . . . , 𝑁] Do
5:
Dsamp ← Collect the state-action pairs via executing the policy 𝜋
6:
Update Bs and Bus based on Alg. 5
7:
𝜖safe,𝜃 ← Get the extra regulation item based on Alg. 5
8:
Train the discriminator 𝐷 𝜃 based on the loss function in Eq. (5.23)
9:
Train the policy via the arbitrary policy optimization RL algorithm based on the reward
function in Eq. (5.12)
10: End
{faster, slower, idle, left, right}. For each action, the corresponding low-level controller is summarized in Appendix-A. The surrounding cars in Highway-env are modeled by the
intelligent driver model (IDM) [92] in the longitudinal aspect and minimizing overall braking
induced by the lane change (MOBIL) model [45] in the lateral aspect. More details can be found
in the manual of the Highway-env simulator [54].
The motion information, i.e., longitudinal position 𝑥, lateral position 𝑦, longitudinal
velocity 𝑣 𝑥 , and lateral velocity 𝑣 𝑦 , of the ego car in the global coordinate and the motion information of the neighbor vehicles relative to the ego car are included in the observations/state s,
i.e.,
𝑦

s = {𝑥 𝑒 , 𝑦 𝑒 , 𝑣 𝑥𝑒 , 𝑣 𝑒 }

Ø

𝑦

𝑦

{𝑥 𝑞 − 𝑥 𝑒 , 𝑦 𝑞 − 𝑦 𝑒 , 𝑣 𝑥𝑞 − 𝑣 𝑥𝑒 , 𝑣 𝑞 − 𝑣 𝑒 },

𝑞∈N

where the subscript 𝑒 denotes the motion information of the ego car, and the subscript 𝑞 ∈ N
denotes the motion information of the neighbor cars with N being the set of neighbor cars. The
ego and neighbor cars are illustrated in Fig 5.4. Normalization is also applied to the state s [54].
Ideally, in addition to itself, the ego car can observe the front and rear cars on the current lane, on
its left adjacent lane, and right adjacent lane, respectively. However, those cars might not always
exist. For example, if the ego car is on the rightmost lane, there will be no car on its right lane.
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Moreover, neighbor cars that are too far away from the ego car are also ignored. If the specific
neighbor car does not exist or is too far away from the ego car, it is denoted as “not presented”.
As a result, besides the motion information introduced above, whether the specific neighbor car
is presented or not, i.e., 1 or 0, is also included in the state s. If the specific car is not present, its
motion information is all set to zeros. For each simulation episode, the ego cars and neighbor cars
is reset with random initial positions and velocities.

Figure 5.4: Highway-env simulation environment

In the Highway-env, we set up a four-lane highway driving scenario. The number of the
surrounding car is set as 20. The target speeds of the surrounding cars are randomly assigned from
20 m/s to 30 m/s. To generate the expert trajectories, a typical RL algorithm, i.e., proximal policy
optimization (PPO) [83], is trained to be the expert driver policy. The hidden expert function is
formulated as follows:

𝑟 𝑒 = 𝑐 1 · 𝐼crash + 𝑐 2 · 𝐿 id + 𝑐 3 · min(max((𝑣 𝑒 − 20)/10, 1), 0),

(5.24)

where the first item is to penalize the crash of the ego car, 𝑐 1 < 0. 𝐼crash is the indicator function.
𝐼crash = 1 if it is crashed, and 𝐼crash = 0, else. The second item is to encourage the ego car to
drive on the right lanes, where 𝑐 2 > 0. The leftmost lane is index as 0, i.e., 𝐿 id = 0, and the
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rightmost lane is indexed as 3, i.e., 𝐿 id = 3. The third item is to encourage the ego car to drive at
high speed, where 𝑐 3 > 0. 𝑣 𝑒 is the speed of the ego car. As can be seen from the formulation,
the car can get more rewards if the speed is greater than 20 m/s. No more rewards will be granted
if the car is greater than 30 m/s. In this case study, to train the expert policy, the values of weight
ratios 𝑐 1 , 𝑐 2 , and 𝑐 3 are chosen as −1, 0.1, and 0.6, respectively. The trajectories sampled from the
trained expert policy are used as the expert demonstrations for the AIRL and S-AIRL training in
Section 5.5.2.

5.5.2

S-AIRL Training
First of all, we need to train the safety critic 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) based on Alg. 4. To predict the
safe

states and actions, we adopt the following kinematic model of the ego vehicle [49].

𝑥¤ 𝑒 = 𝑣 𝑒 cos(𝜓 𝑒 + 𝛽𝑒 )

(5.25)

𝑦¤ 𝑒 = 𝑣 𝑒 sin(𝜓 𝑒 + 𝛽𝑒 )

(5.26)

𝑣¤ 𝑒 = 𝑎 𝑒

(5.27)

𝑣𝑒
sin 𝛽𝑒
𝜓¤ 𝑒 =
𝑙𝑟


𝑙𝑟
tan 𝛿 𝑒
𝛽𝑒 = arctan
𝑙𝑟 + 𝑙 𝑓

(5.28)
(5.29)

where 𝜓 𝑒 is the heading of the ego vehicle, 𝑎 𝑒 is the acceleration command, 𝛽𝑒 is the slip angle
at the center of gravity, 𝛿 𝑒 is the front wheel angle. 𝑙 𝑓 and 𝑙𝑟 are the distance from the car center
𝑦

of gravity to the front and rear axles, respectively. By assuming that 𝑣 𝑥𝑞 and 𝑣 𝑞 of the neighbor
cars, 𝑞 ∈ N , are constant, applying the action element 𝛼 𝑗 with the corresponding low-level
controllers summarized in Appendix-A, we can predict the dynamic state and low-level action
𝑀 , u 𝑀 )] at step 𝑘 (Line 5, Alg. 4). To calculate the CBFpairs [(x0𝑘, 𝑗 , u0𝑘, 𝑗 ), (x1𝑘, 𝑗 , u1𝑘, 𝑗 ), . . . , (x𝑘,
𝑗
𝑘, 𝑗
0 based on the CBF analysis (Line 6, Alg. 4), we need to get a control-affine system
margin 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗
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dynamics in the form of Eq. (5.14) and the corresponding CBF function ℎ. In this case study, we
adopted similar formulations as in [35].
On the lane-keeping mode, denote motion information of the front car on the current
lane with the subscript 𝑓 𝑐, 𝑓 𝑐 ∈ N . Based on the ego car dynamics in Eqs. (5.25)-(5.29), by
assuming 𝛽𝑒 has a small angle, i.e., cos 𝛽𝑒 = 1 and sin 𝛽𝑒 = 𝛽𝑒 , we can have the following controlaffine system:

 
 

 𝑥¤ 𝑒   𝑣 𝑒 cos 𝜓 𝑒   0 −𝑣 𝑠 sin 𝜓 𝑒 

 
 


 
 

 𝑦¤ 𝑒   𝑣 𝑒 sin 𝜓 𝑒   0 𝑣 𝑒 cos 𝜓   

 
 
 

 
 
  𝑎𝑒 
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 𝜓𝑒  
  0 𝑣 𝑒 /𝑙𝑟  |{z}

 
 


 
 
 u
𝑥
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 0
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| {z } | {z } |
{z
}
x

𝑓 𝑓 𝑐 (x)

(5.30)

𝑔 𝑓 𝑐 (x)

where 𝛽𝑒 can be calculated from 𝛿 𝑒 based on Eq. (5.29). For the corresponding control barrier
function ℎ 𝑓 𝑐 , we have,

(𝑣 𝑥𝑓 𝑐 − 𝑣 𝑒 ) 2



,
 𝑥 𝑓 𝑐 − 𝑥 𝑒 − 𝑙 − H𝑒 𝑣 𝑒 −

2𝑎 max
ℎ 𝑓 𝑐 (x) =



 𝑥 𝑓 𝑐 − 𝑥 𝑒 − 𝑙 − H𝑒 𝑣 𝑒 ,


if 𝑣 𝑒 ≥ 𝑣 𝑥𝑓 𝑐
else

where H𝑒 is the minimum acceptable headway of the ego car. 𝑎 max is the maximum deceleration
that can be achieved by the car. 𝑙 is the sum of the length of front half of the following car and
rear half of the preceding car. It is worth noticing that 𝑣 𝑒 ∈ x is here to approximate 𝑣 𝑥𝑒 as the
heading of the road illustrated in Fig. 5.4 is zero, and the slip angle 𝛽𝑒 of the ego car is small [35].
ℎ 𝑓 𝑐 > 0 implies that the interdistance with respect to its front car is greater than the minimum
time headway plus the minimum braking distance (no braking distance needs to consider when
the velocity of the following car is smaller than the preceding car, i.e., 𝑣 𝑒 ≥ 𝑣 𝑥𝑓 𝑐 ), which renders
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the safety of the ego car with a decent margin.
Moreover, considering the social rule, in this case study, we also impose a constraint on
the distance with respect to the rear car on the lane-keeping mode. Denote the motion information of the rear car on the current lane with the subscript 𝑟𝑐, 𝑟𝑐 ∈ N , the corresponding CBF
function is,
𝑥 )2
(𝑣 𝑒 − 𝑣 𝑟𝑐

𝑥


,
𝑥
−
𝑥
−
𝑙
−
H
·
𝑣
−
𝑒
𝑟𝑐
𝑟𝑐
𝑟𝑐


2𝑎 max
ℎ 𝑓 𝑐 (x) =


𝑥
 𝑥 𝑒 − 𝑥𝑟𝑐 − 𝑙 − H𝑟𝑐 · 𝑣 𝑟𝑐
,


𝑥
if 𝑣 𝑟𝑐
≥ 𝑣𝑒

else

where the H𝑟𝑐 is minimum acceptable time headway of the rear car on the current lane.
If the car is on the lane-changing mode, in addition to the cars on the current lane mentioned above, we also need to consider the front and rear cars on the target lane. We denote the
motion information of the front car and rear car on the target lane with subscripts 𝑓 𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡,
𝑓 𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 ∈ N , respectively. The corresponding CBF functions are specified as follows:

(𝑣 𝑥𝑓 𝑡 − 𝑣 𝑒 ) 2



, if 𝑣 𝑒 ≥ 𝑣 𝑥𝑓 𝑡
 𝑥 𝑓 𝑡 − 𝑥 𝑒 − 𝑙 − H𝑒 · 𝑣 𝑒 −

2𝑎 max
ℎ 𝑓 𝑡 (x) =



 𝑥 𝑓 𝑡 − 𝑥 𝑒 − 𝑙 − H𝑒 · 𝑣 𝑒 ,
else

𝑥 )2
(𝑣 𝑒 − 𝑣 𝑟𝑡

𝑥
𝑥


, if 𝑣 𝑟𝑡
≥ 𝑣𝑒
𝑥
−
𝑥
−
𝑙
−
H
·
𝑣
−
𝑟𝑡
rt
 𝑒

𝑟𝑡
2𝑎
max
ℎ𝑟𝑡 (x) =


𝑥
 𝑥 𝑠 − 𝑥𝑟𝑡 − 𝑙 − Hrt · 𝑣 𝑟𝑡
,
else

Based on the same approach to get the control-affine system corresponding to ℎ 𝑓 𝑐 in Eq. (5.30), we
can formulate the dynamics of the ego car related to ℎ𝑟𝑐 , ℎ 𝑓 𝑡 and ℎ𝑟𝑡 , i.e., x¤ = 𝑓𝑞 (x)+𝑔𝑞 (x)u, 𝑞 ∈
{𝑟𝑐, 𝑓 𝑡, 𝑟𝑡}.
As multiple CBF functions are introduced above, to render the safety, the control input
should be within the intersection of the admissible control input set corresponding to all the
𝑖 should be taken as the lowest value
applied CBF functions [35]. As a result, the CBF margin 𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗
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corresponding to different CBF functions. Therefore, with multiple CBF functions, Eq. (5.20)
can be changed as follows:

𝑖
𝜁 𝑘,
𝑗 ≜




min({𝐿 𝑓𝑞 ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 ) + 𝐿 𝑔𝑞 ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 )u𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 + 𝛾(ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 )) |







Lane-keeping mode
 𝑞 ∈ { 𝑓 𝑐, 𝑟𝑐})




min({𝐿 𝑓𝑞 ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 ) + 𝐿 𝑔𝑞 ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 )u𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 + 𝛾(ℎ 𝑞 (x𝑖𝑘, 𝑗 )) |






 𝑞 ∈ { 𝑓 𝑐, 𝑟𝑐, 𝑓 𝑡, 𝑟𝑡})
Lane-changing mode


where the 𝜅∞ function 𝛾(·) is chosen as a linear function with a constant coefficient, i.e., 𝛾(ℎ(x)) =
𝛾𝑒 · ℎ(x) . Finally, as the last component needs to be specified for the implementation of Alg. 4,
the incident indicator 𝐼 (·) is defined as:

𝐼 (s) =




1,












 0,


|𝑥 𝑞 − 𝑥 𝑒 | − 𝑙 < 1.5 and |𝑦 𝑞 − 𝑦 𝑒 | − 𝑤 < 0.5,
∃𝑞 ∈ N
else

where 𝑤 is the sum of the width of the right half of the left car and right half of the left car.
Following the processes mentioned in Alg. 4, the safety critic 𝑄 CBF
(s, a) can be trained (line 1
safe
in Alg. 6). The S-AIRL can then be trained via the following lines in Alg. 6. The key hyperparameters used for the AIRL training are summarized in Table 5.1, where lr(G), lr(D) stand for the
learning rate chosen in training the policy/generator (G) and the discriminator (D), respectively.
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Table 5.1: S-AIRL & AIRL training hyperparameters
CBF-guided safety critic training (Sec. 5.3)
𝜖

0.05

𝑎 max

7

𝑙𝑟 , 𝑙 𝑓 , 𝑙, 𝑤 [54]

2.5, 2.5, 5, 2

𝛾𝑒

0.1

H𝑒 , H𝑟𝑐 , H𝑟𝑡

1, 0.6, 1

𝑀

5

Safety critic integration with discriminator (Sec. 5.4.1)
𝐷 𝜃 net size

([24,40],64,64)

Safety critic-based regulator (Sec. 5.4.2)
Δ𝑠 , Δus

0.8, 0.05

Training process (Sec. 5.5.3)
RL Alg.

PPO

lr (G), lr (D)

1e-4, 1e-4

MDP step interval

0.5s

sampling size

1.6 × 105

max episode length

100

demon. size

3.2 × 105

To verify the effectiveness of the approach proposed in Section 5.4.1, we also trained the
S-AIRL without the safety critic-based regulator described in Alg. 5, denoted as S-AIRL/Reg.
With the same hyperparameters, we trained the typical AIRL algorithm as a benchmark. The
results are shown and analyzed in the next section.

5.5.3

Training Results and Analysis
As the expert policy is trained by PPO to minimize the reward function 𝑟 𝑒 (5.24), the

same function 𝑟 𝑒 is used to evaluate the performance of AIRL, S-AIRL/Reg, and S-AIRL. The
expert demonstrations (with the size of 3.2 × 105 steps as shown in Table 5.1) are generated to train
the IRL algorithms.
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For each algorithm, the training test runs 8 times with 120 iterations.3 The average accumulated 𝑟 𝑒 reward scores versus the training iteration are shown in Fig. 5.5. The solid line stands
for the average value, and the shaded area represents the range of ± standard deviations. As can be
seen, the performance (in terms of IL) of the AIRL, S-AIRL/Reg, and S-AIRL are pretty similar
to each other. This result justifies that imposing the extra safety awareness on the AIRL will not
induce a worse IL capability if not better. The main differences of the three algorithms are shown
in Fig. 5.6, where the safety of algorithm is quantified by the collision rate, i.e., the number of sampling steps (MDP step) with collision versus the total number of sampling steps. Compared to
the original AIRL, the S-AIRL/Reg can achieve a lower collision rate but still suffers a similar
high variance issue. In contrast, the proposed S-AIRL produces the lowest average collision rate
with the smallest variance, which justified the effectiveness of Alg. 5. Based on the results above,
we can observe that, with the same level of IL performance, the S-AIRL/Reg trains a safer policy
than the AIRL, and the S-AIRL can produce the safest policy among the three algorithms.

Figure 5.5: 𝑟 𝑒 reward score versus training iterations
3 The

training scripts are written in Python. The training is running on the high-performance computing resources Palmetto cluster at Clemson University with two Intel Xeon 6148G CPUs (40 cores) and one Tesla V100
GPU. It took 8.65, 8.90, and 9.15 hrs for each training test of AIRL, S-AIRL/Reg, and S-AIRL, respectively. For the
training of safety critic network 𝑄 CBF
, additional 0.7 hrs is needed.
safe
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Figure 5.6: Collision rate versus training iterations
Furthermore, the models with the highest accumulated 𝑟 𝑒 reward scores, trained by these
three algorithms, are compared in Fig. 5.7. The bar chart and the error bar stand for the average value and range of ± standard deviations over 8 training tests, respectively. As can be seen
from Fig. 5.7a, models trained by the three algorithms can achieve a similar level of 𝑟 𝑒 reward
scores (similar IL performance). In Fig. 5.7b, compared to AIRL, S-AIRL/Reg and S-AIRL can
achieve a much lower collision rate. Numerically, the collision rate of the model trained by SAIRL is 32.6% less than its counterpart with AIRL.4 Finally, the models with the lowest collision
rate, trained by these three algorithms, are compared in Fig. 5.8. As can be seen in Fig. 5.8a, the
S-AIRL can still achieve a smaller collision rate than AIRL. The difference between S-AIRL and
AIRL in terms of collision rate becomes smaller. However, in Fig. 5.8b, the models trained by
AIRL achieve much lower 𝑟 𝑒 reward score than the models trained by the other two algorithms,
which shows a poor consistency in achieving high 𝑟 𝑒 reward score (Fig. 5.7) and the low collision rate (Fig. 5.8). In other words, when trying to achieve a higher IL performance, the original
4 It

is also worth mentioning that this decrement of the collision rate is not trivial as the collision rate is defined
as the number of sampling steps with collision versus the total number of sampling steps. The time interval of the
sampling step is 0.5s. Corresponding to the sampling size within one training iteration (1.6 × 105 steps in Table 5.1),
the collision number has been reduced by approximately 170.

110

AIRL performance does not fully aware of the importance of safety. Compared to the AIRL,
our proposed S-AIRL can improve safety awareness in the IL task.
The motion states of the converged models (after 110 iterations) of these three algorithms
are compared in Fig. 5.9. As can be seen, the models from the original AIRL can achieve the highest velocity and lowest time headway by a very narrow margin. Comparing to the collision rate
reduction the S-AIRL and S-AIRL/Reg achieved in Fig. 5.7 and Fig. 5.8, the advantage of AIRL
in driving efficiency is negligible. In other words, compared to the AIRL, the models trained
by the proposed S-AIRL (or S-AIRL/Reg) can generate smarter action sequences in balancing
the driving efficiency and safety. Moreover, the rate of aggressive accelerations, i.e., the number of
sampling steps with aggressive accelerations versus the total number of sampling steps, is adopted
to quantify car motion smoothness. The ego car’s longitudinal acceleration 𝑣¤ 𝑥𝑒 and lateral acceleration 𝑣¤ 𝑒 are considered as aggressive if they are greater than 5 m/s2 and 6 m/s2 [6], respectively.
𝑦

The corresponding plot is shown in Fig. 5.10. As can be seen, AIRL, S-AIRL/Reg, and S-AIRL
share almost the same rate of aggressive accelerations both longitudinally and laterally.
Finally, the sensitivity test of the hyperparameters Δus and Δs is performed. Five different setups for the hyperparameters are taken in the test. The plots of reward comparison and
collision rate comparison are shown in Fig. 5.11(a) and Fig. 5.11(b), respectively. As can be seen,
the performance of S-AIRL is not very sensitive to the hyperparameters Δus and Δs as one might
expect. However, the performance is degraded a little bit if the difference between Δus and Δs is
too small (e.g., Δus = 0.3, Δs = 0.4) or too large (e.g., Δus = 0.005, Δs = 0.9). If the difference
is too small, the safety critic-based regulation can be too rigid and disturb the S-AIRL training
process. On the other hand, the safety critic-based regulation cannot fully show its functionality
if the difference between these two thresholds is too large.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.7: Test Performance comparison (with the trained models having maximum 𝑟 𝑒 reward
score)

5.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, extending the original AIRL algorithm, the S-AIRL algorithm is pre-

sented with better safety awareness. The model-free safety citric is first trained under the guidance of model-based CBF analysis, which can eliminate the need for training an additional guiding policy. Moreover, the sampling process, ruled by the CBF margins of the actions, can better
explore the feasible state-action pairs. Once the safety critic is trained, it is integrated with the
MLP of the discriminator. As a result, the safety level of the state-action pair (evaluated by the
safety critic) serves as an additional reference for the discriminator to discern the learned policy
and expert demonstrations. To further improve safety, a safety critic-based regulator is added to
the loss function of the discriminator training. Via penalizing the recovered reward function by
assigning high rewards to the risky state-action pairs, the discriminator can recover a more safetyaware reward function to the policy training process. In the case study, we tested our S-AIRL
and S-AIRL/Reg in a highway driving scenario. It has been shown that compared to the original
AIRL, both the proposed S-AIRL/Reg and S-AIRL can reduce the collision rate effectively with
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.8: Test Performance comparison (with the trained models having minimum collision
rate)
a similar IL performance. It is also verified that the safety critic-based regulator in S-AIRL can
further reduce the collision rate and its variance (with respect to different episodes).
In addition to the highway driving scenarios shown in the case study, the S-AIRL can
be applied to other general safety critical imitation learning tasks, such as motion planning of a
robot arm through the learning by demonstration approach. The proposed S-AIRL algorithm
is expected to train a safer policy without compromising its imitation learning capability. Moreover, for each specific learning task, the CBF analysis needs to be re-designed accordingly. How
to find a more general and flexible CBF analysis can be a future research direction. Finally, the
proposed S-AIRL seeks to learn from the human expert operations with their underlying safety
levels. It is well acknowledged that the current IRL setup can hardly outperform the human
expert. Although this issue will not hinder the S-AIRL from being a valid solution to the IL
problem, how to reach a much better safety awareness than the human expert can be another
interesting research direction.

113

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.9: Motion states comparison

(a)

(b)

Figure 5.10: Comparison of aggressive acceleration rate
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(a)

(b)

Figure 5.11: Sensitivity test on Δus and Δs
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Chapter 6
Safe Driving Policy Learning Algorithm
Considering Maximum Uncertainties
6.1

Problem Definition
In this chapter, a safe driving policy is learned considering the most destructive behav-

ior of a neighbor vehicle, e.g., the nearest vehicle or the identified adversarial neighbor vehicle. In this case, the interaction between the subject autonomous vehicle and its neighbor vehicle is modeled as a two-player zero-sum Markov game [51], which can be represented as a tuple
(S, A, O, 𝑃, 𝐼, 𝛾, 𝜌0 ) where S is the state space, describing the driving states of the subject vehicle
and its surrounding vehicles, A is the discrete action space of the subject vehicle (player-1), and O
is the action space of the neighbor vehicle with maximum uncertainty (player-2). At step 𝑘, the
state, action of player-1, and action of player-2 are denoted as s 𝑘 ∈ S, a 𝑘 ∈ A, and o 𝑘 ∈ O, respectively. 𝑃(s 𝑘+1 |s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o 𝑘 ) is the transition distribution. 𝛾 ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. 𝜌0 is the
initial distribution of the states. 𝐼 is the safety indicator function. If the state s 𝑘 is immediate safe
(collision-free), then 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) = 1, else 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) = 0. Furthermore, if collision happens at step 𝑖, the
system will be trapped in the “crashed” status. Mathematically, if 𝐼 (s𝑖 ) = 0, 𝐼 (s 𝑗 ) = 0, ∀ 𝑗 ≥ 𝑖.
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Correspondingly, the accumulated rewards that the subject safe driving policy maximizes is,

𝐽 (s0 ) =

∞
∑︁

𝛾 𝑡 𝐼 (s𝑡+1 )

(6.1)

𝑡=0

In TZMG, the objective of player-2 is to minimize the accumulated reward in Eqn. (6.1).
Correspondingly, further denoting the player-1’s policy as 𝜋 and the player-2’s policy as
𝜇, for the TMZG defined above, there always exists the Nash equilibrium as follows [72]:

𝐽 ∗ (s0 ) = max min 𝐽 (𝜋, 𝜇, s0 ) = min max 𝐽 (𝜋, 𝜇, s0 )
𝜋

𝜇

𝜇

(6.2)

𝜋

The optimal policies corresponding to the above equilibrium are denoted as 𝜋 ∗ and 𝜇∗ ,
respectively. The task (of this chapter) is to find the optimal driving policy 𝜋 ∗ of player-1. Intuitively, the optimal driving policy 𝜋 ∗ can guarantee the maximum level of safety under the worstcase scenario of the neighbor vehicle. It is worth mentioning that the above safety-critical zerosum game can be converted to the backward reachability problem, which can then be solved using
the dynamical programming [8] or a neural network-based differential equation solver [9]. However, the above methods require the knowledge of system dynamics and suffer from computation
infeasibility on high-dimensional dynamics. These two drawbacks limit its wide application in
the complex driving scenario, where accurately modeling the system dynamics is challenging, and
the dimensions of the states are usually high as multiple vehicles share the road. In this chapter,
the TZMG Q learning method [109] is adopted to train the safe driving policy 𝜋 ∗ , which is a deep
learning-based model-free approach and can naturally accommodate large dimensions of states.
The learning process is briefly summarized in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3, the policy trained from
the TZMG method is compared with the policy trained from the vanilla RL approach in a testing scenario where human participants play as the aggressive neighbor vehicle to interact with the
trained policies.
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6.2

Preliminary: TZMG Q Learning Method
In this section, the techniques of TZMG Q learning in [109] is briefly summarized.

6.2.1

TZMG Q value and the optimal policy
Let’s first denote the optimal value function as 𝑉 ∗ (s 𝑘 ) = E [𝐽 (s 𝑘 |𝜋 ∗ , 𝜇∗ , s0 )] , 𝑘 ≥ 0.
Similar to the conventional Q learning [99], we can have the optimal Q value function

defined as,
𝑄 ∗ (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o𝑘 ) = 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) + 𝛾

∑︁

𝑃(s′ |s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o 𝑘 )𝑉 ∗ (s′)

(6.3)

s ′ ∈S

As 𝑉 ∗ (s 𝑘 ) = max min
𝜋

o𝑘

Í

a𝑘

𝜋(a𝑘 |s 𝑘 )𝑄 ∗ (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o 𝑘 ), the above equation for the optimal Q can

then be written in the Bellman form:
𝑄 ∗ (s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o 𝑘 ) = 𝐼 (s 𝑘 ) + 𝛾

∑︁

𝑃(s′ |s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o 𝑘 )max min
′
𝜋

s′ ∈S

o

∑︁

𝜋(a′ |s′)𝑄 ∗ (s′, a′, o′)

(6.4)

a ′ ∈A

Once 𝑄 ∗ is determined, given the state s 𝑘 , the optimal policy 𝜋 ∗ (a 𝑘 |s 𝑘 ) can be obtained by the
following linear programming problem.
max

∑︁

𝜋(a|s 𝑘 ) min 𝑄 ∗ (s 𝑘 , a, o)
o∈O

a∈A

subject to:
∑︁

𝑝(a) = 1

(6.5)

a

𝑝(a) ≥ 0, ∀a ∈ A

Specifically, we denote the above linear programming operation in Eqn. (6.5) as LP, i.e., 𝜋(a|s 𝑘 ) =
LP(𝑄 ∗ )(s 𝑘 ).
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6.2.2

TZMG Q network learning
Inspired by the deep Q learning (DQN) and general policy iteration (GPI), the optimal

Q network in Eqn. (6.3) can be solved by the learning method [109] summarized in Alg. 7. In
the beginning, three Q networks, 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 , 𝑄 𝜃 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 , and 𝑄 𝜃 𝑡 𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑡 , are initialized. Intuitively, 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 is the
most update-to-date network. 𝑄 𝜃 𝑡 𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑡 calculates the target value with delays as what the target
Q network did in DQN. 𝑄 𝜃 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 represents the trained network in the previous policy iteration.
From Lines 3 to 4, at step 𝑘, the interaction is conducted based on player-1’s action a 𝑘 and player2’s action o 𝑘 . The corresponding data tuple is also collected in buffer 𝐷 (Line 5). In the minibatch gradient process (Line 6), for each data sample, the target value is first calculated based on
dynamic programming of Q network (Lines 7 - 9). The 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 is then updated based on the mean
squared error (MSE) between the targeted Q values and current Q values (Line 10). Finally, the
𝑄 𝜃 𝑡 𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑡 and 𝑄 𝜃 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 will be updated every predefined intervals, respectively. More details can be
found in [109].
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Algorithm 7 TZMG Q-Network Learning [109]
Input: Experience replay buffer 𝐷 = ∅; Target update steps 𝑇𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 ; Evaluation update steps
𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 ; Initial parameters of the Q network, 𝜃 0
Output: Trained policy 𝜋𝜃 𝑘 and trained Q network 𝑄 𝜃
1: Initialize three Q networks 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 , 𝑄 𝜃 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 , 𝑄 𝜃 𝑡 𝑎𝑟 𝑔𝑒𝑡 , with initial parameters 𝜃 0
2: For step 𝑘 in [0, . . . , total steps] Do:
3:
a 𝑘 ← Get the action of player-1 based on the 𝜖-greedy method:
(

𝜋𝜃 𝑘 = LP 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 (s 𝑘 ), 1 − 𝜖𝑡 probability
a𝑘 ∼
random ∈ A,
𝜖𝑡 probability
Í
4:
o 𝑘 ← Get the action of player-2 based on o 𝑘 = arg min a 𝜋 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 (a|s 𝑘 )𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 (s 𝑘 , a, o),
o

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:
16:
17:

where 𝜋 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 (a|s 𝑘 ) = LP(𝑄 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 ) (s 𝑘 )
Execute the a 𝑘 and o𝑘 and get s 𝑘+1 and 𝐼 (s 𝑘+1 ), and include tuple
(s 𝑘 , a 𝑘 , o𝑘 , s 𝑘+1 , 𝐼 (s 𝑘+1 )) in 𝐷
Sample 𝑚 mini-batches from 𝐷
For each sample (with step index 𝑗) Do:
𝑦
← Update the target value based on
𝑦 𝑗 = 𝐼 (s 𝑗+1 ) +
Í 𝑗
𝛾 mino′ a′ 𝜋 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 (a′ |s 𝑗+1 )𝑄 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 (s 𝑗+1 , a′, o′), where 𝜋 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 (a|s 𝑗 ) = LP(𝑄 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 )(s 𝑗 ).
End
𝜃 𝑘+1 ← Update the parameters
of 𝑄 𝜃 𝑘 , based on the loss function 𝐿 (𝜃 𝑘 ) =
2
1 Í
(𝑄
s
,
a
,
o
)
−
𝑦
𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙
𝑗 𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
𝑗
2𝑚
Every 𝑇𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 steps Do:
𝜃 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 = 𝜃 𝑘+1 ← Update the target network
End
Every 𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 steps Do:
𝜃 𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 = 𝜃 𝑘+1 ← Update the evaluation network
End
End

6.3

Experiment and Results

6.3.1

Training of the TZMG networks
Adopting Alg. 7, we train the TZMG networks in a highway driving environment. The

scenario generator is customized based on Highway-env repository [54]. In the training scenario,
a four-lane highway-driving scenario is built as illustrated in Fig. 6.1. As can be seen, there are three
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kinds of cars on the road. The subject vehicle (yellow) represent the player-1 in the TZMG setup.
Correspondingly, the aggressive vehicle (green)) is the player-2 in the TZMG setup. All other surrounding vehicles are modeled by the intelligent driver model (IDM) model for the longitudinal
dynamics and the minimizing overall braking induced by the lane change (MOBIL) model for
the lateral dynamics. Specifically, normal neighbor vehicles denote the immediate front and rear
vehicles (but not player-2) on the current lanes and adjacent lanes with respect to player-1 that are
not behaving aggressively. In future work, the TZMG learning algorithm in Section 6.2 will be
extended to accommodate the scenario when multiple neighbor vehicles behave aggressively.

Figure 6.1: TZMG simulation environment

The same discrete action space is assigned to both player-1 and player-2, i.e., A = O =
{faster, slower, idle, left, right}. For each action a 𝑘 ∈ A or o 𝑘 ∈ O, the corresponding
low-level controller is summarized in Appendix-A. The motion information, i.e., longitudinal
position, lateral position, longitudinal velocity, and lateral velocity, of the player-1, player-2, and
normal neighbors of player-1 forms the state s in TZMG.
In the initial setup, player-2 is randomly assigned to a neighbor vehicle of player-1. Moreover, initial speed of all the vehicles are randomly assigned from 20 𝑚/𝑠 to 30 𝑚/𝑠. The hyperparameters of the training process are summarized in Table 6.1
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Table 6.1: TZMG training hyperparameters
Learning rate

1e-4

Q network size

Buffer 𝐷 size

2e5

Episode number

4e4

Batch size 𝑚

64

𝛾

0.99

Evaluation update steps 𝑇𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙

800

Target update steps 𝑇𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡

200

[128, 128, 128]

It is worth mentioning that, once the training process is completed, the policy of player-2
is also recovered (as Line 4 in Alg. 7) for the testing purpose in Section 6.5.

6.4

Training of the Vanilla Safe Policy
The PPO algorithm is used to train a vanilla safe policy under the conventional RL pro-

cess. The scenario is the same as the TZMG training, except that player-2 has been replaced by
another normal neighbor vehicle modeled by IDM and MOBIL. Moreover, the accumulated reward function for PPO is the same as player-1’s in Eqn. (6.1). The hyperparameters of the training
process are summarized in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: PPO training hyperparameters
learning rate
policy network size
batch size 𝑚
number of iterations

1e-4

clip value

[96, 96, 96]
256

network policy size
minimal on-policy data size

50

𝛾
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0.2
[128 128, 128]
8e4
0.99

6.5

Testing Scenarios and Results
To improve the readability, the trained policies of player-1 in TZMG, player-2 in TZMG,

and PPO are denoted as 𝜋𝑇 , 𝜇𝑇 , and 𝜋 𝑃 , respectively. Specifically, to formulate the state of the
𝜋𝑇 , player-2 needs to be identified. The identification of player-2 might not always be available
in the driving task. Without the identification of player-2, another policy is devised based on
𝜋𝑇 , which will directly identify the nearest neighbor vehicle as the “player-2” and formulate the
corresponding states. This devised policy is denoted as 𝜋 𝐷 . Three tests are conducted in order to
compare the performance of the 𝜋 𝐷 , 𝜋𝑇 , and 𝜋 𝑃 if available. The details and results are shown in
the following paragraphs.

6.5.1

Test-1: interactions with normal neighbors
The 𝜋 𝑃 and 𝜋 𝐷 are tested in the scenario described in Section 6.4, where the subject car

is controlled by either 𝜋 𝑃 or 𝜋 𝐷 , all the surrounding vehicles are modeled by IDM and MOBIL.
For each driving policy, the total number of test episodes is 1,000, with a the maximum length of
10 secs for each episode. The results of survival time ratio, i.e., length of average episode length
versus maximum length, and the episode collision ratio, i.e., the number of episodes ended with
collision versus the total number of episodes, are reported in Fig. 6.2.
As can be seen, interacting with the model-based surrounding vehicles is not challenging
for either policy. The performance of 𝜋 𝑃 is better than 𝜋 𝐷 , which is considered reasonable as 𝜋 𝑃
is trained to achieve the best performance in this scenario, and 𝜋 𝐷 might overreact by assuming
the worst intention of the nearest neighbor vehicle.

6.5.2

Test-2: interactions with 𝜇𝑇 as player-2
The 𝜋 𝑃 , 𝜋 𝐷 , and 𝜋𝑇 are tested in the scenario described in Section 6.4. Compared to the

test scenario in Test-1, 𝜇𝑇 will randomly replace one of the neighbor vehicles modeled by IDM and
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.2: Interaction results with normal neighbors
MOBIL. Intuitively, interact with the subject driving vehicle as an aggressive/dangerous driver.
The total number of test episodes is 1,000, with a maximum length of 10 secs for each episode.
The results of the survival time ratio and the episode collision ratio are reported in Fig. 6.3

(a)

(b)

Figure 6.3: Interactions with with 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦 2 as player-2
As can be seen, the performance of 𝜋 𝑃 is much worse than the other two policies trained
by the TZMG algorithm, especially in the sense of collision ratio. Half of the test episodes just
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ended with a collision. It is reasonable as the PPO has never interacted with the aggressive neighbor vehicles in the training process. It is unrealistic to expect it behaves decently in this scenario.
Moreover, as 𝜋𝑇 knew the player-2’s identification, this extra information contributes fewer collisions than 𝜋 𝐷 .

6.5.3

Test-3: interactions with the human participant as player-2
To further valid the performance of 𝜋 𝑃 , 𝜋 𝐷 , and 𝜋𝑇 in the uncertainties introduced by

the real human driver, a human in-the-loop experiment is conducted. Different from the Test-2
scenario, the human participant played as an aggressive neighbor and interact with the subject
autonomous vehicle. Five engineering graduate students from Clemson University has been invited to participate this experiment. To render the most destructive behavior from the human
driver in the sense of safety, the participants were asked to try their best to collide with the subject
autonomous vehicle.
Each participant need to interact with all the three driving policies in a random sequence.
For each policy, the total number of test episodes is 100, with a maximum length of 10 secs for
each episode. The results of survival time ratio and the episode collision ratio are reported in
Fig. 6.4.
As can be seen, similar to the result from Test-2, the performance of 𝜋 𝑃 is still much
worse than 𝜋 𝐷 and 𝜋𝑇 . Furthermore, compared to the results from Test-2, the performance gap
between policy trained from PPO and policy trained from the TZMG algorithm is further exaggerated. This result justifies that, while training in the simulated environment, the TZMG
algorithm can produce a safer driving policy (with few collisions) than the vanilla RL approach
under the uncertainties of real manual driving vehicles.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 6.4: Interactions with human as player-2 (average and stddev)
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Chapter 7
Summary
In this dissertation, being aware of the existence of the human, different autonomous algorithms have been proposed with respect to the different roles of the human. First of all, manualdriving neighbor cars can be considered a significant source of disturbances for autonomous driving algorithms. As a result, manual driving cars make it infeasible to have the mixed traffic platoon satisfy the conventional string stability. To fill this research gap, in Chapter 2, a novel mixed
traffic string stability is defined with a relaxed requirement on the velocity fluctuation under the
guarantee of safety. The corresponding theorems and lemmas offer guidance on designing the
autonomous controller and managing the platoon to satisfy the mixed traffic string stability. Secondly, considering a passenger vehicle, humans will still be in the car as riders, even when the autonomous driving algorithm takes the driving duty. To enhance the riding experience, in Chapter 3, a human-centered CACC controller is proposed with the consideration of both physical
comfort and psychological comfort. Thirdly, the human operator can help the connected and
autonomous driving systems under emergencies and uncertainties as a supervisor. In Chapter 4,
an HRI framework is proposed to facilitate human supervision of the autonomous vehicle team
under cyber attacks. Fourthly, as an expert, the experienced driver can teach the autonomous
system to drive safely. Correspondingly, in Chapter 5, a novel safety-aware imitation learning al127

gorithm is proposed, where the safety awareness is enforced by the safety critic-based integration
and regulation. Finally, being aware that the vanilla simulation-based RL method cannot accommodate adversaries introduced by the neighbor vehicle, a TZMG-based learning algorithm
is adopted to deal with this issue and train a better safe driving policy in Chapter 6. In a zero-sum
game setup, the simultaneously-trained second player can always push the safe driving policy to
accommodate the the most destructive behavior of the neighbor vehicle.

7.1

Contributions
The contributions of this dissertation are summarized as follows.
In Chapter 2, the mixed traffic string stability has been defined in order to accommodate

the existence of the manual driving vehicles in the platoon. Correspondingly, Theorem 1 has been
proposed to check whether a mixed traffic platoon is a mixed-traffic string stable or not. Furthermore, in the following Proposition 1, it is rigorously proved that the mixed traffic string stability
can be achieved by the better design of the autonomous driving controller, the arrangement of
the manual driving cars’ sequences, and injecting more autonomous driving cars. The above theoretical results can be used to guide the autonomous driving controller designs in mixed traffic.
In Theorem 2, it is shown that mixed traffic string stability can be guaranteed by adjusting the
time headway of CACC cars or inserting an additional CACC car between the string unstable
car and the leading car.
In Chapter 3, an MPC-like blending ratio controller is proposed to balance the trade-offs
among CACC’s traffic efficiency, fuel economy, physical comfort, and psychological comfort. As
a major novelty, human perception thresholds in the AP model are used to quantify the psychological comfort of the human rider. The proposed MPC-like controller can push more driving
states within the unconscious regime. As a result, the human rider will be less stimulated and
more comfortable psychologically. Moreover, the mixed string stability in Chapter 2 is also con128

sidered here as constraints in the optimal control problem.
In Chapter 4, to deal with the cyber-attack on the CAV platoon, an unknown-observer
(UIO) based resilient controller is designed. The safety conditions of the platoon have been rigorously proved in the Theorem. It has been shown that safety cannot be guaranteed if the cyber
attack value is beyond a specific threshold calculated in Theorem 3, which justifies the necessity
of human supervision in the loop. Moreover, a trust-based information management system is
designed to recover the true information from the collection of corrupted one. The performance
of the information management system has also been formally proved in Theorem 4. Finally, a
human subject test has been conducted to verify the effectiveness of this proposed HRI. Compared to the benchmark, the proposed HRI can greatly improve the platoon’s survivability and
reduce the human workload.
In Chapter 5, a safety-aware inverse reinforcement learning algorithm is proposed, outperforming the benchmark AIRL. The CBF is first used to guide the training process of the safety
critic network, which predicts the collision probability of the subject vehicle given the current
state and action pair. Incorporating the model knowledge in CBF can avoid an additional guiding policy in the conventional safety critic training process. Moreover, the feasible state-action
pairs can be explored more sufficiently without a specific guiding policy. The trained safety critic
network is then integrated with the discriminator network to take account of the safety feature.
Finally, the safety critic regulates the training process of IRL to discourage risky state-action pairs.
Compared to the state-of-art safe learning algorithms, which builds supervisory controller and
override unsafe actions, this work explored a new approach to improve safety, i.e., directly injecting safety awareness into the learning process.
In Chapter 6, a TZMG problem is formulated to train a safe driving algorithm that can
accommodate the most destructive behavior of the neighbor vehicle. The human-in-the-loop experiment is designed and conducted to compare the safe driving policy training in a TZMG-based
algorithm and the vanilla RL algorithm. It has been demonstrated that, in facing the adversaries
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from the real human driver, the policy trained from TZMG formulation has much better performance in reducing the collision rate.

7.2

Limitations and Recommendation for Further Research
For the mixed traffic string stability proposed in Chapter 2, there are two limitations.

First of all, the definitions and theorems are based on linear modeling of the systems. To accommodate nonlinear dynamics, linearization techniques might be required. However, this will be
no guarantee that the property of the string stability still holds even if the linearized dynamics
satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1. Second, in the analysis of the manual driving cars, the driver
models are used. Although the driver models can be used to represent nominal human driving
behaviors, it is still very challenging to reproduce unexpected manual driving behaviors. In other
words, the mixed traffic string stability might not be feasible enough to accommodate unexpected
manual driving behaviors. As a tentative research direction, the string stability for the nonlinear
platoon dynamics considering communication delay and other imperfections can be very exciting. Moreover, although unexpected manual driving car behavior is hard to model, it might be
easier to find the boundaries of manual-driving vehicle behaviors. Using the above boundaries to
formulate the string stability conditions can be another intriguing research direction.
For the MPC-like controller proposed in Chapter 3, the hyperparameters of the AP model
in the literature [102] are directly used without considering the customization of different human
riders. As tentative further research, a human subject test can be conducted to verify the effectiveness of the controller. For each human participant, the AP model is calibrated based on his/her
driving style. Compared to the conventional CACC, the experiment in future work is expected
to show that the psychological comfort of the human participants with our MPC-like controller
has a higher level of psychological comfort based on questionnaires or other metrics, such as brain
activities from Electroencephalography (EEG) signals.
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For the HRI framework proposed in Chapter 4, we assumed that human operators can
always help the autonomous vehicle under adversaries. However, the human operator might
still make mistakes in this situation. As a result, how to build a more intelligent HRI that can
anticipate human performance and hence decide which information to be presented to humans
can be a fascinating future research direction.
For the safety-aware IRL research in Chapter 5, the safety awareness of the algorithm is
improved compared to the conventional IRL algorithm. However, as shown in the highwaydriving case study, although the collision rate is low, the collision scenario still cannot be entirely
removed by the proposed safety-aware IRL research. As a future research direction, it can be
exciting to see how to rigorously guarantee the learned policy’s safety, even under some assumptions.
For the TZMG-based safe driving research in Chapter 6, although multiple neighbor
vehicles are considered in the TZMG formulation, only one of them is controlled by player-2
and has aggressive behaviors. In the extreme safety-critical situation, multiple neighbor vehicles
might be aggressive, which can not be handled by the current TZMG setup and the network
algorithm adopted. As a result, how to extend this TZMG framework accommodates multiple
aggressive vehicles can be an exciting future research direction.
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Appendix A

Dynamics of the Augmented System

y¤̂ 𝑖 = C𝑖 x¤̂ 𝑖 = C𝑖 (¤z𝑖 + P𝑖 y¤ 𝑖 ) = C𝑖 F𝑖 z𝑖 + C𝑖 T𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + C𝑖 K𝑖 C𝑖 x𝑖
+ C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 A𝑖 x𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 E𝑖 Φ𝑖
Φ̂𝑖 = (C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † (C𝑖 F𝑖 z𝑖 + C𝑖 T𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + C𝑖 K𝑖 C𝑖 x𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 A𝑖 x𝑖
+ C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 E𝑖 Φ𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 z𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 x𝑖 − C𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 )
= (C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † ((C𝑖 F𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 )z𝑖 + (C𝑖 T𝑖 B𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 B𝑖 − C𝑖 B𝑖 )𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
+ (C𝑖 K𝑖 C𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 A𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 )x𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 E𝑖 Φ𝑖 )
𝜁ˆ = Φ̂𝑖 (2)

Including Eqns. (4.5) (4.7) (4.8), we can have the following differential equations:
𝑟𝑒𝑠
¤ 𝑖 = Θ𝑖𝑎 (2, :)x𝑖 + Θ𝑖𝑏 (2, :)z𝑖 + Θ𝑖𝑐 (2, :)𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + Θ𝑖𝑑 𝑎 𝑖−1 + Θ𝑖𝑒 𝜁𝑖
x¤ 𝑖 = A𝑖 x𝑖 + B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + E𝑖 (:, 1)𝑎 𝑖−1 + E𝑖 (:, 2)𝜁𝑖
z¤ 𝑖 = F𝑖 z𝑖 + T𝑖 B𝑖 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + K𝑖 C𝑖 x𝑖
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where,
(C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † (C𝑖 K𝑖 C𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 A𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 )
;
𝜏𝑖
(C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † (C𝑖 F𝑖 − C𝑖 A𝑖 )
Θ𝑖𝑏 =
;
𝜏𝑖
(C𝑖 E𝑖 ) † (C𝑖 T𝑖 B𝑖 + C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 B𝑖 − C𝑖 B𝑖 ) − 1
Θ𝑖𝑐 =
𝜏𝑖
†
(C𝑖 E𝑖 ) C𝑖 P𝑖 C𝑖 E𝑖
Θ𝑖 =
;
𝜏𝑖

Θ𝑖𝑎 =

Θ𝑖𝑑 = Θ𝑖 (1);
Θ𝑖𝑒 = Θ𝑖 (2);

The corresponding state-space form is,

 x¤ 𝑖


 z¤
 𝑖


 𝑟𝑒𝑠
¤ 𝑖


 

  A𝑖
0
B𝑖   x𝑖
 
 

= KC
F𝑖
T𝑖 B𝑖   z𝑖
𝑖 𝑖
 

 
  𝑎

  Θ𝑖 (2, :) Θ𝑖𝑏 (2, :) Θ𝑖𝑐 (2, :)   𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖
 

|
{z
}
A𝑎,𝑖 ∈R9×9
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  E(:, 1) 
 E(:, 2) 
 



 



 +  0  𝑎 𝑖−1 +  0  𝜁𝑖
 






 
 



  Θ𝑖𝑑 
 Θ𝑖𝑒 
 



| {z }
| {z }
B𝑎,𝑖 ∈R9×1

E𝑎,𝑖 ∈R9×1

Appendix B

Proof of Lemma 1

Proof As the cyber attack item 𝜁𝑖 = 0, we can further simplify Eqn. (4.13) to x¤ 𝑖𝑠 = A𝑠,𝑖 x𝑖𝑠 +
B𝑠,𝑖 𝑎𝑖−1 + J𝑠,𝑖 𝑣 𝑖−1 . By setting

 -𝜆 1


 0

1
𝐾𝑖 = 
 0



 0



0 

-𝜆 2 0 0 
,
0 -𝜆 3 1 


0 0 -𝜆 4 

1

-1

where 𝜆 1 , 𝜆2 , 𝜆 3 , and 𝜆4 < 0. the corresponding eigenvalues of A𝑠,𝑖 become

(1)

√

2
−1 −1 −𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 ± 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 −4𝑘 𝑝,𝑖
,
,
,
∗
ℎ𝑖 𝜏𝑖
2

𝜆1 , 𝜆 2 , 𝜆 3 , 𝜆 4 . Based on the assumption that ℎ𝑖∗ , 𝑘 𝑝,𝑖 , and 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 > 0, we can show that the real
parts of the eigenvalues are negative which implies asymptotic stability. Next, the velocity transfer function can be derived as 𝐺 𝑣,𝑖 ≜

𝑉𝑖 (𝑠)
𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠)

= C𝑣,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 (𝑠B𝑠,𝑖 + J𝑠,𝑖 ) =

1
1+ℎ∗𝑖 𝑠 ,

where

C𝑣,𝑖 = [0, 1, 0, . . . , 0] 𝑇 , C𝑣,𝑖 ∈ R1×8 . Finally, ∥𝐺 𝑣,𝑖 ( 𝑗𝜔)∥ ∞ = 1, which satisfy the condition of
the string stability requirement for 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 (see the Eqn. (25) in [73]).
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□

Appendix C

Proof of Lemma 2

Proof By setting the 𝐾𝑖1 as the form of Eqn. (1) the corresponding eigenvalues of A∗𝑎,𝑖
√ 2
−1 −1 −𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 ± 𝑘 𝑑,𝑖 −4𝑘 𝑝,𝑖
become ℎ∗ , 𝜏𝑖 ,
, 𝜆 1 , 𝜆2 , 𝜆 3 , 𝜆 4 . Based on condition (a), we can show that the real
2
𝑖

parts of the eigenvalues are negative which implies asymptotic stability and hence bounded-inputbounded-output (BIBO) stability. Based on conditions (b) and (d), the inputs to the system are
bounded. Hence, x𝑖∗ (𝑡) is bounded.

□
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Appendix D

Proof of Proposition 2

Proof We first show that ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞ , ∀1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑁, calculated based on Eqn. (4.22)
is actually the overestimation of ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡)−𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ , i.e., ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡)−𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡)−𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ , ∀1 ≤
𝑖 < 𝑁. We prove this by induction.
The base case is established as follows. When 𝑖 = 1, based on Eqn. (4.22), it automatically
holds that, ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 1 (0)∥ ∞ .
Next, as the inductive step, we show that, if ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ ,
then ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ , 2 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑁. Starting from the reference dynamics (4.15), as only the reference velocity is of interest to derive the overestimation of ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) −
𝑠 . The corresponding input-output
𝑣 𝑖 (0) ∥ ∞ , the output equation can be set as 𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 = C𝑣,𝑖 x𝑟,𝑖

transfer function, from 𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠) to 𝑉𝑖 (𝑠), is 𝐺 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑠) =

𝑉𝑟 ,𝑖 (𝑠)
𝑉𝑖−1 (𝑠)

= C𝑣,𝑖 (𝑠I − A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 (𝑠B𝑠,𝑖 + J𝑠,𝑖 ).

Based on the Input-Output theorem [91], we have

∥𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ .

(2)

𝑠 = x𝑠 −x𝑠 , can be updated as x
𝑠 = A x𝑠 +E 𝜁 . Similarly, since only the
The error states, x𝑒,𝑖
¤ 𝑒,𝑖
𝑠,𝑖 𝑒,𝑖
𝑠,𝑖 𝑖
𝑖
𝑟,𝑖
𝑠 .
velocity error, 𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 = 𝑣 𝑖 − 𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 , is of interest, the output equation can be written as 𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 = C𝑣,𝑖 x𝑒,𝑖

The corresponding transfer function is 𝐺 𝑞,𝑖 (𝑠) =

𝑉𝑒,𝑖 (𝑠)
Z𝑖 (𝑠)

= C𝑣,𝑖 (𝑠I−A𝑠,𝑖 ) −1 E𝑠,𝑖 . Based on Input-

Output theorem [91], when the above error dynamics reach the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0, we have

∥𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔𝑞,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝜁𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ .

(3)

When (4.13) reaches equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 under the condition 𝜁𝑖 (0) = 0, the error state reaches
zero equilibrium, i.e., 𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (0) = 0. Eqn. (3) can then be rewritten as

∥𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑔𝑞,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞ .
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(4)

Since (4.13) reaches the equilibrium at 𝑡 = 0 under the condition 𝜁𝑖 (0) = 0, we also have 𝑣 𝑖 (0) =
𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (0). We then have ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ = ∥𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) + 𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ ≤ ∥𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑟,𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ +
∥𝑣 𝑒,𝑖 (𝑡) ∥ ∞ , substituting Eqns. (2) and (4), we can finally get the inequality to show as follows
∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞
≤ ∥𝑔 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ ∞ + ∥𝑔𝑞,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞
≤ ∥𝑔 𝑝,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ + ∥𝑔𝑞,𝑖 (𝑡)∥ 1 ∥𝜁𝑖 (𝑡)∥ ∞
= ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞
where the second inequality is based on the assumption that ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖−1 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 𝑖−1 (𝑡) −
𝑣 𝑖−1 (0) ∥ ∞ , and the next equation is directly based on Eqn. (4.22). As a result, the inductive step
is also established. Since both the base case and inductive step are proved to be true, based on
the mathematical induction, the condition ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞ ≥ ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ ∞ holds for all
1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑁.
As the overestimation ∥𝑣 𝑖 (𝑡) − 𝑣 𝑖 (0)∥ +∞ has been proved above, it is then trivial to show
that the safety conditions in (4.14) holds for all the following 𝑈𝐺𝑉𝑖 , 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, if the inequalities
in (4.21) are satisfied for all the following vehicles. As a result, the safety of the whole platoon can
be guaranteed.

□
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The low-level controllers used in the Highway-env simulator [54]
A.1. Velocity controller
The velocity controller is as follows:

𝑎 𝑒 = 𝐾1 · (𝑣 𝑟 − 𝑣 𝑒 ),

(5)

where 𝑎 𝑒 is the acceleration command of the ego car, 𝐾1 is the proportional controller gain, 𝑣 𝑒
is the velocity of the ego car, and 𝑣 𝑟 is the desired velocity. The desired velocity 𝑣 𝑟 is calculated
from Alg. 8.

A.2. Steering controller
The steering controller used in Highway-env is:

𝑦

𝑣 𝑟 = −𝐾2 · Δ𝑙𝑎𝑡

(6)


𝜓𝑟 = 𝜓 𝐿 + arcsin

𝑦

𝑣𝑟
𝑣𝑒

𝜓¤ 𝑟 = 𝐾3 · (𝜓𝑟 − 𝜓 𝑒 )


𝑙𝑟 𝑙𝑟 ¤
𝛿 𝑒 = arcsin
𝜓𝑟
𝑙𝑟 + 𝑙 𝑓 𝑣 𝑒

(7)
(8)
(9)

where Δ𝑙𝑎𝑡 is the lateral position of the ego vehicle with respect to the centerline of the desired
lane. The desired lane index, denoted as des lane id, can be obtained in Alg. 9. 𝐾2 is the
𝑦

corresponding proportional controller gain. 𝑣 𝑟 is the desired lateral velocity command. 𝜓𝑟 is the
desired heading angle, which consists of the lane heading at a look ahead position, i.e., 𝜓 𝐿 , and
the heading change imposed by desired lateral velocity. 𝜓¤ 𝑟 is the yaw rate command. 𝜓 𝑒 is the
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heading angle of the ego car. 𝐾3 is the corresponding proportional controller gain. 𝛿 𝑒 is the front
wheel steering angle of the ego car. 𝑙 𝑓 and 𝑙𝑟 are the distance from the car center of gravity to the
front and rear axles, respectively.

A.3. Desired velocity generator
The desired velocity generator converts the action faster and slower to the desired
velocity 𝑣 𝑟 . The process is summarized in Alg. 8.
Algorithm 8 Desired velocity generator
Hyperparameters: The minimum desired velocity vel min; The maximum desired velocity, vel max; The number of desired velocity levels, vel count
Input: The current velocity 𝑣; The actions, i.e., faster and slower
Output:The desired velocity 𝑣 𝑟
vel min
1: vel level = vel𝑣−
max−vel min · (vel count − 1) ←Find the speed level of the current
speed 𝑣
2: If faster Do:
3:
vel level=min(vel level + 1, vel count − 1)
4: Else If slower Do:
5:
vel level=max(vel level − 1, 0)
6: End
max−vel min
· vel level
7: 𝑣 𝑟 = vel min + velvel
count−1

A.4. Desired lane index generator
The mid-level lateral controller will convert the action left and right to the desired lane index,
which is summarized in Alg. 9.

140

Algorithm 9 Desired lane index generator
Input: The current lane index, 𝐿 id ; The desired lane index, des lane id. The action, i.e.,
left and right;
Output: The desired lane index (updated), des lane id
1: If left Do:
2:
des lane id∗ = max (des lane id − 1, 0)
3:
If |des lane id∗ − 𝐿 id | < 2 Do:
4:
des lane id = des lane id∗
5:
End
6: Else If right Do:
7:
des lane id∗ = min (des lane id + 1, 3)
8:
If |des lane id∗ − 𝐿 id | < 2 Do:
9:
des lane id = des lane id∗
10:
End
11: End
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